Sanders v. Jones, 040418 FED6, 15-6384
|Opinion Judge:||SUHRHEINRICH, CIRCUIT JUDGE.|
|Party Name:||AMY SANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAMAR JONES, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Judge Panel:||BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, ROGERS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||April 04, 2018|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit|
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, ROGERS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
SUHRHEINRICH, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
The Supreme Court has vacated our judgment in this case and remanded for further consideration in light of Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017). For the following reasons, we conclude that we lack interlocutory jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings.
In our prior decision we made two rulings. First, we held that, to the extent that Plaintiff Amy Sanders's malicious prosecution claim was based on Defendant Lamar Jones's allegedly false grand jury testimony, Jones was entitled to absolute immunity under Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369 (2012). Second, we held that, to the extent Sanders's malicious prosecution claim was based on Jones's allegedly false police report, it failed because she could not rebut the grand jury indictment's presumption of probable cause without using Jones's grand jury testimony, which carries an evidentiary privilege per Rehberg. See id. (grand jury immunity may extend to use of "evidence of the witness' testimony to support any other § 1983 claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution"); see also Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2015) ("As a general rule, 'the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.'") (quoting Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006)).
After our ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that "a grand jury indictment or preliminary examination" serves to "expunge" any possible "Fourth Amendment claim." Manuel, 137 S.Ct. at 920 n.8. Applying Manuel, this court held in King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2018 WL 311323 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2018), that the presumption of probable cause created by a grand jury indictment is rebuttable "where...
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