Sanders v. Radtke

• Decision Date: 01 September 2022
• Docket Number: 20-1451
• Citation: Sanders v. Radtke, 48 F.4th 502 (7th Cir. 2022)
• Parties: Prentice S. SANDERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dylon RADTKE, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

48 F.4th 502

Prentice S. SANDERS, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Dylon RADTKE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 20-1451

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 20, 2022

Decided September 1, 2022

Ahmad Murrar, Attorney, Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Abigail C.S. Potts, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before Rovner, Brennan, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

Brennan, Circuit Judge.

Prentice Sanders pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first degree intentional homicide and was sentenced to prison. He later sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court summarily denied. On appeal Sanders contends that court erred because his petition plausibly stated claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. But Sanders's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally defaulted, and it plainly appears from Sanders's petition and attached exhibits that he is not entitled to relief on his claim that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. So, we affirm.

I

State Trial Proceedings. In 2011 Sanders drove a U-Haul truck into his sister and her boyfriend and was charged with two counts of attempted first degree intentional homicide. At the time of the offense, Sanders suffered from schizophrenia and was not taking his prescribed medication. He had not completed high school, and his precise educational level was unknown. The state trial court ordered a competency evaluation, and the Wisconsin Forensic Unit reported initially that Sanders lacked the mental capacity to proceed or to assist in his defense. Sanders received treatment, was reevaluated, and a second report suggested he was "malingering" or intentionally producing false symptoms. It also concluded that Sanders was competent to proceed. Rather than contest his competency, Sanders entered into a negotiated agreement to plead guilty to both counts and a plea hearing was held.

In a plea questionnaire, Sanders agreed:

• he had read the criminal complaint and his attorney had read it to him;

• he understood the charges to which he was pleading guilty had elements the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and his attorney had explained those elements to him; and

• he had three years of schooling, and he did not have a high school diploma or equivalent degree.

In response to questions from the state trial court, Sanders reiterated he had read and understood the criminal complaint. When asked whether he had discussed the elements of the charges with his counsel, Sanders replied: "Not really. I would like to go over that again." The court then read the relevant jury instructions to Sanders twice (once for each count). Sanders confirmed he understood that by pleading guilty, he was admitting to the elements of those charges. The state trial court then accepted Sanders's guilty pleas on each count.

Although not discussed at the plea hearing, Sanders's cognitive abilities and educational level were considered at his sentencing hearing. Also discussed at sentencing was whether Sanders could have pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.¹ Specifically, his trial counsel said he and Sanders had conferred on a "not guilty by mental defect claim," but that "[u]ltimately [Sanders] decided to reject that." The state trial court imposed two consecutive terms of seven years initial confinement in prison followed by a total of ten years extended supervision.

State Postconviction Proceedings. On July 13, 2012, the day after sentencing, Sanders gave notice of his intent to pursue postconviction relief and he was appointed new counsel. That attorney filed a no-merit report, concluding that Sanders lacked a meritorious claim that his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered. Sanders filed three responses to the no-merit report, the last on April 30, 2015. He argued that his trial counsel had not discussed available trial defenses or the possibility of pleading not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Sanders also said he had not understood the nature of the charges against him when he entered his guilty pleas.

On January 13, 2016, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the no-merit report, denied appointed counsel's motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal. The state appellate court reasoned that Sanders had pointed to facts outside the record to support his plea withdrawal claim, so it could not resolve the factual disputes. For example, while trial counsel had stated at sentencing that Sanders declined to plead not guilty by reason of mental defect, Sanders argued this was an "outright lie." Sanders further maintained that contrary to his plea questionnaire, trial counsel had not gone over the elements of the homicide charges with him. According to Sanders, he did not know that acting with a specific intent to kill was an element of the offense. And even though the state trial court had reviewed the jury instructions with Sanders, the state appellate court was not convinced he understood the charges. It had "sufficient concerns about whether [Sanders's] pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Accordingly, the state appellate court remanded the case so Sanders could pursue postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing in the state trial court.

On remand, Sanders brought two postconviction motions to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting first that he did not understand the elements of the offenses to which he pleaded, and second that his trial counsel was ineffective. The issues were briefed, and the state trial conducted a Machner hearing on April 28, 2017.² Sanders and his trial counsel testified at the hearing.

In an exceptionally thorough written decision, the state trial court denied both postconviction motions. That court began by making two credibility determinations. It found Sanders's trial counsel "very credible in all regards." To his credit, trial counsel admitted that he could recall some—but not all—of the facts from Sanders's plea hearing about five years earlier, which "demonstrated that he was testifying honestly about what he recalled." In contrast, the court found Sanders's testimony "was generally not credible, and, specifically on critical issues, [his] testimony was evasive, exaggerated, non-specific and/or otherwise not credible." The court "found Sanders to be an intelligent person," who was "quite capable of verbally jousting with the State's attorney and parsing his words on cross examination." Throughout questioning, "Sanders demonstrated that he understood the important issues and that he ... had prepared to respond to significant questions in [a] way that was favorable to his position," repeatedly emphasizing his lack of education and other "themes" supporting his arguments. To the court, these responses "sounded contrived, coached and/or insincere," and "at several points in his cross examination, Sanders admitted that he was untruthful in his responses to [the] Judge." Sanders's testimony, in the court's view, was also fraught with "extreme responses" that were framed "unequivocally and without limitation" and which "lack[ed] credibility."

Following these credibility determinations, the state trial court made seven factual findings, each supported by extensive analysis:

• Trial counsel "read the criminal complaint to Sanders and discussed the factual allegations of the complaint with Sanders in detail prior to the plea hearing";

• Trial counsel "provided Sanders with a copy of the criminal complaint to read, and Sanders read the complaint himself prior to the plea hearing";

• Trial counsel "explained the factual elements of the offense of Attempted First Degree Intentional Homicide to Sanders prior to the plea hearing";

• Trial counsel "explained to Sanders the Constitutional rights that are waived by ... entering a ‘guilty’ plea";

• "At the time of the guilty plea hearing, Sanders had an education level that went beyond the third grade";

• "Sanders did not have intellectual limitations that would have prevented him from understanding the elements of the offense when those elements were read to Sanders by the judge at the plea hearing"; and • Trial counsel "discussed the possible motions and defenses to the charges with Sanders."

Based on these credibility determinations and factual findings, the trial court reached three legal conclusions. First, trial counsel "provided effective representation." Second, even if trial counsel's representation was deficient, "the defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged deficiency." And third, "[t]he defendant's guilty pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently." Therefore, the court denied Sanders's postconviction motions.

Sanders then appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. While Sanders had previously "argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel" before the state trial court, the state appellate court pointed out that "Sanders d[id] not appeal this aspect of the circuit court's decision." So, the only issue before the state appellate court was whether Sanders's guilty pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

On this point, Sanders argued that the state trial court's factual findings about his education level and comprehension abilities were clearly erroneous because his testimony on those topics was unrebutted. The state appellate court disagreed. After pointing to several inconsistencies and overstatements in his contentions, that court concluded "all of Sanders's arguments suffer from a fatal flaw in that they rely on Sanders's own assertions and testimony about his cognitive abilities." Given the state trial court's thorough credibility findings—which Sanders did not adequately call into question—the state appellate court reasoned that "the [state trial] court was entitled...