Sanchez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 10 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-1400-J-34MCR |
| Parties | SIMON A. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Simon Sanchez, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on November 2, 2016,1 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). In the Petition, Sanchez challenges a 2009 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for attempted armed robbery. Sanchez raises twelve grounds for relief. See Petition at 6-48.2 Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Response (Response; Doc. 23) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Sanchez submitted a brief in reply (Reply; Doc. 30) with exhibits (Reply Ex.). This case is ripe for review.
On April 10, 2008, the State of Florida (State) charged Sanchez by way of an amended Information with two counts of armed robbery (counts one and two), robbery(count three), and attempted armed robbery (count four). Resp. Ex. A at 12-13. On February 23, 2009, Sanchez, through counsel, moved to sever the trials of all four counts. Id. at 48. The circuit court granted the motion to sever the same day. Id. at 49. Sanchez proceeded to a jury trial on count four, at the conclusion of which the jury found him guilty as charged, with a specific finding that Sanchez actually carried a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Id. at 102. On May 18, 2009, the circuit court adjudicated Sanchez a habitual felony offender (HFO) and sentenced him to a term of incarceration of thirty years in prison. Id. at 126-31.
Sanchez initiated a direct appeal of his judgment and conviction on June 9, 2009. Id. at 135. With the assistance of counsel, he filed an initial brief raising the following claims: (1) the circuit court erred in overruling a defense objection that the State's cross-examination of Sanchez shifted the burden of proof; (2) the circuit court erred in denying the motions for judgment of acquittal; and (3) the circuit court fundamentally erred in reading an incomplete, misleading, and confusing jury instruction on deadly weapons. Resp. Ex. E at 9-23. The State filed an answer brief. Resp. Ex. F. On June 10, 2010, the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) per curiam affirmed Sanchez's conviction and sentence and issued the Mandate on June 28, 2010. Resp. Ex. G. Sanchez filed a pro se motion for rehearing, which the First DCA struck as unauthorized. Id.
On June 13, 2011, Sanchez filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus with the First DCA. Resp. Ex. H. In the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Sanchez alleged his appellate counsel was ineffective because counsel: (1) failed to raise a fundamental error argument concerning his HFO designation; (2) failed to raise an argument that the circuit court violated Sanchez's right to self-representation; (3) failed to a raise a fundamentalerror argument concerning improper prosecutorial comments; and (4) failed to obtain records needed for his direct appeal. Id. On July 8, 2011, the First DCA denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits. Resp. Ex. I.
Sanchez filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion) on July 27, 2011. Resp. Ex. L. Sanchez raised the following grounds for relief, alleging his counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) properly object to his HFO sentence; (2) protect his speedy trial rights; (3) adopt and refile his pro se motion to suppress; (4) challenge the victim's out-of-court identification; (5) object to the prosecutor's improper comments; (6) adequately argue a motion for judgment of acquittal; (7) object to a defective jury instruction; (8) adequately investigate and prepare a misidentification defense; (9) impeach witnesses; (10) obtain an expert witness; and (11) withdraw due to a conflict of interest. Id. at 4-32. On July 2, 2012, Sanchez filed an amended motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 (Amended Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. N. In the Amended Rule 3.850 Motion, Sanchez raised the same eleven claims as he did in his Rule 3.850 Motion and added two additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. As ground twelve, he alleged that his counsel failed to file a proper and timely motion for new trial, and as ground thirteen, he contended that his counsel failed to properly file a motion in limine. Id. at 30-34. On August 3, 2015, the circuit court struck grounds four, ten, and eleven of the Amended Rule 3.850 Motion and gave Sanchez leave to amend. Resp. Ex. X. Sanchez did not amend these grounds. Resp. Exs. J; Y at 6. On December 14, 2015, the circuit court denied the Amended Rule 3.850 Motion. Resp. Ex. Y. On June 1, 2016, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. DD at 1. Sanchezmoved for rehearing, which the First DCA denied on July 21, 2016. Id. at 2-8. The First DCA issued the Mandate on August 8, 2016. Id. at 10.
On February 27, 2016, Sanchez filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) (Rule 3.800(a) Motion). Resp. Ex. EE. In his Rule 3.800(a) Motion, Sanchez alleged his HFO sentence was unconstitutional. Id. The circuit court denied the Rule 3.800(a) Motion on July 1, 2017. Resp. Ex. FF. On June 13, 2018, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. GG; Sanchez v. State, 249 So. 3d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
The Petition was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Sanchez's] claim[s] withoutfurther factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court recently stated:
[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial