Sanders, In re

• Decision Date: 26 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. S043131,S043131
• Citation: 21 Cal.4th 697,981 P.2d 1038,87 Cal.Rptr.2d 899
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 981 P.2d 1038, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6978, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8891 In re Ronald Lee SANDERS on Habeas Corpus

Page 899

87 Cal.Rptr.2d 899

21 Cal.4th 697, 981 P.2d 1038, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6978,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8891

In re Ronald Lee SANDERS on Habeas Corpus.

No. S043131.

Supreme Court of California

Aug. 26, 1999.

Faegre & Benson, Robert L. Collins, Mary Cullen Yeager, Eric E. Jorstad; and Nina Rivkind for Petitioner.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, W. Scott Thorpe and Jane N. Kirkland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

Our recent decisions in In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311 (Robbins ), and In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d 290 (Gallego ), explained many aspects of the timeliness rules applicable to petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In general, those decisions explain that such petitions should be filed without substantial delay, or good cause must be shown for the delay. In this case, counsel representing a capital defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of potentially meritorious claims in the face of triggering facts, leading to a substantial delay in the presentation of the defendant's legal claims by the defendant's subsequent attorney. We must thus decide whether prior counsel's inaction is relevant to a determination of whether petitioner has stated good cause for the delay. On the particular facts of this case, we conclude that when, as here, an attorney representing a capital defendant essentially abandons his client and fails, in the face of triggering facts, to conduct an investigation in order to determine whether there exist potentially meritorious claims, such abandonment constitutes good cause for substantial delay in the presentation of potentially meritorious claims by subsequent counsel. ¹

BACKGROUND

Because we are concerned only with the procedural aspects of this case, the facts of petitioner's crime are not relevant. Suffice it to say, petitioner Ronald Lee Sanders and one John Cebreros committed a home invasion robbery of Dale Boender, a drug dealer, and his girlfriend, Janice Allen. Both victims were bound and blindfolded and struck on the head with a blunt object. Boender survived, but Allen died.

Petitioner was convicted in Kern County Superior Court of first degree murder, attempted murder, robbery, burglary and attempted robbery. The jury also found true two allegations that petitioner was armed with a firearm, as well as four special-circumstance allegations: the murder was committed while petitioner was engaged in the commission or the attempted commission of the robbery and burglary (Pen.Code, § 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i) Still represented by counsel appointed by this court, petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on May 28, 1991. (Sanders v. California (1991) 500 U.S. 948, 949, 111 S.Ct. 2249, 114 L.Ed.2d 490.) Counsel did not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court. Thereafter, the People obtained an order from the superior court authorizing petitioner's execution. (§ 1227.) Petitioner successfully moved in federal court for a stay of the proceedings and appointment of new counsel. Newly appointed counsel subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on December 20, 1993. (Sanders v. Vasquez, CV-F-92-5471-REC-P.) After the People moved successfully to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this court on November 7, 1994. In his informal response (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 60), respondent Attorney General claimed, inter alia, that all of petitioner's claims were untimely and should be denied for that reason.

& (vii), see now subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)); ² the victim was intentionally killed to prevent her testimony in a criminal proceeding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10)); and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(14)). The jury set the penalty at death. This court appointed counsel to represent petitioner. Thereafter, on appeal, this court set aside two of the four special-circumstance findings, but otherwise affirmed the judgment in its entirety. (People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.)

On June 13, 1996, we ordered the Director of Corrections to show cause "(1) whether, and under what circumstances, ineffective assistance of counsel may explain or excuse delay in presentation of a claim on habeas corpus (see In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729; Supreme Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death, Policy 3, stds. 1-1, 1-2, 1-3), (2) whether counsel appointed to represent petitioner in his automatic appeal rendered ineffective assistance as to any claim set forth in the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus by failing to investigate and present that claim at an earlier time, and (3) whether this court must therefore determine whether any such claim states a prima facie case for relief on the merits. (See People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 119, fn. 37, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127; In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875, fn. 4, 87 Cal.Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1.)"

DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

As explained recently in Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, we insist a litigant mounting a collateral challenge to a final criminal judgment do so in a timely fashion. By requiring that such challenges be made reasonably promptly, we vindicate society's interest in the finality of its criminal judgments, as well as the public's interest "in the orderly and reasonably prompt implementation of its laws." (Id. at p. 778, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.) Such timeliness rules serve other salutary interests as well. Requiring a prisoner to file his or her challenge promptly helps ensure that possibly vital evidence will not be lost through the passage of time or the fading of memories. In addition, we cannot overestimate the value of the psychological repose that may come for the victim, or the surviving family and friends of the victim, generated by the knowledge the ordeal is finally over. Accordingly, we enforce time limits on the filing of petitions for writs of habeas corpus in noncapital cases (see, e.g., In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304, 209 P.2d 793) as well as in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed (Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311; Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th 825, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d The manifest need for time limits on collateral attacks on criminal judgments, however, must be tempered with the knowledge that mistakes in the criminal justice system are sometimes made. Despite the substantive and procedural protections afforded those accused of committing crimes, the basic charters governing our society wisely hold open a final possibility for prisoners to prove their convictions were obtained unjustly. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2 [limiting federal government's power to suspend writ of habeas corpus]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 11 [limiting state government's power to suspend writ of habeas corpus].) A writ of "[h]abeas corpus may thus provide an avenue of relief to those unjustly incarcerated when the normal method of relief--i.e., direct appeal--is inadequate" (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 828, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391, fn. omitted), and the Great Writ has been justifiably lauded as " 'the safe-guard and the palladium of our liberties' " (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 764, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, quoting In re Begerow (1901) 133 Cal. 349, 353, 65 P. 828; see also Lonchar v. Thomas (1996) 517 U.S. 314, 322, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 134 L.Ed.2d 440, quoting Smith v. Bennett (1961) 365 U.S. 708, 712, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 [writ of habeas corpus is the "highest safeguard of liberty"] ).

290; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729 (Clark )).

A tension is thus created between society's desire for finality of its criminal judgments and its insistence the person being punished is actually guilty of the crimes of which he or she was convicted. One way we attempt to resolve this tension is to require collateral challenges be filed promptly, but to excuse delay on a showing of good cause. In capital cases, the timeliness of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is evaluated according to a four-pronged test. We recently explained this test in Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, which incorporates policy 3 of the Supreme Court Policies: "Pursuant to policies adopted by this court in June 1989, a habeas corpus petition is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness if it is filed more than 90 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant's reply brief on the direct appeal. In such a case, to avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. [p] Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.... [p] A claim or a part thereof that is substantially delayed nevertheless will be considered on the merits if the petitioner can demonstrate good cause for the delay.... [p] A claim that is substantially delayed without good cause, and hence is untimely, nevertheless will be entertained on the merits if the petitioner demonstrates (i) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (ii) that the...