Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc.

Decision Date27 June 1985
Docket NumberNo. 8012,8012
PartiesFrancis SANCHEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOLYCORP, INC., a Self-Insured Employer, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico
OPINION

DONNELLY, Chief Judge.

Defendant, Molycorp, Inc., (Employer), appeals from a judgment awarding plaintiff workmen's compensation benefits for total disability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Two issues are presented on appeal: (1) claim of lack of substantial medical evidence of causal connection between the accident and plaintiff's disability; and (2) propriety of award of prejudgment interest in a workman's compensation action. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

Plaintiff was employed as a miner at Employer's molybdenum mine near Taos. On May 29, 1982, during his work shift, plaintiff slipped and fell, striking his head against a rail. Plaintiff began to experience headaches, dizziness, difficulty in functioning, and depression. During the period between the accident and the trial on February 13, 1984, plaintiff was examined by a number of physicians and psychologists, including Dr. Michael Baten, a neurologist, Drs. Robert Hillman and James Knoll, psychiatrists, and Drs. Elliott Rapoport and Joyzelle McCreary, clinical psychologists. The deposition testimony of Drs. Hillman, Knoll, Rapoport, and McCreary was presented at trial.

Following trial, the trial court adopted findings of fact and determined that plaintiff was totally disabled. The court also found that:

4. [Plaintiff as a result of his fall struck] his head against a rail and, as a natural and direct result thereof * * * suffered brain damage with a post-concussion syndrome (organic personality syndrome) accompanied by chronic and severe * * * headaches, dizziness and general difficulty in functioning, producing severe psychological reactions, including depression.

The court also found that Employer voluntarily paid plaintiff weekly installment benefits of $246.44 from August 29, 1982 through April 30, 1983, for a total of 35 weeks. Beginning May 1, 1983, Employer reduced the weekly maximum compensation installments payable to plaintiff to $24.64. The trial court further found that the reduction in the payment of compensation benefits to plaintiff was made:

solely upon the basis of a medical evaluation of impairment, according to the American Medical Association classification, to * * * [plaintiff's] labyrinthine/vestibular function, determined at 10 percent, as distinguished from an administrative evaluation of Sanchez' disability with respect to work, in a case that clearly was outside the scope of the scheduled injury section (NMSA 1978, sec. 52-1-43).

The court's findings of fact additionally provided:

17. In reducing Sanchez' weekly compensation to 10 percent of the maximum, based upon a patently erroneous application of New Mexico law, Molycorp acted solely to further its best interests * * * its conduct evinced an ostrichlike attitude of self-delusion * * *.

18. In reducing Sanchez' weekly compensation to 10 percent of the maximum beginning May 1, 1983, Molycorp acted heedlessly, unjustly and unfairly.

Predicated upon its findings, the court awarded plaintiff total permanent disability, medical benefits, and vocation rehabilitation benefits. The court concluded that the:

applicable rate of compensation [benefits] from Sanchez' injury on payments made by Molycorp from August 29, 1982 through April 30, 1983 was $246.44 weekly, the maximum compensation for disability in 1982. As a result, however, of the wrongful reduction by Molycorp, beginning May 1, 1983, the 1984 rate of compensation of $289.20 weekly applies to Sanchez, beginning May 1, 1983.

The judgment entered by the court on July 25, 1984, further specified:

Upon entry of Judgment herein, Molycorp, Inc., should pay to Sanchez all sums owing beginning May 1, 1983, to the date of entry of Judgment, at the rate of $289.20 weekly less, however, the sums heretofore paid to Sanchez for such period at the rate of $24.64 weekly. Should * * * the case of Purcella v. Navajo Freight Lines, 95 N.M. 306 (Ct.App.1980) [be overruled], and thereby reduce the applicable weekly rate of compensation to $246.44, [p]laintiff shall be allowed pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date his Complaint was served, June 8, 1983, until the date of entry of this Judgment on weekly amounts due.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Employer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that plaintiff's disability was causally connected with the accident suffered by him on May 29, 1982, when he fell and struck his head. At trial, the deposition testimony of Drs. Baten, Hillman, Knoll, Rapoport, and McCreary was tendered to the court. However, the trial court excluded the testimony of the clinical psychologists, Drs. Rapoport and McCreary, concerning causation.

Employer argues that although Dr. Baten initially testified that causation existed, he later changed his opinion based on the results of a brain stem test administered January 19, 1984. Employer also argues that Drs. Hillman and Knoll, prior to stating their medical opinions concerning causation, did not have knowledge of Dr. Baten's report or opinion concerning the January 19, 1984 brain stem test administered to plaintiff.

Drs. Hillman, Knoll, and Baten all testified that plaintiff's accident probably caused the disabling symptoms which plaintiff experienced after his accident. Specifically, Dr. Hillman testified that, in his opinion, plaintiff was "totally disabled from doing any kind of work." He also testified:

Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether Francis Sanchez has some extent of organic brain damage?

A: I believe the basis for his clinical picture is some organic dysfunction, brain damage.

Q: Do you have an opinion based on reasonable medical probability as to whether the disability of [plaintiff] is a direct and natural result of the accident of May 29, 1982, that he suffered while working for Molycorp?

A: I believe that the present clinical picture and the present diagnosis is a result of the accident in May of 1982.

Q: It's your opinion that based on reasonable medical probability that his present disability, and the disability that he suffered * * * was a direct and natural result of the accident of May 29, 1982?

A: Yes. That's my medical opinion.

Similarly, Dr. Knoll, a psychiatrist, also testified in part as follows:

Q: To a reasonable degree of medical probability, would you say that [plaintiff's] disability is a direct and natural result of that accident on May 29, 1982?

A: Yes, I think it is the direct result of his accident.

Dr. Baten further testified that plaintiff was totally unable to work as a miner, and that as a medical probability the accident suffered by plaintiff caused his disability. Employer argues that because Dr. Baten subsequently changed his opinion, Dr. Baten's opinion could not be utilized to establish causation as a medical probability.

Employer contends that the testimony of Drs. Hillman and Knoll concerning their opinion as to "causation" was speculative, not adequately explained, and failed to indicate that they considered certain pertinent medical information in arriving at their opinion. We disagree.

NMSA 1978, Evid. Rule 705 (Repl.Pamp.1983), provides:

The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.

Evidence Rule 705 does not require that an expert give all of the underlying data or facts upon which the opinion is premised unless compelled by the trial court. When a witness has been qualified as an expert in a particular field, in the absence of a ruling by the trial court requiring an expert to disclose the basis for his opinion as a prerequisite to its admission, the cross-examiner has the responsibility of eliciting material factors underlying an expert's opinion. See also Coleman v. De Minico, 730 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.1984); United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910, 103 S.Ct. 218, 74 L.Ed.2d 173 (1982); Perma Research & Development v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987, 97 S.Ct. 507, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976).

An expert's opinion is not impermissibly speculative or lacking as to a factual basis where the expert gives a satisfactory explanation as to how he arrived at his opinion. Harrison v. ICX Illinois-California Exp., Inc., 98 N.M. 247, 647 P.2d 880 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982). Cf. Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 799 (Ct.App.1983), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984). Causation exists within a reasonable medical probability when a qualified medical expert testifies as to his opinion concerning causation and, in the absence of other reasonable casual explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action. NMSA 1978, Sec. 52-1-28; Bufalino v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 N.M. 560, 650 P.2d 844 (Ct.App.1982); Lyon v. Catron County Commissioners, 81 N.M. 120, 464 P.2d 410 (Ct.App.1969), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 140, 464 P.2d 559 (1970).

Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate support for a conclusion. Montoya v. Anaconda Mining Co., 97 N.M. 1, 635 P.2d 1323 (Ct.App.1981). The testimony about causation was not speculative and constitutes substantial evidence sufficient to support the trial court's findings concerning causation. The conflicts in the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
45 cases
  • State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • May 12, 1993
    ...are not conclusive on facts in issue, and the trial court may reject expert opinion as it chooses. Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc., 103 N.M. 148, 153, 703 P.2d 925, 930 (Ct.App.1985). In particular, the expert opinions of economists, based as they are on projections, assumptions, and uncertaintie......
  • 1997 -NMCA- 4, Conoco, Inc. v. State Taxation and Revenue Dept.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • May 1, 1995
    ... ... See Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc., 103 N.M. 148, 153, 703 P.2d 925, 930 (Ct.App.1985). In this case, the hearing officer found the Department's experts' opinions to ... ...
  • In re N.M. Indirect Purchasers Microsoft
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • November 15, 2006
    ...and the appellate court will indulge in reasonable presumptions in support of the order entered."); Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc., 103 N.M. 148, 153, 703 P.2d 925, 930 (Ct.App. 1985) ("[T]he opinions of an expert even where uncontradicted, are not conclusive on facts in issue and the fact[-]fin......
  • Molinar v. Larry Reetz Constr., Ltd.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • August 17, 2017
    ...it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action." Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc. , 1985-NMCA-067, ¶ 16, 103 N.M. 148, 703 P.2d 925. "[O]nce [a worker] establishe[s] that the accidental injury caused disability, it matters not whether a pre[ ]existing condition contribu......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT