Sanders v. Reid

• Decision Date: 15 April 1942
• Docket Number: 129/648.
• Citation: 25 A.2d 541,131 N.J.Eq. 407
• Parties: SANDERS v. REID.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

25 A.2d 541

131 N.J.Eq. 407

SANDERS

v. REID.

129/648.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

April 15, 1942.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Mere submission to the use of a portion of one's land for driveway purposes for a period short of 20 years cannot, by presumption, deprive the owner of the right to compel discontinuance of such use.

2. The principle underlying the doctrine of equitable estoppel by reason of mere silence of the party against whom the estoppel is claimed is based on the principle that one who is silent when he ought to speak will not be heard to speak when he ought to be silent, and to give rise thereto there must have been an obligation or duty to speak on the part of the party against whom such estoppel is claimed.

3. To give rise to an estoppel by mere silence of the party against whom it is claimed it must appear that the party claiming such estoppel lacked knowledge and means of knowledge as to the truth of the facts in question.

4. When it appears that one claiming an estoppel by mere silence of the party against whom the estoppel is claimed relied on his own observations as to the user of an alleged right of way, without making any inquiry to determine his right to continue that use, and it appears that reasonable investigation would have disclosed the true facts in connection therewith, there can be> no estoppel.

Suit by H. Walter Sanders against Eva T. Reid to restrain defendant from obstructing a driveway used by plaintiff.

Decree in accordance with opinion.

Cole & Cole, of Atlantic City, for complainant.

Samuel Morris, of Atlantic City, for defendant.

SOOY, Vice Chancellor.

Complainant and defendant own adjoining properties situate on Collins Avenue in Pleasantville, New Jersey. Each property has a 50 feet frontage on Collins Avenue by a depth of approximately 167 feet.

Complainant purchased his property in 1928 from his mother and father, who took title thereto from one Leon L. Collins, the then owner, who testified that he built the dwelling still standing thereon in 1912, at which time the lot to the west, now occupied by defendant, appeared to be farm land, with no buildings thereon erected. Collins further said that from the time of the erection of his dwelling until he erected his garage in 1923, he used about 4 feet of his land on the west and about 7 feet of the adjoining land on the east as and for a driveway for the delivery of coal, wood, etc., to a cellar window about 4 feet southwardly from the rear of his dwelling. This use of the driveway by Collins continued during the time Mrs. Reid was erecting her house (about 1914) and it continued to be used by both Collins and Reid for delivery purposes at all times thereafter up to the rear window aforesaid, and that use was not questioned by either party. In 1923 Collins built a garage approximately 39 feet in the rear of his dwelling and he thereafter extended the use of the driveway for the purpose of ingress and egress to his garage. Mrs. Reid never built a garage on her property and consequently her use of the driveway was for delivery purposes to a rear cellar delivery window inserted in the east side of her dwelling.

It is conceded that a right of way exists in favor of both properties for delivery purposes to the extent above indicated, i. e., from the property line northwardly beyond the delivery windows in each house facing the drive for the length necessary to unload deliveries of coal, etc., to the delivery windows aforesaid. With this accord the Court will not interfere, so that the question is, Has complainant a right of way for ingress and egress for automobiles northwardly on the conceded right of way aforesaid, i. e., to the entrance to complainant's garage?

The facts show that if complainant is denied the use of the driveway as it now exists for ingress and egress to his garage, that it will be necessary for him to use that portion of land on the east side of his house, which is now occupied in part by a hedge and lawn, as well as certain steps which give access to a door inserted in the east rear of complainant's property.

It is admitted that complainant does not have a right of way to the extent necessary for use for ingress and egress to his garage as it now stands by reason of adverse user for 20 years or over. This is obvious, since Collins built his garage in 1923.

The theory of the bill of complaint as originally drawn was that the complainant was entitled to a right of way back to his garage by reason of adverse user, but complainant now contends that even though he does not have that right of way, the defendant is estopped from denying complainant the right of user for ingress and egress from the front property line to the garage.

The evidence shows that Collins and defendant lived as friendly neighbors and there is no testimony to show whether or not Collins asked permission of Reid to locate his garage where he did, nor that he asked or was given permission to drive over the so-called right of way from the garage to the street, nor is there any evidence to disclose that Collins used the land over which his auto passed and repassed under the claim of adverse right. Apparently he simply used the right of way and nothing was said about it.

There is no doubt but that when complainant bought from his father and mother (who I understand in fact held title for him) he saw the single garage erected on the lot purchased by him and observed the fact that ingress and egress to and from the garage had been over the disputed right of way, and he also observed that part of that driveway was over the adjoining property.

Complainant does not testify as to any investigation or inquiry as to the nature of the right of user of the right of way, but simply that he used it from the date of his purchase, and I assume he also used it during the ownership of his mother and father. Complainant said he tore down the old garage in 1926, which was then in a dilapidated condition, and erected a double garage at approximately the same location, and continued to use the disputed right of way until stopped by defendant in December of 1940.

Mrs. Reid, the defendant, testified that while Collins occupied the property now owned by complainant she offered no objection to the use of the right of way, but that after title passed from Collins the right of way was frequently obstructed by standing automobiles, and that this was particularly so after complainant had removed from the property and rented it to others, and this objectionable user, plus a report that complainant intended to remodel his house and use it for apartments, caused her to compel a discontinuance of its use, by the placing of four posts in the ground at various places along her property line.

The asserted estoppel consists in the assertion that Mrs. Reid, in 1926, saw complainant go to the expense of demolishing the old garage and erecting the new one, and that she stood silently by and made no...