Sanders v. Ellington
| Decision Date | 23 August 1968 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 5077. |
| Citation | 288 F. Supp. 937 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
| Parties | Rita SANDERS; Patrick J. Gilpin; Ernest Terrell; Harold Sweatt; and Phillip Sweatt, Individually and as Next Friend of Phillip Sweatt; Citizens and Residents of the State of Tennessee, and Citizens of the United States, Plaintiffs; The United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor; v. Buford ELLINGTON, Governor of the State of Tennessee and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the University of Tennessee; Howard Warf, Commissioner of Education of the State of Tennessee and Chairman of the Tennessee State Board of Education; Tennessee State Board of Education, a State Agency; Tennessee Higher Education Commission, and its Chairman, John R. Long, Jr.; the University of Tennessee, and its President, Andrew Holt; Board of Trustees of the University of Tennessee, and its Vice Chairman, Wassell Randolph; Tennessee A & I State University, and its President, Walter Davis, and its President-elect, Andrew P. Torrence; Interim Committee for Tennessee A & I State University and the members of said Interim Committee, Arthur Danner, William Jackson, and Granville Sawyer, Defendants. |
George Barrett, and John G. Mitchell, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiffs Rita Sanders, and others.
Patrick Hardin, Kermit V. Lipez, Nathan Lewin, and Thomas Hutchison, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., and Carlton Petway, Asst. U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-intervenor, the United States.
John C. Baugh, Gen. Counsel, and James E. Drinnon, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants Buford Ellington, Governor of the State of Tennessee and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the University of Tennessee, The University of Tennessee, and its President, Andrew Holt, Board of Trustees of the University of Tennessee, and its Vice Chairman, Wassell Randolph.
Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Paul E. Jennings, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Tennessee, Nashville, Tenn., for remainder of defendants.
The following is the text of opinion delivered from the Bench on August 21, 1968. Material in brackets has been added to the opinion as delivered.
This action was brought in an effort to prevent the University of Tennessee from constructing a new facility for expanding its program at the Nashville Center. The original plaintiffs are: a member of the faculty at Tennessee A & I State University; a member of the faculty of the University of Tennessee Nashville Center; a Negro student at Tennessee A & I State University; a Negro senior student at Wilson County High School; and the father of this high school student.
Although there has been no question raised by the parties either as to jurisdiction or as to whether this is a proper class action under Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court finds that it does have jurisdiction and it further finds that the action can be sustained as a class action.
The original defendants in the action were: the Governor of Tennessee, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the University of Tennessee; the Commissioner of Education for the State, Chairman of the Tennessee State Board of Education; the Tennessee State Board of Education itself; the Tennessee Higher Education Commission and its Chairman; the University of Tennessee and its President; the Board of Trustees of the University of Tennessee and its Vice-chairman; Tennessee A & I State University and its then President, supplemented later by making as an additional party the newly-designated President of the University; the Interim Committee at the Tennessee A & I State University; the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and its chief executive officer; and the United States Office of Education and its chief executive officer.
By order previously entered the action was dismissed as to the federal defendants.
Subsequently the United States moved to intervene as a party plaintiff under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2, and finding that the statutory requirements were met and that the motion was timely, the court granted the motion to intervene.
By its complaint in intervention the United States seeks not only an injunction to prevent the construction of the new facility, but also asks that this court order the State defendants to present a plan calculated to produce meaningful desegregation of the public universities of Tennessee.
In considering this case it is necessary, in my opinion, to put the present situation in perspective. The history of public educational opportunities for Negroes in Tennessee is not a pretty one. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 the public educational system of Tennessee operated under one-half of the decision of the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson of 1896 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256. The races were certainly kept separate in the schools, but I would assume that no one would argue in good faith that the schools were equal.
The lone institution for so-called higher learning operated by the State of Tennessee for Negroes was the institution now designated as Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial State University. One of its chief functions was, according to the statutory history, the training of teachers.
Response to the decision of the Supreme Court in 1954 by the State was slow and reluctant. Although the blatant racism exhibited by some of the political leaders in states to the south of Tennessee was happily absent here, delay was the order of the day. The dockets of this court and the dockets of the courts in the other districts of Tennessee indicate that most of the progress which took place in the integration of the elementary and secondary schools of the State came as a result of court action. Insofar as its universities are concerned, some six years elapsed before racial requirements for admission were formally abolished.
The record does show, however, that now all institutions of higher learning are at this time pursuing an open-door policy.
Complaint is made here that the dual education system admittedly heretofore established by law in Tennessee has not been dismantled and, to support this allegation, figures have been introduced showing that the historically white institutions still have overwhelmingly white enrollments, and the Tennessee A & I State University still has an overwhelmingly Negro enrollment.
Figures introduced at this hearing indicate that some 57,000 students attend the State's public universities, of whom slightly over 6,000 are Negroes, or approximately 11 percent of the total.
In the individual traditionally white institutions the percentage of Negro enrollment ranges from six-tenths of one percent to a high of about 7 percent at Memphis State University. Incidentally, Memphis State University's percentage is not closely approached by any of the other schools.
On the other hand, Tennessee A & I State University continues substantially all Negro with a Negro enrollment in excess of 99 percent.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the dual system of education created originally by law has not been effectively dismantled. It appears, with the possible exception of Memphis State University, that progress toward desegregating these institutions in the eight years of the open-door policy has been slow. The reasons for this slow progress are, as I view the record, many and diverse.
I do not find, however, that the defendant Board of Trustees for the University of Tennessee or its administrative officials or the State Board of Education operating the other Tennessee public institutions of higher learning or its administrative officials are now or have been in the recent past, and I emphasize recent, guilty of any constitutionally impermissible acts in the administration of the institutions. Rather, it appears to the court clearly evident that the present situation is the result of mistakes and inequities...
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