Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 02 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-1171,94-1171
• Citation: 37 F.3d 712
• Parties: 66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 148 Jose L. SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. PUERTO RICO OIL COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 712

37 F.3d 712

66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 148

Jose L. SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. PUERTO RICO OIL COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 94-1171.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Aug. 2, 1994.

Decided Sept. 29, 1994.

Enrique Velez-Rodriguez, with whom Lespier & Munoz-Noya, San Juan, PR, was on brief, for appellant.

Federico Lora Lopez, Hato Rey, PR, for appellee.

Before SELYA, BOUDIN and STAHL, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

This is a ghost ship of an appeal. One hears the creak of the rigging, the groan of the timber, and the muted sound of voices through the fog--but there is nothing solid to be grasped. In the end the appeal, like the ghost ship, vanishes into the mist, leaving things exactly as they were. The tale follows.

I. AN OVERVIEW

Plaintiff-appellee Jose L. Sanchez sued defendant-appellant Puerto Rico Oil Company (Proico) asserting that the company constructively discharged him due to his advanced age. A jury agreed; it found that Proico had willfully violated both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-634 (1988) (ADEA), and a Puerto Rico statute proscribing employment discrimination, P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 29, Sec. 146 (Supp.1989) (Law 100). The jury awarded Sanchez $40,376.80 in backpay under ADEA and $150,000 for mental and moral suffering under Law 100. ¹ Proico moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), or for a new trial, Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). The district court reduced the damage awards to $38,000 for backpay and $37,500 for suffering, but otherwise gave Proico cold gruel. The court then doubled the reduced awards, bringing Proico's aggregate liability to $151,000. This appeal ensued.

Although appellant aggressively advances an armada of artful arguments, only five are worthy of extended comment. ² These include four evidence-oriented propositions, namely, that the evidence (1) failed to establish a prima facie case, (2) did not warrant a finding of liability on the ADEA count, (3) fell short of showing willfulness, and (4) did not warrant a finding that plaintiff sustained non-economic damages in the amount awarded under Law 100. Appellant's final claim is that the lower court erred in doubling the two awards.

Because these importunings do not withstand close perscrutation, we affirm the judgment below.

II. THE ADEA CLAIM

Since the first three components of appellant's asseverational array challenge the adequacy of the evidence in respect to various aspects of plaintiff's ADEA claim, we treat them in the ensemble.

A. Standards of Review.

The standards of review that appertain to a trial court's denial of the usual post-trial motions in civil cases are firmly settled. With respect to a motion for judgment n.o.v., now known as judgment as a matter of law, the court of appeals must examine the evidence and the inferences reasonably to be extracted therefrom in the light most hospitable to the nonmovant, and may reverse the denial of such a motion only if reasonable persons could not have reached the conclusion that the jury embraced. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1987). In performing this tamisage, "we may not consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence." Id.

Appellate review of a district court's disposition of a Rule 59(a) motion is even more circumscribed; a district court may set aside a jury's verdict and order a new trial only if the verdict is against the demonstrable weight of the credible evidence or results in a blatant miscarriage of justice. See Coffran v. Hitchock Clinic, Inc., 683 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 571, 74 L.Ed.2d 933 (1982). And, moreover, a trial judge's refusal to disturb a jury verdict is further insulated because it can be reversed solely for abuse of discretion. See Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir.1988); Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir.1988).

Mindful of the high hurdles that obstruct appellant's path, we evaluate the evidence referable to the ADEA count with an eye toward determining whether it can support only one outcome, or, if not, whether it is so one-sided that the trial court's failure to defenestrate the verdict constituted an abuse of discretion. If neither of these conditions obtain, we cannot disturb the lower court's disposition of appellant's post-trial motions.

B. The Proof.

Plaintiff worked for appellant in various capacities for approximately two decades. During the first 18 years, he performed satisfactorily, spending most of his time maintaining the company's inventory system. In 1988, appellant reassigned plaintiff, then 67 years old, to man a sales counter at appellant's place of business in San Juan. Plaintiff concedes that this reclassification reflected a legitimate change in business conditions.

Though the evidence is largely disputed from this point forward, plaintiff contends, and the jury could warrantably have found, that he continued to perform his duties ably. ³ In May of 1990, however, managerial changes occurred. Manuel Catinchi became the company's executive vice-president. Plaintiff asserts that Catinchi soon embarked on a course of age-animated harassment. The pot began to boil when Catinchi summoned plaintiff on July 5 and August 1, and criticized his job performance. A jury reasonably could have concluded from all the evidence that Catinchi had an ulterior motive in calling the meetings; contrary to Catinchi's testimony that the sessions were sparked by customer complaints that had been reported to Soto and relayed by him to Catinchi, Soto denied having received any such complaints. In fact, Soto testified, he had never spoken with Catinchi concerning plaintiff's job performance. Soto added that plaintiff's work was exemplary.

On August 23, 1990, Catinchi wrote to plaintiff informing him that he was being "promoted" to head a new office in Aguadilla, effective September 1. Appellant asserts that this promotion demonstrates its lack of animosity toward Sanchez. But a jury feasibly could have viewed the employment decision in a more sinister light; after all, Aguadilla is located in the westernmost part of Puerto Rico, a three-hour drive from plaintiff's home; and at any rate, management knew that plaintiff did not own a car and that his wife suffered from a disability that made it unwise (if not impossible) for him to spend additional time away from home. The company did not offer to relocate plaintiff or to furnish him transportation, and the modest pay increase that was to accompany the promotion was not enough to defray the costs associated with commuting. ⁴

The record is tenebrous as to whether appellant presented the promotion to plaintiff as obligatory or optional. For present purposes, we do not think it matters, for, on August 29, plaintiff wrote to Catinchi declining reassignment. His letter stated that he had "reached the conclusion that all this has a name and a purpose: harassment and age discrimination to force me to resign...." The company neither responded to this missive nor opened an office in Aguadilla. Meanwhile, plaintiff continued on the job.

On September 18, 1990, plaintiff toppled from a ladder while at work. He reported to the State Insurance Fund (SIF) to receive treatment for the injuries sustained. He refrained from working for several weeks on doctor's orders. On November 9, the SIF authorized plaintiff to resume employment. When he reported for duty, however, Gonzalez refused to reinstate him. A conversation ensued, during which Gonzalez asked plaintiff his age and then counseled him to collect his pension rather than to "screw" himself by returning to work. Appellant disputed plaintiff's version of this conversation, suggesting that any remarks by Gonzalez were motivated solely by a concern for plaintiff's health and physical condition.

Having been shut out of the workplace, plaintiff repaired to the SIF. A functionary there told him that he needed a letter from his employer as to why he had not been allowed to reclaim his job. Plaintiff went to appellant's place of business on Monday, November 12, and again requested reinstatement. His entreaty fell on deaf ears. He then asked for an explanatory letter, and was told to return some other time since it was a firm holiday and only a skeleton staff was on hand.

Plaintiff reappeared later the same week, bearing a letter he himself had composed. The letter stated that appellant had "ordered" him to return to the SIF. When he sought to have Gonzalez sign the letter, Gonzalez's secretary told him to retype it, substituting "suggested" for "ordered." Plaintiff complied, but Gonzalez still refused to sign the document.

The barring of the company's doors on November 9 and the events of the following week proved to be the straws that broke the dromedary's back. When Gonzalez withheld the letter to the SIF, plaintiff left Proico's premises, went directly to the offices of the Puerto Rico Labor Department, and filed an administrative complaint charging age discrimination. Two men in their twenties assumed his duties on a temporary basis.

Plaintiff never returned to Proico's employ. At first, he was unable to obtain unemployment benefits (apparently due to the lack of the required letter) and soon declared bankruptcy. ⁵ He returned to the SIF for periodic medical treatment until he received a full discharge on March 7, 1991. ⁶ Several weeks later the company officially terminated plaintiff's employment and hired a 36-year-old man as his permanent replacement. Thereafter, plaintiff filed suit in federal district court with the results previously described.

C. ADEA Liability.

In a trio of related arguments, appellant maintains that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, and that the evidence supports neither the jury's finding that appellant violated the ADE...