Sanchez v. Office of the State Superintendent of Educ.

• Decision Date: 12 August 2022
• Docket Number: 21-7014
• Citation: 45 F.4th 388
• Parties: Altagracia SANCHEZ, et al., Appellants v. OFFICE OF the STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION and District of Columbia, Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

45 F.4th 388

Altagracia SANCHEZ, et al., Appellants

v.OFFICE OF the STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION and District of Columbia, Appellees

No. 21-7014

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued November 12, 2021

Decided August 12, 2022

Renée Flaherty argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs was Robert J. McNamara.

Adam J. Tuetken, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, and Graham E. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General.

Before: Srinivasan, Chief Judge, Katsas, Circuit Judge, and Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge.

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge Randolph.

Srinivasan, Chief Judge:

The District of Columbia's Office of the State Superintendent of Education regulates childcare facilities, including by setting minimum qualifications for their workers. In 2016, OSSE issued a rule requiring many childcare workers to obtain an associate's degree or its equivalent in a field related to early-childhood education. Two childcare workers and a parent filed this lawsuit to challenge the new college requirements. They allege violations of their substantive due process and equal protection rights, as well as of the nondelegation doctrine.

The district court initially dismissed plaintiffs' claims as unripe and moot. In a prior appeal, we found the case justiciable and reversed. On remand, the district court again dismissed, this time on the merits. In rejecting plaintiffs' substantive due process and equal protection claims, the court concluded that the college requirements are rational, including in the distinctions they draw between different classes of daycare workers. And in rejecting plaintiffs' nondelegation doctrine claim, the court held that the statute granting regulatory authority to OSSE bears an intelligible principle to guide the agency's work. We agree with the district court and affirm its judgment.

I.

We explained the background of this case in our prior opinion. Sanchez v. OSSE , 959 F.3d 1121, 1123–24 (D.C. Cir. 2020). We expand on that discussion here as relevant to the present appeal. Because the district court resolved the case at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we accept as true the facts pleaded in plaintiffs' complaint. Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

A.

The D.C. Council enacted the Child Development Facilities Regulation Act of 1998 to modernize the city's licensing regime for childcare providers. See D.C. Law 12-215, 46 D.C. Reg. 274 (Apr. 13, 1999) (codified as amended at D.C. Code § 7-2031 et seq. ). The Facilities Act applies to "[c]hild development facilit[ies]," which it defines as any "center, home, or other structure that provides care and other services, supervision, and guidance for children, infants, and toddlers on a regular basis, regardless of its designated name." D.C. Code § 7-2031(3). Rather than setting any specific standards in the statute, the D.C. Council directed the mayor to "promulgate all rules necessary" to establish "[m]inimum standards of operation of a child development facility concerning staff qualification, requirements and training," among other subjects. Id. § 7-2036(a)(1)(A). The mayor has delegated that authority to OSSE. See Mayor's Order 2009-130, 56 D.C. Reg. 6883 (Aug. 21, 2009).

In 2016, OSSE issued new childcare regulations intended to "ensure that care provided in a licensed Child Development Facility is not only safe, but also supports children's healthy development and future academic achievement and success." 63 D.C. Reg. 11,279, 11,279 (Sept. 9, 2016). Those regulations institute new minimum education requirements for certain classes of childcare workers. Broadly speaking, the regulations require many such workers to obtain an associate's degree or its equivalent in a field related to early-childhood education.

The specific requirements vary depending on where a childcare provider works. First, the regulations cover "expanded child development home[s]," which are private residences where two or more caregivers are responsible for up to twelve children. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-A, § 199. Caregivers in those facilities must obtain at least an associate's degree "with a major in early childhood education, early childhood development, child and family studies or a closely related field." Id. § 170.2(a)(1). The regulations also apply to teachers in "child development centers," which are childcare facilities serving more than twelve children outside the operator's home. Id. § 199. Teachers in those centers may comply with the regulations in either of two ways. Like expanded-home daycare workers, they may obtain an associate's degree in an early-childhood field. Id. § 165.1(a). If they already have a college degree in another field, they may instead complete at least twenty-four credit hours in subjects related to early-childhood education. Id. § 165.1(b).

Facilities may seek two types of waivers from the new college requirements. First, OSSE may grant experience waivers to qualified teachers who had worked in the same position continuously for the ten years preceding the rulemaking (from 2006 to 2016). Id. § 165.4. Second, OSSE may grant hardship waivers if the "demonstrated immediate economic impact or hardship on the [f]acility or staff member is sufficiently great to make immediate compliance impractical despite diligent efforts," so long as the facility or staff member meets or exceeds "the intent of the regulation for which the waiver is requested" and the welfare of children is not jeopardized. Id. § 106.1. The decision whether to grant a waiver is committed to OSSE's discretion. Id. §§ 106.5, 165.4.

B.

Plaintiff Altagracia Sanchez immigrated to the United States from the Dominican Republic and provides daycare services in her home. Sanchez employs two assistant caregivers and is licensed to care for up to nine children. She has a law degree from a university in the Dominican Republic but has not attended college in this country. Under the regulations, she is classified as an "expanded home caregiver," so she must obtain an associate's degree in an early-childhood field. Id. § 170.2(a)(1).

Plaintiff Dale Sorcher is a teacher at a preschool. The preschool serves children ages zero to three and is licensed as a "child development center." Sorcher has three college degrees, but none of them is in an early-childhood field. To comply with the regulations, then, she must either obtain a degree in an early-childhood field or complete twenty-four credit hours in subjects related to early-childhood education. Id. § 165.1(a)–(b).

Sanchez and Sorcher, along with Jill Homan, a parent with two children in daycare, filed this lawsuit against OSSE to challenge the college requirements. They allege that the regulations infringe their substantive due process and equal protection rights and also violate the nondelegation doctrine. Sanchez and Sorcher argue that they can effectively care for children without going back to school, such that taking expensive college classes would serve no purpose. Enrolling in an associate's degree program would be especially difficult for Sanchez, given her limited English proficiency and the competing time demands of running her small business. Homan posits that the college requirements will increase the costs of daycare while forcing some of her children's favorite teachers either to provide worse care while going back to school part-time or to quit their jobs entirely because they lack the time and money required to earn an associate's degree.

The district court initially dismissed plaintiffs' suit on threshold justiciability grounds, but we reversed and remanded for the court to consider the merits of plaintiffs' challenges. Sanchez , 959 F.3d at 1124–26. On remand, OSSE moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims on the merits. The district court granted the motion in a thoroughly reasoned opinion. Sanchez v. OSSE , 513 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2021).

The court held that plaintiffs had failed to state a viable claim on any of their three legal theories. As to plaintiffs' due process and equal protection claims, the court concluded that the regulations were subject to only rational-basis review and met that forgiving standard. Id. at 111–16.

And as for plaintiffs' claim under the nondelegation doctrine, the court held that the Facilities Act satisfied the doctrine by adequately guiding OSSE's regulatory discretion. Id. at 108–11. Plaintiffs now bring this second appeal.

II.

We review the district court's dismissal of the complaint de novo. W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Zinke , 892 F.3d 1234, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

A.

We first consider plaintiffs' due process and equal protection claims. Before addressing whether OSSE had a rational basis for issuing the challenged regulations for purposes of both of those claims, we first resolve a dispute about the applicable legal standard.

1.

The parties agree that plaintiffs' due process and equal protection claims are subject to rational-basis review. Plaintiffs first contend the college requirements "do[ ] absolutely nothing " to further any legitimate government interest, in violation of substantive due process. Sanchez Br. 40. Because the challenged requirements implicate no fundamental rights, they are reviewed only for a rational basis. Heller v. Doe , 509 U.S. 312, 319–20, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) ; Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach , 495 F.3d 695, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). Plaintiffs further allege that the college requirements draw irrational distinctions between different classes of childcare workers, in violation of their rights to equal protection. Because the challenged classifications "neither proceed[...