Sanchez v. Sanchez
| Decision Date | 17 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 9437,9437 |
| Citation | 748 P.2d 21,106 N.M. 648,1987 NMCA 143 |
| Parties | Joe L. SANCHEZ, Sr., Petitioner-Appellee, v. Maria M. SANCHEZ, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, wife appeals a judgment that designated certain real properties as community property.
The parties married in 1946; in 1948 or 1949, they moved to Harding County, New Mexico, where they resided on the Martinez Ranch (wife's parents' ranch) until husband moved to Santa Fe County and instituted divorce proceedings. In 1959, wife's parents deeded a ranch, consisting of 160 acres and known as the Pacheco Ranch, to wife in her name only. In 1960, wife and her sister each received in their names only an undivided one-half interest in 880 acres known as the Galway Ranch. At the divorce proceeding, wife claimed that all real property was her separate property by gift or devise. Only the status of the Pacheco and Galway Ranches is before us on appeal. Further, we are not concerned with the sister's one-half interest in the Galway Ranch.
Wife raises two issues: (1) Does a deed that names only one spouse convey the realty absolutely as separate property, or does it only create a presumption of separate property that may be rebutted; and, assuming the latter (2) may the fact finder consider parol evidence to show absence of intent by the grantors to make a gift? We hold the applicable statute creates a presumption that may be overcome, and that the trial court properly considered parol evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
The trial court determined that the interests in the Galway and Pacheco Ranches were community property despite the fact that the deeds transferring the properties did not reflect husband's name. The trial court based its ruling on the following: for approximately fifteen years following the parties' move to the Martinez Ranch, husband provided substantial time, labor, talent and money to working and managing the ranching enterprises owned by wife's father, all essentially without wages; under the circumstances, these contributions constituted an essential part of the consideration underlying the transfer of the Galway Ranch; these transfers were induced by the consideration given by the community; husband overcame any presumption of a gift to wife only. In addition, husband testified, and the trial court found, that husband and wife relinquished their interest in real property known as the Burro Ranch, in favor of wife's brother, in reliance on the father's offer to replace it with similar ranch properties. The trial court also found that the deeds transferring the Galway and Pacheco Ranches were then filed within sixty days of relinquishing title to the Burro Ranch. Thus, the trial court determined that the ranches in question were community property.
Wife contends that the properties in question were gifts to her. To support this contention, wife argues adamantly that property acquired by a spouse by gift, bequest, devise or descent is separate property. She relies on NMSA 1953, Repl.Vol. 8, Part 2 (1962), Section 57-3-4, which provides: See also NMSA 1978, Sec. 40-3-8 (Repl.1986). Wife claims this statute raises no presumptions. Wife contends the form of the deeds controls and, thus, she acquired as gifts separate property interests on both ranches. Wife asserts that this fact cannot be rebutted. Wife's argument is fatally flawed. The dispositive issue on appeal is the nature of the transaction by which the ranches were conveyed. Accepting wife's conclusory statement that the properties were gifts would deny this court the right of review with which we are charged. On these facts, and under the relevant statutes, the form of the deeds raises a rebuttable presumption.
NMSA 1953, Repl.Vol. 8, Part 2 (1962), Section 57-4-1 provides in relevant part:
All other real and personal property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, is community property; but whenever any real or personal property, or any interest therein or encumbrance thereon is acquired by a married woman by an instrument in writing the presumption is that title is thereby vested in her as her separate property.
See also NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-12(B) (Repl.1986).
Because the titles to the properties in question state wife's name, but not husband's name, the presumption that the ranches are wife's separate property arises. "This presumption is not conclusive but may be overcome by proof." Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 37, 155 P.2d 1010, 1020 (1944). See also SCRA 1986, 11-301. Overcoming this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence appears to be sufficient. See Campbell v. Campbell, 62 N.M. 330, 310 P.2d 266 (1957).
Wife claims the trial court erred in allowing as proof husband's testimony as to the intent of the grantor of the ranch properties. She challenges only the admissibility of the evidence, not its substance. Therefore, if the evidence is admissible, the intent to convey the properties as community property is established.
The gist of wife's argument is that the trial court improperly considered parol evidence to interpret unambiguous deeds. She contends that the evidence in question varied the terms of the written deeds and was, therefore, inadmissible. To support her view, wife refers us to 32A C.J.S. Evidence Section 913 (1964)....
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