Sanchez v. State

• Decision Date: 06 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0304-CR-362.,49A02-0304-CR-362.
• Citation: 803 N.E.2d 215
• Parties: Pedro SANCHEZ, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

803 N.E.2d 215

Pedro SANCHEZ, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 49A02-0304-CR-362.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

February 6, 2004.

Transfer Denied May 7, 2004.

Michael C. Borschel, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Pedro Sanchez (Sanchez), appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana or hash, a Class D felony, Ind.Code § 35-48-4-11.

We reverse and remand.

ISSUES

Sanchez raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by denying Sanchez' Motion to Suppress evidence seized incident to arrest after an illegal detention.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At approximately 6:30 p.m. on December 9, 2002, uniformed Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) Officers Todd Wellman (Officer Wellman) and Angela Poe (Officer Poe) (collectively "the Officers") attempted to serve a warrant on Antwan Luckett (Luckett) at his apartment located at 4600 Georgetown Court, Indianapolis, Indiana. Luckett was described as an African-American male, about 5'11" tall, and weighing 250 pounds. Failing to find Luckett at home, the Officers canvassed the area surrounding the apartment complex. While walking away from Luckett's apartment, Officer Wellman noticed an individual, about 40 to 50 feet away, who he thought fit Luckett's description, leaning in the passenger window of a car. However, as the Officers approached this individual within 10 feet, they realized he was Hispanic, not African American.

Officer Wellman requested permission to speak to this individual, later identified as Sanchez, and asked him if he lived in the area and knew Luckett. The Officers subsequently required Sanchez to remove his hands from his pockets and to provide identification. Sanchez told the Officers that although he did not have state identification with him, his name was "Carlos Hernandez," with a date of birth October 31, 1981. He further added that he could not remember his social security number. While Officer Wellman investigated the information for open warrants, Officer Poe continued questioning Sanchez. When the Officers were unable to confirm Sanchez' identity, Sanchez clarified that his identification card might be just a "school I.D." (Transcript p. 36). Sanchez stated next that he did not have one fixed address, but received mail at 3110 Medford Avenue. He was unable to identify the owner of this residence or its telephone number. When the Officers questioned Sanchez why he was at the apartment complex, he told the Officers that he was visiting his uncle in apartment C. However, the Officers knew from prior experience that the apartments were numbered, not lettered.

After failing to find Sanchez' identification as Carlos Hernandez on file, the Officers took him to his uncle's apartment, about forty feet away. At the apartment, an Hispanic male opened the door and claimed not to recognize Sanchez. At that moment, Sanchez whispered something in Spanish and the occupant replied that he was indeed Sanchez' uncle, but when asked, did not know Sanchez' name. Thereafter, Sanchez was handcuffed and transported to the IPD Identification Unit located in the City-County Building where he was fingerprinted and identified as Sanchez. He was arrested for an open State of Illinois warrant and searched incident to the arrest. During this search, a small quantity of marijuana was recovered.

On December 10, 2002, the State filed its information charging Sanchez with Count I, Part I, possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-48-4-11, and Count I, Part II, possession of marijuana, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-11. On January 22, 2003, Sanchez filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, which was denied by the trial court on February 10, 2003. On February 19, 2003, a jury trial was held. Before evidence was heard by the jury, the trial court conducted a hearing on Sanchez' Motion in Limine and revisited the Motion to Suppress. After review, the trial court again denied Sanchez' Motion to Suppress. The trial court held that, although the initial stop was illegal, the evidence was obtained incident to his arrest on an open Illinois warrant. At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found Sanchez guilty of Count I. On March 17, 2003, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Sanchez to a term of imprisonment for one year, with 198 days executed and 167 days suspended.

Sanchez now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Sanchez argues that the Officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the corresponding provision under the Indiana Constitution, when they stopped him on December 9, 2002. For this reason, Sanchez maintains that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Suppress. The State counters that the stop was legal as Sanchez consented to the questioning. Furthermore, the State contends, that even if Sanchez' consent was not valid, his arrest at the police station pursuant to an outstanding warrant dissipated any taint of the illegal stop and made the search incident to that valid arrest proper.

I. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. See Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)

. Generally, no abuse of discretion occurs where there exists sufficient evidence justifying the initial seizure. Id. As with other sufficiency determinations, we do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. Unlike other sufficiency determinations, however, we must also consider the uncontested evidence most favorable to the defendant, in order to effectuate the broad protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind.1995). "The provision must receive a liberal construction in its application to guarantee the people against unreasonable search and seizure." Id.

II. Fourth Amendment

Sanchez first contends that the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by denying his Motion to Suppress. Specifically, Sanchez argues that the marijuana evidence resulted from an illegal detention and should have been excluded from trial under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Conversely, the State maintains that Sanchez' valid arrest pursuant to an outstanding warrant dissipated any taint of the stop and made the search incident to that valid arrest proper.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..." U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures has been extended to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 464-65 (Ind.1998)

. As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless search. Id. Consequently, when a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that the search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 465.

One exception to the warrant requirement was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court established the rule that a police officer may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes, if, based on specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Id. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

Nevertheless, this concept of reasonable suspicion is not readily reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Rather, in evaluating the legality of an investigatory stop, we must consider the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)

. The requirement is then satisfied when the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Lyons v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-84 (Ind.Ct.App.2000),

trans. denied (emphasis added).

However, our Supreme Court has previously held that a consensual encounter does not implicate the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind.2003)

. As long as an individual engaged by the police remains free to leave, the encounter is consensual. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). The determination whether a citizen is free to walk away from contact with police is "whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Id.

In the instant case, our review of the record reveals that when the Officers were about ten feet away, they realized that Sanchez did not fit Luckett's description. Officer Wellman testified that he requested Sanchez' permission to talk to him for a minute. After this permission was freely granted, the Officers asked Sanchez whether he knew Luckett and whether he himself lived in the area. The record further reflects that following Sanchez' response that he didn't live anywhere close, the Officers told Sanchez to take his hands out of his pockets and to show his identification. When Sanchez failed to produce an...