Sanders v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 8:15-cv-2821-T-02CPT |
| Parties | MANFRED VAN SANDERS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Manfred Van Sanders, a Florida prisoner, initiated this action for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. (Dkt. 1). Upon consideration of the petition and memorandum, the Court ordered Respondent Secretary, Department of Corrections, to show cause why relief sought in the petition should not be granted. (Dkt. 4). Thereafter, Respondent filed a response in opposition to the petition, along with the state court record. (Dkts. 11, 13). Mr. Sanders then filed a reply. (Dkt. 17).
In his petition, Mr. Sanders alleges a total of fourteen (14) claims for relief, set forth in four grounds with sub-grounds. The Court has reviewed the record and the undersigned has read the trial transcript in its entirety. The Court will address related claims together.
On December 7, 2004, Mr. Sanders was charged with capital sexual battery in violation of Florida Statutes Section 794.011(2)(a).2 (Dkt. 13 Ex. 1 Vol. I at 1). The charges stemmed fromthe alleged sexual battery of Mr. Sanders' young niece. Following a jury trial held in October 2007, Mr. Sanders was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life in prison. (Dkt. 13 Ex. 1 Vol. I at 40-41, 47-52). On appeal, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence per curiam. (Dkt. 1 Exs. 2, 4); Sanders v. State, 14 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (table).
Mr. Sanders then moved, in a motion and amended motion, for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Dkt. 13 Ex. 6). Through a series of orders, the state post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on several issues and ultimately denied each claim. (Dkt. 13 Exs. 7, 10, 11). He appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion without a written opinion. (Dkt. 13 Exs. 12, 15); Sanders v. State, 179 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (per curiam) (table).
Mr. Sanders also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state appellate court, which was denied. (Dkt. 13 Ex. 18). He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Florida Supreme Court, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Dkt. 13 Ex. 19). He subsequently filed a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the state appellate court, which was denied. (Dkt. 13 Exs. 20, 23); Sanders v. State, 83 So. 3d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (table).
Mr. Sanders then filed the instant federal habeas petition in this Court. Upon review, the Court can resolve the entire petition on the basis of the record. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).
Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996("AEDPA"). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 889-90 (11th Cir. 2003). The AEDPA "establishes a more deferential standard of review of state habeas judgments," Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2001), in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) ().
Pursuant to the AEDPA, habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase "clearly established Federal law," encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
"[S]ection 2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state court decisions; the 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider." Maharaj v. Secretary for Dep't. of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). The meaning of the clauses was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001):
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [theUnited States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United States Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
If the federal court concludes that the state court applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application was "objectively unreasonable." Id.
Under section 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." A determination of a factual issue made by a state court, however, shall be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Parker, 244 F.3d at 835-36; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In evaluating a petitioner's claim, a federal habeas court must first identify the highest state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Where that state court's adjudication is not accompanied by a reasoned opinion, the United States Supreme Court has explained that:
the federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a petitioner to demonstrate bothdeficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Demonstrating deficient performance "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690. However, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. Additionally, "a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id.
The petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's alleged errors prejudiced the defense because "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 691-92. To show prejudice, the petitioner must show Id. at 694.
Sustaining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on federal habeas review is very difficult because "[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential,' and when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (citations omitted). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 202 (2011) () (citation omitted). If a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be resolved through one of Strickland's two prongs, the other prong need not be considered. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998).
In ground three and grounds four (A)-(G), Mr. Sanders claims that the state court erred by summarily denying his claims without an evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 1 at 10-14; Dkt. 17 at 8). Under Florida law, a motion for post-conviction relief may be summarily denied "only if the claims asserted are either legally insufficient or conclusively refuted by the record."...
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