Sanchez v. SEGUROS TRIPLE S, INC., Civil No. 08-1215 (GAG).
| Decision Date | 22 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 08-1215 (GAG). |
| Citation | 687 F. Supp.2d 6 |
| Parties | Manuel Rodriguez SANCHEZ, Plaintiffs, v. SEGUROS TRIPLE S, INC.; Transportistas Independientes Del Sur; and Hector Muniz Martinez, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Jaime F. Agrait-Llado, Agrait Llado Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Giancarlo Font-Garcia, Dario Rivera Carrasquillo Law Offices, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgement submitted by Defendants Seguros Triple S, Inc. ("Triple S"), Transportistas Independientes Del Sur ("Transportistas"), and Hector Muniz Martinez ("Martinez"). Plaintiff, Manuel Rodriguez Sanchez ("Sanchez"), commenced this action after he suffered injures caused by the alleged negligent driving of Noel Cintron Cruz ("Cintron Cruz"). For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 45.)
Consistent with the summary judgement standard, the court states the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir.2006).
On March 9th, 2005, Plaintiff Sanchez was riding his motorcycle in the right lane of road Number 165. (See Docket No. 63-3 at ¶ 2.) After stopping at a red light he began to accelerate. (Id. at ¶ 3.) It was at this point that Sanchez was hit by a vehicle coming into his lane. (Id.) Sanchez was struck by a trailer, attached to a truck, being driven by Cintron Cruz. (Id.) As a result of the collision Sanchez sustained injuries, including one which required that his leg be amputated above the knee. (See Docket No. 63-3 at ¶ 3.)
The truck and trailer involved in the accident were owned by defendant Martinez. (See Docket No. 63-2 at ¶ 1.) Martinez had hired Cintron Cruz to drive the truck and trailer on the day of the accident. (Id.) It is an uncontested fact that Cintron Cruz was an independent contractor, and not an employee of Martinez. (See Docket No. 45-3 at ¶ 15.) Martinez admits that he had no knowledge of Cintron Cruz's driving record. (See Docket No. 63-5 at 4, 5.)
It is also uncontested that defendant Transportistas had no employer relationship with Cintron Cruz, nor did it have any financial interest in the truck. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 8.) Transportistas is a non-profit association of truckers that purchases, in bulk, items such as fuel and health insurance in order to obtain lower prices for its members. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Transportistas has no control over the employees of its members. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12.) On February 21, 2008, Sanchez brought this action alleging negligence against Triple S, Transportistas, Cintron Cruz, and Martinez. (See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 3.) Triple S, Transportistas, and Martinez moved for summary judgment on October 5, 2009. (See Docket No. 45.) Plaintiff opposed this motion on November 6, 2009. (See Docket No. 63.) That same day, defendant Cintron Cruz was dismissed as a party without prejudice. (See Docket No. 67.)
Summary Judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party, and a "material fact" is one that has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004). The moving party has the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. This burden may also be discharged by showing there is insufficient evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id.
If the moving party meets its burden, then the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, the plaintiff) and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id.
Defendants Transportistas and Martinez move for summary judgment on the theory that they are not liable for the alleged negligent acts committed by Cintron Cruz. Both parties assert they owed no duty to Sanchez in regards to the traffic accident, and that Sanchez has failed to state a cause of action for negligence under section 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (2009).
As this is a diversity case, the court applies Puerto Rico law to all substantive matters and "is bound by the teachings of the state's highest court." N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir.2001). If the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not definitively addressed a question, the court may consult other sources so as to "make an informed prophecy" about what rule the commonwealth courts would likely follow. Id. Therefore, Puerto Rico's tort law governs our analysis of Sanchez's claim.
Under Puerto Rico law a "person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (2009). To succeeded in a negligence claim the plaintiff must establish the following: (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proof of damage; and (4) a causal connection between the damage and the tortious conduct. De-Jesus-Adorno v. Browning Ferris Indus., 160 F.3d 839, 842 (1st Cir.1998).
In this case, where the plaintiff's claim of negligence is based on the defendant's failure to check Cintron Cruz's driving record, we are concerned with an act of omission. An omission will give rise to a cause of negligence when there is a legal duty to act. Muniz v. National Can Corp., 737 F.2d 145, 148 (1st Cir.1984). Puerto Rico law dictates a duty to act arises: (1) by a statute, regulation, ordinance, bylaw or contract; (2) as the result of a special relationship between the parties that has arisen through custom; or (3) as the result of a traditionally recognized duty of care particular to the situation. De-Jesus-Adorno, 160 F.3d at 842.
Still, for there to be liability, the harm must have been foreseeable by the defendant. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3022. To foresee is to "provide against, to anticipate, or to avoid an injury or danger." Lopez v. Cruz, 131 D.P.R. 694, 708 Offic. Slip Trans. at 11 (1992) (citing Salva Matos v. Diana Const. Corp., 95 P.R.Dec. 900, 906, 95 P.R.R 880, 884 (1968)). The Puerto Rican Supreme Court has also stated, that the "precautions need not be of an extraordinary nature." Barrientos v. Gov. of the Capital, 97 D.P.R. 552, 564, 97 P.R.R. 539, 550 (1969).
Sanchez, however, mentions no statute, regulation ordinance, law or contract that would impose an affirmative duty on the defendants to check Cintron Cruz's driving record. There is likewise nothing in the record indicating there is a special relationship between the parties that would create a duty. Instead, Sanchez contends Martinez had a traditionally recognized duty of care to check Cintron Cruz's driving record, and that the harm, resulting from a failure to do so, was foreseeable. In support of this theory, Sanchez points to facts on record that show Martinez was not aware of Cintron Cruz's driving record before hiring him to drive a heavy truck with a trailer. To assert this claim, Sanchez points to statements made by Martinez in his deposition. (See Docket No. 63-5 at 4, 5.) Further, Sanchez claims that the injury he sustained was a foreseeable consequence of hiring a reckless driver, and that but-for the hiring of Cintron Cruz, Sanchez would not have been injured.1 In his opposition, Sanchez has demonstrated all necessary elements to establish a prima facie case of negligence.
In their motion for summary judgment, however, Defendants Transportistas and Martinez, argue that they cannot be held liable regardless of the negligence of Cintron Cruz, because he was an independent contractor. The independent contractor theory can limit the liability of employers depending on the injury. Courts in Puerto Rico have held that "the persons who directly or indirectly hire an independent contractor shall be held jointly liable for the negligent harm caused by the latter in the performance of the work if said harm is a risk foreseeable by the employer." Martinez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 108 D.P.R. 515, 522, 108 Offic. Trans. 542, 547 (1979). In Lopez v. Cruz, the court revisited its decision in Chase Manhattan, and decided that this test does not create vicarious liability for employers from all injuries caused by independent contractors. Lopez, 131 D.P.R. at 705, Offic. Slip Trans., at 9. Employers are liable for the actions of independent contracts when the employer fails to "take the necessary precautions, given the particular risks of a project." Lopez, 131 D.P.R. at 706, Offic. Slip Trans. at 9 (emphasis added). "The precautions need not be of an extraordinary nature either." Chase Manhattan Bank, 108 D.P.R. at 519, 108 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 544 (P.R.1979).
Defendants cite Lopez to assert they cannot be held...
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