Sanchez v. State
| Decision Date | 14 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04–1206–CR–318.,49A04–1206–CR–318. |
| Citation | 989 N.E.2d 843 |
| Parties | Serafin SANCHEZ, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court; The Honorable Carol J. Orbison, Judge; Cause No. 49G22–1005–MR–37095.
Darren Bedwell, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Appellate Division, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
The State charged Serafin Sanchez with two counts of murder and one count of class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Sanchez asserted an insanity defense. A jury found him guilty as charged. On appeal, Sanchez contends that the jury instructions regarding the State's burden of proof as to the offenses and his burden of proof as to his insanity defense constitute fundamental error. We find no error and therefore affirm his convictions.
Sanchez lived in half of a double on North Holmes Avenue in Indianapolis. On May 9, 2010, Sanchez had been using methamphetamine for four days straight and also had consumed alcohol. At approximately 9:00 that morning, he was smoking meth in his home with Luis Aguilar, who lived down the street. According to Sanchez, Aguilar said that he had tortured Sanchez's brother in Sanchez's neighbors' home the night before. Aguilar also said that the neighbors were currently torturing Sanchez's mother and brother and asked if Sanchez could hear them screaming. Sanchez grabbed a shotgun and shot and kicked at his neighbors' front door to gain entry. He then used an assault rifle to riddle his neighbors' ground floor with bullets, screaming, State's Ex. 246 at 7. Sanchez returned to his residence and confronted Aguilar, who denied harming Sanchez's family. Sanchez shot Aguilar in the leg, and the two struggled for the weapon. Aguilar ran outside and down the street toward his house. Sanchez gave chase and fired multiple bullets from multiple firearms at Aguilar, who collapsed and died after being shot seven times. A nearby resident saw the killing and called 911.
Sanchez returned to his home, grabbed additional firearms, and went outside. When police officers arrived in response to the 911 call, Sanchez yelled that his family had been murdered and that he needed the officers' help. Sanchez ran inside his neighbors' home, went upstairs, and shot Florindo Juarez ten times. 1 Sanchez yelled, Tr. at 162. Police officers ordered Sanchez to drop his weapon, handcuffed him, and led him downstairs. Sanchez told the officers that his family had been murdered in the basement. No victims were found in the basement, but three of Juarez's relatives had hidden there during Sanchez's shooting spree. Juarez later died from his wounds. Sanchez confessed to the killings and admitted to using meth.
The State charged Sanchez with two counts of murder, which is the knowing or intentional killing of another human being, Ind.Code § 35–42–1–1, and one count of class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Sanchez filed notice of his intent to assert an insanity defense. The trial court appointed a psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine whether Sanchez had been insane at the time of the killings, i.e., whether he had been unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct as a result of mental disease or defect, and therefore was not legally responsible. Ind.Code § 35–41–3–6. Both experts interviewed Sanchez and determined that he had not been insane and that his mental state had been a result of voluntary intoxication from meth use, which is not a valid defense to murder. Ind.Code §§ 35–41–2–5, 35–41–3–5. The court later appointed the same two experts to determine whether Sanchez was competent to stand trial. The experts interviewed Sanchez again and determined that he was competent to stand trial and that he was malingering, or faking symptoms of mental illness. At trial, Sanchez offered the testimony of another psychiatrist, who opined that Sanchez suffered from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shootings and thus was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct as a result of mental disease or defect. The jury was instructed on the affirmative defense of insanity and was also given the option of finding Sanchez guilty but mentally ill, but it ultimately found him guilty as charged. This appeal ensued.
The State has the burden of proving all elements of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Cruz v. State, 980 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). “The insanity defense is an affirmative defense for which the defendant carries the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Carson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 670, 676 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citing Ind.Code § 35–41–4–1), trans. denied. The State need not disprove insanity. Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind.2004).
Sanchez contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the parties' respective burdens of proof. Because Sanchez did not object to the instructions at trial, he must establish fundamental error.
The fundamental error doctrine provides a vehicle for the review of error not properly preserved for appeal. In order to be considered fundamental, the error must represent a blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant and thereby depriving the defendant of fundamental due process. The error must be so prejudicial to the defendant's rights as to make a fair trial impossible. In considering whether a claimed error denied the defendant a fair trial, we determine whether the resulting harm or potential for harm is substantial. Harm is not shown by the fact that the defendant was ultimately convicted; instead, harm is determined by whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was detrimentally affected by the denial of procedural opportunities for the ascertainment of truth to which he would have been entitled.
Quiroz v. State, 963 N.E.2d 37, 42 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citations omitted), trans. denied.
Specifically, Sanchez takes issue with preliminary instructions 5 and 7A. Preliminary instruction 5 reads as follows:
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to this information, and upon the issues thus joined, the burden rests upon the state of Indiana to prove to each juror every material allegation of the information beyond a reasonable doubt. The information that has been filed against the defendant, or the fact that the defendant may have been arrested or held on a charge, is not to be considered as any evidence of guilt herein. It is merely the formal statutory manner of presenting the charge that must be proven by the evidence during the trial.
Since the defendant is presumed to be innocent, he is not required to present any evidence to prove his innocence. However, if you were to find that the defendant committed the crime charged, then the burden would be upon him to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was insane at the time the crime was committed.
Preponderance of the evidence, as it applies to the issue of insanity, means that you must be convinced from a consideration of all the evidence in the case that the defendant was more probably insane than sane at the time that he committed the offense.
The definitions and essential elements of the crime charged in the information will be given in other instructions. The proof of the commission of a crime is not complete unless each element thereof is proven, and the doctrine of reasonable doubt applies to each element.
Appellant's App. at 140. Preliminary instruction 7A reads as follows:
The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the State's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is a fair, actual and logical doubt. It may arise from the evidence, from a lack of evidence, or from a conflict in the evidence. It should be a doubt based upon reason and common sense and should not be a doubt based upon imagination or speculation.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you may find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you should give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
If you are firmly convinced that the defendant has committed the crime charged, you should then consider the issue of insanity. If you are convinced from all of the evidence in the case that the defendant was more probably sane than insane at the time of the offense, then you will have reached that degree of certainty that authorizes conviction. If you are convinced from all the evidence in the case that the defendant was more probably insane than sane at the time of the offense, then you should find the defendant not responsible by reason of insanity.
Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
Sanchez's only quibble...
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