Sand v. Sand
Decision Date | 17 December 1985 |
Docket Number | No. CX-85-980,CX-85-980 |
Citation | 379 N.W.2d 119 |
Parties | In re the Marriage of Anne Loudon SAND, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Richard E. SAND, Respondent. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it adopted standards underlying rehabilitative maintenance to conclude that appellant had an obligation to retrain herself despite an original award of permanent maintenance stipulated to by the parties.
2. Despite this error, the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to modify the maintenance award was proper when she failed to show a substantial change in circumstances.
Kenneth P. Griswold, St. Paul, for appellant.
Todd R. Haugan, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard, considered and decided by FORSBERG, P.J., and PARKER and FOLEY, JJ.
Anne Loudon Sand appeals from a May 1, 1985 order denying her motion for modification in permanent maintenance under Minn.Stat. § 518.64 (1984). Under a January 7, 1975 decree and pursuant to stipulation, maintenance was to be reduced by $300 per month in January 1985. The motion sought to set aside this reduction or, alternatively, to increase the maintenance award. On appeal she claims that the denial of her motion constituted an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
Anne and Richard Sand were married on June 22, 1956 and divorced on January 7 1975. Respondent was at that time, and remains, a physician. Appellant was a housewife and had not worked outside the home since 1962. She was 43 years old and in good health.
Under the decree and pursuant to stipulation, appellant received custody of the couple's two minor children. She was awarded monthly child support of $200 per child which was to terminate at emancipation. Respondent agreed to pay for reasonable college expenses for each child and retain full medical insurance. The parties agreed that respondent could claim both children as dependents for tax purposes. Appellant received marital property consisting of the homestead subject to a $42,000 mortgage, household goods and furnishings, a Wisconsin condominium unit and municipal bonds, totalling approximately $60,000. She also received non-marital property that included an $18,000 note, $5,000 in a savings account and 300 shares of General Motors common stock.
Appellant was further awarded permanent alimony:
[Dr. Sand] shall pay [Mrs. Sand] as alimony $1,800.00 per month in two installments of $900.00 each * * *. The first installment shall be due January 5, 1975. This alimony shall continue for 10 years until January 5, 1985 when it shall be reduced $300.00 per month to $1,500.00 per month payable in two equal installments * * *. All alimony shall cease in the event [Mrs. Sand] dies or remarries.
On March 13, 1976, the first child attained majority, and on July 9, 1980 the second child attained majority. Maintenance remained at $1,800 per month. On January 11, 1985, appellant motioned for a modification in maintenance so as to eliminate the $300 reduction effective on January 5, 1985. Alternately, she sought an increase in maintenance. Her December 7, 1984 affidavit alleged "considerably reduced circumstances" and claimed increases in expenditures: 24% in mortgage payments, 93% in overall household expenses and 8% in taxes. The affidavit further alleged net income from self-employment ranging from a high of $2,664 in 1979 to a low of $262 in 1983. She asserted that her outside income was limited to the General Motors stock and $170 annually from a municipal bond. The affidavit also contained a general allegation of "poor health."
At a March 11, 1985 hearing, the referee was informed that respondent's counter-motion to dismiss had been only recently submitted. Appellant was granted 10 days to respond. Response was to be limited to respondent's counter-motion and affidavit. Appellant submitted a second affidavit on March 20, 1985. In it she alleged a deterioration in health and an inability to afford medical insurance. She further alleged that the Wisconsin condominium was involved in bankruptcy proceeding, a fact she claimed respondent knew. On May 1, 1985, by order, the district court adopted the referee's findings and recommendation to deny the motion. Appellant appeals from that order.
1. Did the trial court's determination that the wife had a duty to rehabilitate and retrain herself despite an award of permanent maintenance in the dissolution decree constitute reversible error?
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to modify the spousal maintenance award?
The appeal from the district court's order denying the motion to modify is properly grounded in Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03(e) under the authority of King v. Carroll, 356 N.W.2d 449 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). A trial court has broad discretion in determining matters relating to maintenance. An appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court's determination is based on a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47 (Minn.1984); Nelson v. Nelson, 371 N.W.2d 19 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). Moreover, a maintenance award is to be modified only when there is clear proof of a substantial change in circumstances from the time of the divorce. Peterson v. Peterson, 304 Minn. 578, 231 N.W.2d 85 (1975).
A party seeking modification in a maintenance award must positively show one or more of the following:
(1) substantially increased or decreased earnings of a party; (2) substantially increased or decreased need of a party; * * * or (4) a change in the cost-of-living for either party as measured by the federal bureau of statistics, any of which makes the terms unreasonable and unfair.
Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (1984). In the present case, appellant sought modification on alternate grounds. First, the substantially increased earnings of respondent, and second, her substantially increased need.
1. Permanent Maintenance/Duty to Rehabilitate. Although the parties may not have labeled their language as such, it is clear that the 1975 dissolution decree awarded appellant permanent maintenance. Appellant argues chiefly that given this fact, she was not legally obligated to rehabilitate herself. She claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it concluded that occupational rehabilitation was required. She supports this claim by referring to legal inconsistencies contained within the trial court's order:
Minnesota appellate decisions concerning rehabilitative maintenance are not applicable to this proceeding.
* * *
* * *
10. That the purpose of spousal maintenance is to care for the wife's needs after divorce, not to provide her with a lifetime profit-sharing plan, Kaiser v. Kaiser, 290 Minn. 173, 186 N.W.2d 678 (1971); that, although the maintenance award was permanent, Petitioner had an obligation to retrain or rehabilitate herself so as to increase her earning power; that there has not been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of the parties as contemplated by M.S. Chapter 518.64, Subd. 2; that the failure of the Petitioner to increase her earning potential with an award of permanent alimony at age 45 should not become the husband's responsibility and basis for an increase in maintenance, See Crampton v. Crampton, (Minn.App.1984); and that Petitioner's motion for an increase in spousal maintenance should be and is hereby denied. (emphasis supplied)
The court's "profit-sharing" remark is merely dictum. Accordingly, we confine our discussion to the trial court's conclusion that an obligation to rehabilitate exists despite an award of permanent maintenance and its finding that appellant did not meet this standard.
It is well established that conclusions of law are not binding on appellate courts. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn.1977); A.J. Chromy Construction Co. v. Commercial Mechanical Services, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Minn.1977). In such circumstances, an appellate court is free to exercise its independent judgment. Van Dee Loo v. Van Dee Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) ( ). Moreover, findings of fact that are controlled or influenced by errors of law will be set aside by a reviewing court. In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940). Appellant contends that the court's reference to Crampton v. Crampton, 356 N.W.2d 768 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), as support for its decision, signifies that it utilized an erroneous standard. We agree that Crampton is not applicable to this case.
In Crampton, the appellant/wife sought to continue maintenance beyond the eight-year period designated in the original decree. The sole ground asserted for modification was a substantial increase in the husband's earnings. The trial court denied the motion and this court affirmed, stating:
The court viewed the original award as one for "rehabilitative maintenance," as described in Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.1980), and felt that Julia Crampton's rehabilitative failure should not become Richard Crampton's responsibility.
Crampton, 356 N.W.2d at 770 (emphasis supplied).
In Crampton, the appellant's failure to increase her earning power was not in itself dispositive. The failure to do so became a key factor because the original maintenance award was "rehabilitative" in nature. Here, there is no debate over the original award as permanent in nature.
Appellant relies on Ramsay v. Ramsay, 305 Minn. 321, 233 N.W.2d 729 (1975), to support her claim that rehabilitation or retraining is not an obligation that co-exists with permanent maintenance. In Ramsay, as in the present case, the parties entered into a pre-dissolution stipulation. Five years later, the husband motioned for a termination in alimony payments because the wife started working on a part-time basis and could have extended her...
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