Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida

• Decision Date: 08 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-10312,00-10312
• Citation: 243 F.3d 1282
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2001) Jerry SANDERLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1282

243 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001)

Jerry SANDERLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-10312.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

March 8, 2001.

March 27, 2001.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 99-06641-CV-WPD), William P. Dimitrouleas, Judge.

Before EDMONDSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI^*, Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Jerry Sanderlin appeals the district court's order granting Defendant Seminole Tribe of Florida ("Tribe")'s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Sanderlin also appeals the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration as well as that court's denial of his motion to compel certain jurisdiction-related discovery. In his complaint Sanderlin alleges that the Tribe discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of the federal Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the case because it found that the Tribe was entitled to the sovereign immunity accorded Native American tribes. Sanderlin does not dispute that the Tribe generally would be entitled to immunity, but asserts that in this context Congress has abrogated that immunity, and additionally that the Tribe waived whatever immunity it may have had by accepting federal funds.

Because the Tribe has not waived its sovereign immunity, and Congress did not expressly abrogate that immunity through the Rehabilitation Act, the district court properly dismissed Sanderlin's lawsuit. Nor did the district court commit reversible error by denying Sanderlin's motion for reconsideration and motion to compel. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

The relevant background is straightforward. Sanderlin was hired by the Tribe, a federally-recognized Native American tribe, in January 1993 to be a law enforcement officer with the Seminole Department of Law Enforcement ("SDLE"). In July 1996, Sanderlin suffered a seizure, and subsequently was diagnosed with epilepsy. On July 17, 1996, Sanderlin returned to light duty with a restriction against the use of a firearm or the operation of a police cruiser. Sanderlin was accommodated in that way through January 6, 1997, when he returned to work on road patrol. On March 20, 1998, Sanderlin suffered another seizure. Three days later he returned to full duty with a driving restriction. On June 21, 1998, however, Sanderlin was terminated.

On May 26, 1999, Sanderlin filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging that the Tribe had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability (epilepsy), in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701, et seq. ("the Act"). In his complaint, Sanderlin alleged that he was able to perform the essential functions of a law enforcement officer either with or without reasonable accommodation, and that "[t]he Defendant refused to provide a reasonable accommodation to the Plaintiff for his continued employment." Sanderlin sought reinstatement, with any necessary reasonable accommodation, to his previous position, or alternatively front pay. Sanderlin also sought compensatory and punitive damages and back pay.

On July 30, 1999, the Tribe moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tribe argued that it was immune from suit under the Act because it had not waived its tribal sovereign immunity nor had Congress expressly and unmistakably abrogated that immunity. While the motion to dismiss was pending, Sanderlin filed a motion to compel discovery, seeking to compel the Tribe to produce documents reflecting its receipt of funds from the United States Government ("Government"). These documents, according to Sanderlin, were relevant to establishing jurisdiction.

On December 21, 1999, the district court granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss, holding that it did not have jurisdiction over Sanderlin's claim because the Tribe had not waived its right to tribal immunity and Congress had not abrogated tribal immunity under the Act. In the same order, the court also denied all pending motions, including Sanderlin's motion to compel, as moot. On December 30, 1999, Sanderlin, citing new evidence, moved the district court to reconsider the dismissal order. The district court denied that motion on January 5, 2000. This appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo the district court's dismissal of a complaint for sovereign immunity. See State of Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (11th Cir.1999); Florida Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1128 (11th Cir.1999). The denial of a motion for reconsideration or a motion to compel discovery is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir.1998) ("This court reviews the denial of a Rule 59 motion [for reconsideration] for an abuse of discretion."); Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir.1999) (reviewing denial of a motion to compel for abuse of discretion).

III.

We address first the question of sovereign immunity and subject matter jurisdiction. It is well-settled that "[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 1702, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 909, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991) ("Suits against Indian tribes are [ ] barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation."); Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1241 ("A suit against an Indian tribe is ... barred unless the tribe clearly waived its immunity or Congress expressly abrogated that immunity by authorizing the suit."); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 63 F.3d 1030, 1038 n. 30 (11th Cir.1995) (same). Although Congress "has occasionally authorized limited classes of suits against Indian tribes" and "has always been at liberty to dispense with [ ] tribal immunity or to limit it," it nevertheless has "consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 510, 111 S.Ct. at 910. Moreover, "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit." Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 2403, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985) (same); Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985); see also Florida Paraplegic Ass'n, 166 F.3d at 1130 ("[W]e should not assume lightly that Congress intended to restrict Indian sovereignty through a piece of legislation.").

Sanderlin contends that both exceptions to the rule of tribal sovereign immunity are present in this case. He asserts that the Tribe waived its immunity by accepting federal funds contingent on compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. He also asserts that Congress abrogated tribal immunity when it enacted relevant portions of the Act. We consider these arguments in turn.

A.

Sanderlin argues that, by accepting federal funds, the Tribe voluntarily waived its right to immunity from lawsuits under the Rehabilitation Act. Sanderlin does not suggest that the Tribe explicitly waived its right to immunity, but rather maintains that the Tribe did so implicitly when Tribal Chief and Chairman James Billie accepted federal funds on the Tribe's behalf. This implied waiver argument has two parts. First, Sanderlin contends that Chief Billie acted with actual or apparent authority to waive the Tribe's sovereign immunity when he entered into contracts with the Government for the receipt by the Tribe of federal funds. Second, Sanderlin contends that by entering into these contracts-which required the Tribe to refrain from discrimination on the basis of disability-Chief Billie specifically waived the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suits under the Rehabilitation Act.

We are unpersuaded. "The Supreme Court has made it plain that waivers of tribal sovereign immunity cannot be implied on the basis of a tribe's actions, but must be unequivocally expressed." Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1243. Although the Court has expressed some skepticism regarding the current expansive state of tribal sovereign immunity, it has declined to rewrite its existing case law and has instead deferred to Congress to alter or narrow the bounds of that immunity. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758, 118 S.Ct. at 1704 (noting that "in our interdependent and mobile society, ... tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance," but declining to revisit the broad grant of immunity afforded by prior decisions). Sanderlin has not presented any evidence sufficient to show that Seminole Tribe expressly and unmistakably waived its right to sovereign immunity from suit. The evidence is all to the contrary.

Sanderlin points to the following four transactions in which he says Chief Billie, acting as an agent of the Tribe, bound the Tribe in contracts with the Government that waived the Tribe's immunity for Rehabilitation Act claims.

One, in July 1995, the Government awarded the Tribe $189,000 for a drug elimination program. Prior to disbursement, the Government required the Tribe to agree to "prohibit discrimination against handicapped individuals under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) and implementing regulations at 24 C.F.R. Part 8."

Two, in September 1997, the Government approved the Tribe's request for a Child Care and Development Fund for the period October 1, 1997 through September 30, 1999. By signing the funding request, Chief Billie assured the Government that the Tribe "will comply with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ... and all...