Sanchez v. State
| Decision Date | 20 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-183.,04-183. |
| Citation | 2006 WY 12,126 P.3d 897 |
| Parties | Susan Juanita SANCHEZ, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ., and ARNOLD, D.J.
[¶ 1] In March 2004, a Carbon County jury found Susan Juanita Sanchez (the appellant) guilty of second-degree murder for shooting her boyfriend. She now appeals that conviction, claiming that the district court erred in admitting extrinsic impeachment evidence, that the prosecutor committed misconduct because he intentionally misrepresented witness testimony to the jury during closing argument, and that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence concerning the victim's affiliation with an "outlaw" motorcycle gang. We affirm.
[¶ 2] 1. Whether extrinsic impeachment evidence admitted by the district court was harmless error?
2. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument?
3. Whether the district court erred in excluding evidence concerning the victim's affiliation with an "outlaw" motorcycle gang?
[¶ 3] The instant case essentially revolves around four people: the appellant (who has been paralyzed on one side of her body since she suffered a stroke and who apparently uses a leg brace to help her walk), the appellant's live-in boyfriend Marvin "Lucky" Batchelor (the victim), Travis Tappan (who occasionally lived with the victim and the appellant) (Tappan), and Sam Huffman (Huffman).1 All four individuals spent most of the day July 15-16, 2003, drinking and partying at the appellant's residence in Rawlins. Huffman was "too drunk" to return home later that evening, so Tappan retrieved a sleeping bag for Huffman to use in the yard, where he eventually "passed out." Tappan also arranged a tarp and a sleeping bag in the yard for himself and the appellant.
[¶ 4] Sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m., the victim was shot once in the chest. At 1:30 a.m., the appellant called 911 and indicated that she thought that the victim was dead. Law enforcement officers responded to the residence, where they discovered the victim's body (with no pulse) in the yard; the victim was wearing a t-shirt and underwear, and his pants were located nearby on a chair next to a picnic table in the yard. As the appellant exited the residence at the officers' request, the officers asked her if she possessed any weapons. She replied "no, the gun is ... over there" (pointing to where she and Tappan had been sleeping), and officers discovered a black single-action .41 caliber Ruger handgun. Ballistics analysis subsequently confirmed that the victim was shot with this gun.
[¶ 5] Several witnesses provided information about the shooting. It appears that the appellant confessed to at least five different individuals that she shot the victim, and in several instances she confessed that fact more than once to the same individual.2 The appellant told the 911 dispatcher that she shot the victim "because he was raping" her, and numerous other statements were attributed to the appellant by the law enforcement officers who spoke with her after the shooting. According to the trial testimony of these officers, the appellant stated that while Tappan was arranging the sleeping accoutrements in the yard, the appellant retrieved some bedding and the Ruger handgun3 from her bedroom (she needed the gun for "her protection" because the victim became "mean" or "aggressive" when he was drinking).4 The appellant met Tappan in the yard and put the gun under her pillow, while the victim remained inside watching television.
[¶ 6] As the appellant and Tappan were lying in the yard holding hands,5 the victim appeared and ripped off their covers, and Tappan got up and ran. The victim asked the appellant if she was "having sex" with Tappan and repeatedly told the appellant (in a profanity-laced exchange) to go in the house. The appellant replied that she wanted to remain outside. The victim then grabbed or pulled the appellant's legs in an attempt to get her into the house. At some point, he tried to "get on top" of her (or he "jumped" on top of her) and said "get your ass in there and I'll f* * * you," and the appellant "pushed him off." The victim ultimately started walking towards the house, and away from the appellant's location. When he stopped and turned to continue yelling at the appellant, she reached under her pillow (while lying down), "pulled" the gun, and shot the victim once.6
[¶ 7] According to the appellant, Tappan, who was by this time next to the appellant, said "I think you killed him," and the appellant replied "[O]h, my God, we better go in and call 911." Tappan "helped [the appellant] put [her] leg brace on ... so they could go in the house," and the appellant called 911. When asked if the victim had raped her, the appellant told an officer "no, he got on top of me and I pushed him off," and further stated that she told the 911 dispatcher that she had been raped because "she was scared when she saw [the victim lying] there on the ground."7 The appellant maintained that Tappan "had nothing to do with it" and that she was not "covering" for him. By 3:46 a.m., the appellant's blood alcohol content was .07; the victim's blood alcohol content was .213 at the time of his death.
[¶ 8] At the scene of the shooting, Tappan provided Rawlins police officer David Ferguson several different versions (both exculpatory and inculpatory) of what happened. We will detail these statements later in this opinion. Tappan also subsequently gave another police officer several different versions of what happened: (1) Tappan stated that he and the appellant were in the yard "getting ready to have sex" when the victim caught them. The victim "started to rape" the appellant,8 and the appellant shot the victim; (2) Tappan then stated that the Ruger handgun was his, that the officer was "going to pin it on [Tappan] anyway," and that Tappan shot the victim; and (3) Tappan also stated that the victim exited the house with a gun, so Tappan shot the victim. Tappan admitted that he had consumed "a lot" of alcohol and was "very drunk" that night; by 3:57 a.m., Tappan's blood alcohol content was .30.
[¶ 9] Huffman stated that he was awakened because the appellant and the victim were arguing in "loud voices." The victim asked the appellant if she was having sex with Tappan and the appellant replied "no." He heard the appellant yell "[H]elp me, [Tappan]" while the victim was "helping" the appellant into the house. Huffman then heard the gunshot, sat up, and heard the appellant ask "[I]s he dead, [Tappan]?" Tappan replied "[Y]es, he was shot with a .44." Huffman saw the appellant and Tappan walk back over to the area where they had been sleeping. He heard Tappan tell the appellant (who was standing) "here, Sue, get your fingerprints all over this" because He also saw Tappan hand the appellant a "black object" with a "belt [or] something hanging down from the holster." Huffman believed that the object was the gun. The appellant and Tappan then left the area. Tappan came out looking for something and returned to the house.
[¶ 10] Two neighbors also provided information about the shooting. One neighbor who was a friend of the victim and the appellant, was awakened at "a little after 1:00" a.m. when she heard the victim's voice "louder than usual." When she heard the gunshot, the neighbor went and looked out her window. She saw the appellant "sitting up," while a shirtless Tappan retrieved the appellant's leg brace from a clothesline. Tappan knelt down and helped the appellant "strap the brace on," and Tappan helped the appellant walk to the house. Tappan returned briefly to look for something, and then went back into the house. The other neighbor returned home from work at about 1:00 a.m. and heard voices coming from the appellant's yard. The victim was repeatedly asking the appellant what she was doing "naked" in the back yard, accused the appellant of having sex with Tappan, and told the appellant to go in the house. The neighbor may have heard the appellant reply that she and Tappan were trying to "warm up," and also say "don't hit me, don't touch me" during the incident. She also saw Tappan (dressed in shorts and a t-shirt) tip-toe up her driveway and look towards the appellant's yard through a hole in the fence. After the neighbor went inside to care for her infant child, she heard the gunshot.
[¶ 11] The appellant and Tappan were ultimately both charged with second-degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2005), and the two cases were joined for a jury trial. However, Tappan apparently pled guilty to "being an accessory before the fact" a week prior to the trial, and the appellant's case proceeded to trial. The appellant's trial strategy was essentially to claim that Tappan shot the victim, but if the appellant shot the victim, she acted in self-defense. The district court instructed on the elements of voluntary manslaughter, and the appellant also referenced that instruction during closing argument. A jury found the appellant guilty of second-degree murder in March 2004, and the district court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for twenty—to twenty-five years. The appellant now appeals from that judgment and sentence.
[¶ 12] The appellant subpoenaed Tappan to testify at trial, but Tappan's ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bowlsby v. State
...of that rule of law; and (4) the error adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him. Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 12, ¶ 19, 126 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo.2006).Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 505, 509 (Wyo.2009). [¶ 7] In this case, the record clearly refle......
-
Snow v. State
...of that rule of law; and (4) the error adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him. Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 12, ¶ 19, 126 P.3d 897, 904 [¶ 14] The appellant contends that his right to protection against double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted a......
-
Lascano v. State
...v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766 (Wyo.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S.Ct. 1554, 152 L.Ed.2d 477 (2002)).Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 12, ¶ 29, 126 P.3d 897, 908 (Wyo.2006).DISCUSSION [¶ 9] In his main issue, Lascano argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misre......
-
Haynes v. State
...of that rule of law; and (4) the error adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him. Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 12, ¶ 19, 126 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo.2006).Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 505, 509 (Wyo.2009).DISCUSSION [¶ 8] The Fifth Amendment to the U......