Sanchez v. State, No. A09–2195.
| Decision Date | 18 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A09–2195. |
| Citation | 816 N.W.2d 550 |
| Parties | Jorge Alberto SANCHEZ, a/k/a Jorge Alberto Sanchez–Reyes, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. The 2–year time limit in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2010), applies to all of the exceptions listed in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2010).
2. A claim based on an exception in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b), arises, for purposes of calculating the 2–year time limit in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), when the claimant knew or should have known that the claim existed.
3. Even if the 2–year time limit in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), is subject to equitable tolling, where state actors are not alleged to have prevented the petitioner from discovering the basis of his interests-of-justice claim, and the petitioner was not otherwise diligently pursuing his claim, petitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of equitable tolling.
4. The Legislature did not unconstitutionally usurp a judicial function when it added time limits to the postconviction relief statute, Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2010), and application of the time limits in the statute did not violate appellant's due process rights under the Minnesota Constitution.
David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, Saint Paul, MN, for respondent.
Jorge Sanchez was convicted, after a stipulated facts bench trial, of first-degree possession of a controlled substance. More than 5 years after his conviction became final, Sanchez filed this petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied Sanchez's petition as untimely and meritless. The court of appeals affirmed. Sanchez v. State, No. A09–2195, 2010 WL 2813535, at *3–4 (Minn.App. July 20, 2010).1 Because we conclude that Sanchez's petition was untimely, we affirm.
In August 2002, Sanchez was arrested while in possession of over 25 grams of cocaine, and the State charged him with violating Minn.Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(1) (2010).2 Before trial, Sanchez moved to suppress the cocaine that police recovered from him. The district court denied Sanchez's motion. Following denial of his motion to suppress, Sanchez waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter was tried to the court on stipulated facts. The court found Sanchez guilty of first-degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(1), and sentenced Sanchez to 98 months in prison. The court, however, stayed execution of the sentence pending appeal, and ordered Sanchez to return to court on March 2, 2004, to report on the status of his anticipated appeal.
When the parties returned to district court on March 2, Sanchez's trial attorney suggested that the appeal was in process but not yet perfected. 3 The court reminded Sanchez at that time that he would be able to “remain at liberty pending the outcome of” his appeal. The court said that if Sanchez was not successful in his appeal that he would be given a date by which he would have to turn himself in. At Sanchez's attorney's request, the court explained to Sanchez that Sanchez needed to keep in contact with his attorney, and that Sanchez's appeal process was ongoing. The court cautioned Sanchez that he needed to follow through with this appeal, and ordered the parties to return to court on July 6, 2004, for a further status report on the progress of the appeal.
It appears from the record that from the start of Sanchez's appeal process, Sanchez and his attorney had a troubled relationship. Specifically, Sanchez's attorney had problems contacting and securing payments from Sanchez. His attorney sent Sanchez a letter dated January 12, 2004, indicating that Sanchez needed to pay the attorney so that the attorney could perfect the appeal. The letter indicated that Sanchez could contact the State Public Defender's Office (SPDO) if he could not pay the attorney for his services. At some point close to the March 2, 2004 hearing, Sanchez attempted to pay his attorney with a car. But the car turned out to be stolen, and the attorney would not accept it as payment. Sanchez's attorney, nonetheless, filed a notice of appeal just before the March 2, 2004 hearing. Sanchez did not perfect his appeal, however, because he did not make proper financial arrangements to obtain the district court transcripts.4
The court of appeals dismissed Sanchez's appeal on April 26, 2004, based on Sanchez's failure to provide satisfactory financial arrangements for the transcripts. But the court gave Sanchez leave to file a motion to reinstate, provided that Sanchez (1) show that he had good cause for failure to timely order the transcripts, and (2) provide a completed transcript certificate showing that he had made satisfactory financial arrangements to secure the transcripts. On May 4, 2004, Sanchez moved to reinstate his appeal, and his attorney wrote a letter to the court reporter stating, “ I will pay the $400.00 or whatever is the cost of the transcript.” The court of appeals concluded that this was not a satisfactory financial arrangement, however, and on June 2, 2004, the court denied Sanchez's motion to reinstate his appeal.
On July 6, 2004, Sanchez appeared in district court as previously ordered. The record is disputed as to how much contact Sanchez and his attorney had between the March 2, 2004 hearing and the July 6, 2004 hearing, and initially his attorney did not appear for the July 6 hearing. When Sanchez appeared without his counsel, the court had staff contact his attorney. While waiting for his attorney to appear, the court told Sanchez, The court then waited for Sanchez's attorney to arrive.
When his attorney arrived, Sanchez and his attorney met briefly outside of the courtroom. The content of their discussion was later contested at a postconviction evidentiary hearing. But it is undisputed that after their discussion Sanchez fled from the courthouse. After his attorney informed the district court that Sanchez was gone, and that Sanchez had not contacted him since the March 2, 2004 hearing, the court executed Sanchez's sentence and issued a bench warrant for Sanchez's arrest.
Sanchez traveled to Mexico where he remained for over 3 years. In January 2008, Sanchez was arrested at the United States–Mexico border. Sanchez was returned to Minnesota, and he contacted the SPDO in April 2008. At that time, the SPDO told Sanchez that his appeal was never perfected.
On March 19, 2009, with the assistance of the SPDO, Sanchez filed this petition for postconviction relief. Sanchez argued that he was entitled to postconviction relief because (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unreasonable search and seizure at the time of his arrest on August 19, 2002, (2) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, and (3) his untimely petition met the interests-of-justiceexception in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2010).
The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing at which Sanchez testified. According to Sanchez's testimony, his attorney told Sanchez during the July 6, 2004 discussion that Sanchez had lost everything, he had attempted to contact Sanchez about the appeal, and he encouraged Sanchez to leave court. Sanchez also testified that he did not recall being contacted by his attorney in the time period between March 2 and July 6. Sanchez explained that he tried to reach his attorney in early July, but that his attorney did not respond. Sanchez also explained that his attorney called him the evening of the July 6 hearing, told him that the district court had issued a bench warrant for his arrest, and that he “should be very careful.” Sanchez testified that he “got scared and [then] went to Mexico.” Sanchez also told the postconviction court that he first learned that his conviction had not been appealed when he spoke with the SPDO in April 2008.
Sanchez's trial attorney also testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing regarding his July 6 discussion with Sanchez. Counsel said that he was surprised Sanchez was at court because he “hadn't heard anything from [Sanchez] for a long time and ... assumed that [Sanchez] panicked and fled the jurisdiction.” Counsel specifically denied that he told Sanchez to leave court and testified that after their conversation, Sanchez told him that Sanchez needed to use the restroom. When Sanchez never returned, counsel informed the court that Sanchez was gone, and that Sanchez had not contacted him since the March 2, 2004 hearing.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court held that Sanchez's Fourth and Sixth Amendment claims were meritless and that his petition was untimely. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Sanchez's petition was untimely because his interests-of-justice claim arose on July 6, 2004, when he knew or should have known “that his appeal had been dismissed without a substantive review.” Sanchez v. State, No. A09–2195, 2010 WL 2813535, at *3–4 (Minn.App. July 20, 2010).
On appeal to our court, Sanchez asserts three arguments. First, Sanchez argues his petition for postconviction relief is not barred by Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2010). Second, Sanchez argues that if we conclude the time limits set forth in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, bar his petition for postconviction relief, then those time limits render section 590.01, subdivision 4 unconstitutional. Third, Sanchez argues that we should review his conviction under our inherent authority.
We turn first to the question of whether Sanchez's petition for...
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