Sandee Manufacturing Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.
| Decision Date | 08 February 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 13427.,13427. |
| Citation | 298 F.2d 41 |
| Parties | SANDEE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROHM & HAAS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
William C. Wines, Erwin H. Greenberg, Carl J. Greenberg, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
A. Leslie Hodson, Howard Ellis, Max E. Wildman, Howard G. Krane, Chicago, Ill., Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for appellee.
Before SCHNACKENBERG, KNOCH and SWYGERT, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court dismissing an action because plaintiff failed to prosecute its case. It is argued that the trial court abused its discretion by insisting the case go forward and in dismissing the case after plaintiff said it was not prepared for trial. The dismissal ended a case that had been on the docket for five years and came after nine pre-trials and four trial settings. A detailed history of the litigation follows a summary of its nature.
Defendant, Rohm & Haas Company, manufactures a basic chemical material, acrylic monomer, from which there can be produced cast sheets and molding powder for the making of a variety of plastic products. Defendant also manufactures cast sheets and molding powder from its monomer under the trade name "Plexiglas." Plaintiff, Sandee Manufacturing Company, is a plastic products manufacturer who uses an extrusion process with the molding powder. Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that defendant has monopolized the monomer as well as the sheet and powder markets. It further charges that defendant conspired with E.I. duPont deNemours & Company to fix the prices of both the monomer and powder. It is plaintiff's claim that defendant's conduct was in violation of the federal antitrust laws, and that because of such conduct it suffered severe losses of invested capital and lessened sales and profits. Damages of $3,000,000 are requested.
The complaint was filed November 1, 1955. By stipulation, time to answer was extended to February 1, 1956, when the answer was filed with a motion to strike. Defendant did not file its brief in support of the motion to strike until June 22, 1956. Opposing and reply briefs followed and on February 26, 1957, the District Court heard arguments on the motion. Judge Campbell determined that a clarification of the complaint was essential to a disposition of the motion. Defendant moved for a more definite statement September 23, 1957. Plaintiff did not amend until November 24, 1958, possibly because its then counsel were negotiating to withdraw their appearances. On October 1, 1958, plaintiff's present counsel entered the case. On March 20, 1959, the District Court ruled on the motion to strike and on objections to plaintiff's interrogatories.
It is apparent that March 20, 1959, is the critical date with respect to the issue before us. From this date onward discovery proceeded in earnest in anticipation of a forthcoming trial. Defendant filed answers to the bulk of plaintiff's interrogatories August 17, 1959, and informally advised plaintiff February 26, 1960, that it had concluded its discovery.
Between August 20, 1959, and December 19, 1960, the trial court conducted nine pre-trial conferences and set the case for trial four times. The first tentative setting was made for May or June, 1960. At the pre-trial conference on April 20, 1960, plaintiff represented it needed more time to complete its examination of documents and conduct other discovery. Accordingly, the District Court set another pre-trial for May 20, 1960, and the trial date at the head of the call September 12, 1960. The case did not go to trial September 12, because plaintiff's counsel at pre-trials in August stated that although he thought he had sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case, he wanted to examine defendant's documents to meet an affirmative defense.
At the October 6 pre-trial plaintiff represented it would conclude discovery by October 30, and the trial court set the case for a final pre-trial and trial December 12, 1960. When the case was called for trial December 12, plaintiff moved for a 90 days' continuance, stating it was not in a position to present any documents in pre-trial conference or otherwise because it did not know if they had any probative value or to which issues they pertained. The court appealed to plaintiff to begin the pre-trial which was for the purpose of presenting documentary evidence relied upon. The pre-trial was to proceed in an "unhurried"...
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