Sanders v. Blue Ridge Glass Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1930
• Citation: 33 S.W.2d 84,161 Tenn. 535
• Parties: SANDERS v. BLUE RIDGE GLASS CORPORATION.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

33 S.W.2d 84

161 Tenn. 535

SANDERS v. BLUE RIDGE GLASS CORPORATION.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 28, 1930

Error to Chancery Court, Sullivan County; H. T. Campbell Chancellor.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Ira Sanders claimant, opposed by the Blue Ridge Glass Corporation employer. The chancellor granted an award, and both parties bring error.

Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.

John R Todd, Jr., and R. B. Dade, both of Kingsport, and Robert Burrow, of Bristol, for complainant.

Kelly & Penn and Dodson & Ferguson, all of Kingsport, for defendant.

SWIGGART J.

Ira Sanders is claimant for compensation from his employer. The chancellor decreed that he is entitled to compensation as for a permanent partial disability. On his appeal in error, Sanders contends that his disability is both permanent and total, and that compensation should be awarded accordingly.

The employer prosecutes its appeal in error, to reverse the finding of the chancellor that the disability suffered by Sanders is the proximate result of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. It is contended that there is no evidence to support this finding.

At the time of the accident, which is the basis of the claim, January 14, 1930, Sanders had been in the employ of the defendant five months. He had performed manual labor of a general nature, without inconvenience or pain. On the date named, he was engaged in unloading some blocks of metal, weighing several hundred pounds, from a freight car to a platform, using an ordinary two-wheel hand truck for the purpose. The wheels of the truck struck a small obstruction, causing the body of the truck to pitch forward and upward. One of the truck handles struck the left side of Sanders, under his arm. By "straining himself" Sanders succeeded in bringing the truck back to level, having been instructed "not to break the block."

Sanders described the immediate effects of the blow on his side and strain as including dizziness, difficulty in breathing, and pain through his chest and in the region of his heart. After a short halt, he continued his work during the afternoon, and then called on two doctors without finding either in his office. His pain and discomfort continued during the night, and on the next day he went to his work, but was unable to do much. On that evening he consulted Dr. Keener.

The chancellor accredited the testimony of Sanders, describing the accident, blow, strain, and immediate effects; and his finding thereon is conclusive on appeal. Milne v. Sanders, 143 Tenn. 602, 228 S.W. 702.

The chancellor found further that, as a result of the injury thus sustained by Sanders, a pre-existing heart trouble was aggravated, disabling him from thereafter performing anything except "light work, not attended with unusual exertion or hard work."

Dr. Keener, who examined Sanders on the second day after he was hurt, testified that he then found Sanders had a "very much enlarged heart and leaking valve," and that he was then permanently and totally disabled "so far as any hard work or manual labor is concerned."

Drs. Reed and Tipton testified for the defendant that in May, 1929, seven or eight months before the accident, they examined Sanders to determine his fitness for employment by another employer of labor in Kingsport, and that they then found and reported that Sanders had a defective valve in his heart, which they considered would render it dangerous for him to do heavy work; on account of which his application for employment was rejected.

The chancellor appears to have accepted so much of the testimony of these doctors; and the issue on the employer's appeal is whether there is any material evidence to sustain the chancellor's finding that the condition reported by Drs. Reed and Tipton in May, 1929, was augmented and aggravated by the blow and strain suffered by Sanders in January, so as to cause the disability existing after that date.

Drs. Reed and Tipton again examined Sanders, after his accident, in the latter part of February, and testified that his heart condition was "some better," and "in better condition" than it was when they examined him in 1929; that the principal change was an increased blood pressure, which indicated to them that the muscles of the heart had grown stronger and were better able to overcome the ill effects of the leaky valve. Dr. Reed testified: "He is more able to work now than he was then, from the records of the examination." Dr. Tipton testified to the same effect.

This testimony of Drs. Reed and Tipton is in direct opposition to other evidence; and it was necessary for the chancellor to make a choice. He evidently rejected it in favor of the undisputed testimony that Sanders worked without pain or distress for five months after the first examination, and that his ability to work was suddenly and abruptly terminated upon sustaining a blow over his heart, and a severe strain, following which he was wholly unable to do any heavy work, not only according to the testimony of himself and his wife, but supported by the testimony of Dr. Keener, above referred to. The conflict may be likened to the traditional conflict between theory and practice, in which the latter so often demonstrates the error of the former.

Dr. Keener was asked "if any kind of serious blow or lick would tend to cause the trouble you find now with his heart?" He replied: "I do not think that would cause a normal heart to, but it would probably make an abnormal heart worse." Again he testified that a blow or lick "might have a tendency to increase the leakage of the heart; it might increase that." This is expert testimony sustaining the opinion or finding of the chancellor that the injury aggravated the already abnormal condition of petitioner's heart.

Counsel for the employer depreciate the value of Dr. Keener's testimony because on cross-examination he was asked whether the "heart condition he found could have been brought about by traumatism," and replied: "It's not likely to be." Counsel say: "He nowhere states that petitioner's heart condition is due in whole or in part to the alleged blow. He does state the perfectly obvious fact that a severe blow might make an abnormal heart worse."

In making this contention and admission, counsel overlook the real nature and purpose of expert testimony. Physicians are not substituted for the court in the determination of the cause of the petitioner's disability, in a case of this character. The rule is that: "Where the cause of an existing condition or injury is in...