Sanders v. Charleston Consol. Ry. & Lighting Co, (No. 12817.)
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Writing for the Court | COTHRAN |
Citation | 151 S.E. 438 |
Docket Number | (No. 12817.) |
Decision Date | 23 January 1930 |
Parties | SANDERS. v. CHARLESTON CONSOL. RY. & LIGHTING CO. |
151 S.E. 438
SANDERS.
v.
CHARLESTON CONSOL. RY. & LIGHTING CO.
(No. 12817.)
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jan. 23, 1930.
[151 S.E. 439]
Carter, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Charleston County; W. H. Townsend, Judge.
Action by J. J. Sanders, Jr., against the Charleston Consolidated Railway & Lighting Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.
The complaint, answer, the judge's charge, the remarks of the court in refusing a motion for a new trial, and the exceptions, were as follows:
The Complaint was verified and alleges: First: That as plaintiff is informed and believes, defendant above named is now and at the times hereinafter mentioned was a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the State of South Carolina, and as such at the times hereinafter mentioned owned, operated and maintained an electric lighting plant in the City of Charleston, together with wires carrying a high and deadly current of electricity and more particularly certain of such wires located on Harris Street, a public street in the City of Charleston.
Second: That on or about the 20th day of November, 1026, plaintiff and his nephew, Carroll Huggins, a lad of about sixteen years of age, were in the yard in the rear of premises, corner Harris and Meeting Streets, in the City of Charleston, where the said plaintiff lived; that the said Carroll Huggins, in play and sport, tied a long wire to a piece of iron and telling his grandmother that he was going to throw it into the marsh, threw the iron with the wire attached in the direction of the marsh; that the piece of iron fell and in doing so the wire attached to said iron came across an electric wire owned by said defendant corporation and strung along said Harris Street and carrying a high and deadly current of electricity, the insulation on said wire having been allowed by said defendant to become worn and defective; that when the said lad, Carroll Huggins, saw that the wire attached to the piece of iron which he had thrown had caught over said electric wire, he ran out in the street and in a few minutes plaintiff heard him scream and rushed out to see what the trouble was; that as he did so and got in the street he saw his nephew, Carroll Huggins, lying on the ground dying, the said nephew having come in contact with the wire which had been thrown over the electric wire of defendant corporation, which said electric wire was carrying a high and dangerous current of electricity and on which the insulation had been allowed by said defendant to become worn and defective; that in the alarm, confusion, excitement and emergency of the situation, in going to the aid of said nephew, plaintiff became entangled in the wire attached to the missile which the said Carroll Huggins had thrown, and said wire, having become highly charged with electricity by reason of the insulation on said wire belonging to said defendant having been allowed to wear off, and become defective, he received a frightful and terrible shock from said highly charged wire, he was rendered unconscious, his right hand was burned at the wrist and side and crippled, he was badly burned on the side and back, burned in the mouth and nose and his left hand so horribly and frightfully burned that it was obliged to be amputated above the wrist. He was taken to a hospital where he remained for weeks and weeks, suffering the most excruciating and agonizing pain, was afterwards taken to his home, still suffering, and is permanently disfigured, maimed and crippled.
Third: That the injuries to plaintiff, as aforesaid, were caused by the negligence, carelessness, recklessness and wantonness of said defendant corporation, its agents and servants, in the following particulars, to wit:
(a) In causing and allowing the insulation to be worn off and become defective on its wires on Harris Street, which said wires carried a high and dangerous electric current.
(b) In failing and omitting to keep said wires, carrying said high and dangerous current of electricity over a public street in the City of Charleston, properly insulated.
(c) In failing and omitting to have made any proper inspection of said wires, carrying said deadly current of electricity, so as to have ascertained their defective condition.
Fourth: That by reason of the negligence, carelessness, recklessness and wantonness of said defendant corporation, its agents and servants, as above set forth, said plaintiff was caused to suffer the most frightful and excruciating pain and anguish, was burned, maimed and disfigured and crippled, had his left hand so badly injured that it had to be amputated and was permanently injured to his damage One hundred thousand ($100,000) Dollars.
[151 S.E. 440]The answer was verified and sets forth:
1. That the South Carolina Power Company is the successor to the Charleston Consolidated Railway and Lighting Company, Defendant herein.
2. Answering the first paragraph of said Complaint defendant admits that it is a South Carolina Corporation and owns a lighting plant and distributing system which includes poles and wires through Harris Street, in the City of Charleston, and alleges that the said wires were safely and securely suspended and not dangerous unless some person through his own reckless or wilful act using some independent instrumentality such as a metallic wire, throws the same over the aforesaid wire in such a reckless manner as to ground the current from the wire through his body.
3. Defendant denies the allegations of the second, third and fourth paragraphs of said Complaint, being the remaining paragraphs of the complaint, except that Defendant is informed and believes that on the 20th day of November, 1926, Carroll Huggins, a nephew of the plaintiff, standing on the ground, recklessly threw a stove lifter attached to a piece of copper wire over an electric wire on the poles on Harris Street and grounded the current in the wire creating a danger that resulted in injuries to this plaintiff, Jabez J. Sanders, Jr., when the plaintiff placed himself in contact with the capper wire that Carroll Huggins had thrown up over the power line. And defendant alleges on information and belief that the said injuries to plaintiff, Jabez J. Sanders, Jr., were caused by the rashness, negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the plaintiff, who without taking any precaution to avoid the injury placed himself in contact with a piece of electrically charged copper wire which he knew was dangerous and which could not be handled by any human being without the aid of a stick or other insulator, and he brought about his own injury. And defendant denies that the insulation on the wires was worn or defective or that the wires wore improperly insulated and that the injuries were in any way due to the negligence, recklessness or wilfulness of this defendant, or of its agents, or servants and alleges that the accident was duo to rashness, negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the plaintiff.
4. Further answering said Complaint and for a further defense defendant alleges on information and belief that whatever injuries plaintiff Jabez J. Sanders, Jr., received were due to and caused by the rashness, negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the plaintiff, as a proximate cause thereof, and without which the injury would not have occurred, combining with the alleged acts of negligence, carelessness, recklessness and wantonness of the defendant, in that plaintiff, who in the face of a visible danger and without taking any precaution to avoid an injury, placed himself in contact with a piece of electrically charged copper wire, which he knew was dangerous, and could not be handled by a man without the aid of a stick or other insulator, and in consequence of this he was unable to handle the wire and the injury resulted.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover damages for injuries to his person or body by burns alleged to have been caused by the carelessness, negligence, recklessness or wantonness of the defendant in maintaining an electric power wire carrying a high and dangerous electric current in and over a street in this city (a) on which it allowed the insulation to be worn off and become defective, (b) in failing and omitting to have such wires properly insulated, (c) in omitting to make any proper inspection of the wires so as to ascertain their defective condition.
The defendant denies that it has been either careless or negligent or reckless or wanton in any particular alleged in the complaint, that the plaintiff has been injured as claimed by. him, and the burden is on the plaintiff to prove such allegations by the greater weight of the evidence before he would be entitled to recover any damages. The defendant claims that whatever injuries plaintiff may have received were proximately due to the acts of Carroll Huggins, a third person, for whose conduct defendant is not responsible, in throwing a stove lifter attached to a piece of copper wire over an electric wire of defendant on Harris Street, which grounded the current in the wire, and created the danger which injured plaintiff when the plaintiff placed himself in contact with the wire so thrown by Carroll Huggins over the power line. The defendant denies that the insulation on its wires was worn or defective, and denies that its wires were improperly installed, and that plaintiff's injuries were due to any negligence, recklessness, wilfulness or wantonness on the part of defendant or of its agents or servants. Defendant claims that whatever injuries were sustained by plaintiff were proximately due to and caused by the plaintiff's own rashness, and contributory negligence, recklessness, wilfulness or wantonness, without which the injury would not have occurred, combining with any wrongful acts, if any there were, on the part of the defendant, in that...
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Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Melendez, Record No. 992957.
...case. See e.g., Reed v. Kinnik, 389 Pa, 143, 132 A.2d 208, 210 (1957); Sanders v. Charleston Consol. Ry. & Lighting Co., 154 S.C. 220, 151 S.E. 438, 447 Instead, the issue we must address is whether it is within a trial court's exercise of discretion to direct a jury to deliberate furth......
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Gramling v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., Civ. A. No. 1997.
...contradict the record. State v. Cash, 1927, 138 S.C. 167, 136 S.E. 222; Sanders v. Charleston Consol. R. & L. Co., 1930, 154 S.C. 220, 151 S.E. 438; Caines v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1941, 196 S.C. 502, 14 S.E.2d The public policy on which this rule is grounded is expressed in 53......
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State v. Linder, No. 21452
...whether they assented and still assent to the verdict. Sanders v. Charleston Consolidated Railway & Lighting Company, 154 S.C. 220, 151 S.E. 438 (1930). In Sanders this Court noted that "until a verdict has been published and recorded, it may be recalled and altered by the jury, an......
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Weatherhead v. Burau, No. 35827
...54 P.2d 290; Kramer v. Kister, 187 Pa. 227, 40 A. 1008, 44 L.R.A. 432; Sanders v. Charleston Consol. Ry. & Lighting Co., 154 S.C. 220, 151 S.E. 438; Coughlin v. Weeks, 75 Wash. 568, 135 P. 649; State ex rel. Volkman v. Waltermath, 162 Wis. 602, 156 N.W. 946; Lawrence v. Stearns, 11 Pick......
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Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Melendez, Record No. 992957.
...case. See e.g., Reed v. Kinnik, 389 Pa, 143, 132 A.2d 208, 210 (1957); Sanders v. Charleston Consol. Ry. & Lighting Co., 154 S.C. 220, 151 S.E. 438, 447 Instead, the issue we must address is whether it is within a trial court's exercise of discretion to direct a jury to deliberate furth......
-
Gramling v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., Civ. A. No. 1997.
...contradict the record. State v. Cash, 1927, 138 S.C. 167, 136 S.E. 222; Sanders v. Charleston Consol. R. & L. Co., 1930, 154 S.C. 220, 151 S.E. 438; Caines v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1941, 196 S.C. 502, 14 S.E.2d The public policy on which this rule is grounded is expressed in 53......
-
State v. Linder, No. 21452
...whether they assented and still assent to the verdict. Sanders v. Charleston Consolidated Railway & Lighting Company, 154 S.C. 220, 151 S.E. 438 (1930). In Sanders this Court noted that "until a verdict has been published and recorded, it may be recalled and altered by the jury, an......
-
Weatherhead v. Burau, No. 35827
...54 P.2d 290; Kramer v. Kister, 187 Pa. 227, 40 A. 1008, 44 L.R.A. 432; Sanders v. Charleston Consol. Ry. & Lighting Co., 154 S.C. 220, 151 S.E. 438; Coughlin v. Weeks, 75 Wash. 568, 135 P. 649; State ex rel. Volkman v. Waltermath, 162 Wis. 602, 156 N.W. 946; Lawrence v. Stearns, 11 Pick......