Sanders v. State

• Docket Number: 2021AP373
• Decision Date: 30 June 2023
• Parties: Derrick A. Sanders, petitioner-Appellant, v. State of Wisconsin claims Board, Respondent-Respondent-petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

1

2023 WI 60

Derrick A. Sanders, petitioner-Appellant, v. State of Wisconsin claims Board, Respondent-Respondent-petitioner.

No. 2021AP373

Supreme Court of Wisconsin

June 30, 2023

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: April 19, 2023

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 404 Wis.2d 327, 978 N.W.2d 398 (2022 - unpublished)

CIRCUIT COURT, DANE COUNTY, STEPHEN E. EHLKE JUDGE:.

For the respondent-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Colin T. Roth, assistant attorney general.

For the petitioner-appellant, there was a brief filed by Matthew Splitek and Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Matthew Splitek.

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court, and delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.

¶1 In 1992, Derrick A. Sanders and two others "severely beat[]" James.^[1] After the assault, Sanders's co-actors took James to another location. Sanders did not accompany them. One of the co-actors shot James in the head, killing him.

¶2 Sanders twice pled no contest to first-degree intentional homicide as party to a crime; consequently, he spent about 26 years in prison. He incorrectly believed the State could prove that charge even though he participated only in the assault. The first plea was vacated in 1995. The State brought the charge again, and Sanders entered the second plea. In 2018, the second plea was vacated.

¶3 Months later, Sanders petitioned the State Claims Board for compensation, seeking over $5.7 million. The Board awarded $25,000, the maximum under Wis.Stat. § 775.05(4) (201920).^[2] Section 775.05(4) provides, in relevant part, "[i]f the . . . [B]oard finds that" $25,000 "is not adequate compensation it shall submit a report specifying an amount which it considers adequate to the chief clerk of each house of the legislature[.]" The Board did not find $25,000 inadequate; therefore, it did not submit a report.

¶4 Sanders sought judicial review, arguing the Board should have made a finding regarding the adequacy of $25,000. The circuit court rejected his argument, affirming the Board.^[3]In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed. Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims Bd., No 2021AP373, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 9, 2022). We granted review.

¶5 We reject Sanders's argument. It is incompatible with the plain meaning of Wis.Stat. § 775.05(4). Section 775.05(4) requires the Board to submit a report in the event that the Board finds $25,000 inadequate. The Board did not so find. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.^[4]

I. BACKGROUND

¶6 The governing statute requires the Board to use a multiple-step process when it receives a claim. First, the Board must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine "either that the evidence is clear and convincing that the petitioner was innocent of the crime for which he . . . suffered imprisonment, or that the evidence is not clear and convincing that he . . . was innocent." Wis.Stat. § 775.05(3). "If the . . . [B]oard finds that the petitioner was innocent and that he . . . did not by his . . . act or failure to act contribute to bring about the conviction and imprisonment for which he . . . seeks compensation," the Board proceeds to address compensation. § 775.05(4).

¶7 As to compensation, the Board must first "find the amount which will equitably compensate the petitioner, not to exceed $25,000 and at a rate of compensation not greater than $5,000 per year for the imprisonment." Wis.Stat. § 775.05(4). Second, "[i]f the . . . [B]oard finds that the amount it is able to award is not an adequate compensation it shall submit a report specifying an amount which it considers adequate to the chief clerk of each house of the legislature[.]" Id.

¶8 In this case, the Board found Sanders was innocent of the crime for which he was imprisoned. He did not participate in the murder--only the assault. It also found he did not contribute to his conviction even though he twice pled no contest. No party challenges these findings. Sanders takes issue with the Board only for not making a finding regarding adequacy.

¶9 After the Board awarded Sanders $25,000, Sanders filed a petition for rehearing. The Board, via its Chairman, denied the petition. The denial letter explains:

The . . . Board's decision clearly states that the [B]oard . . . voted to award compensation in the amount of $25,000. Because the Board did not conclude that the amount which it was able to award was "not adequate compensation," it is not required to submit a report to the legislature "specifying an amount which it considers adequate." Therefore, the absence of an explicit statement regarding the request for additional damages does not render the Board's decision incomplete.

¶10 The circuit court affirmed the Board, noting Sanders did not cite any "administrative rule, policy, or prior practice that requires the Board to expressly address his additional damages claims in its final decision." As the court continued:

He relies solely on the final sentence of Wis.Stat. § 775.05(4) . . . . I find Sanders'[s] reliance on this portion of the statute unpersuasive. . . . [T]he Board did not make a finding that $25,000 was inadequate compensation and it was therefore not required to take further action.

Over one judge's dissent, the court of appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court with directions to remand to the Board. Sanders, No. 2 021AP37 3, ¶1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Sanders argues Wis.Stat. § 775.05(4) compels the Board to make a finding regarding adequacy. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to our independent review. State v. Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶14, 390 Wis.2d 248, 938 N.W.2d 521 (quoting State v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶14, 389 Wis.2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271).

¶12 Our rejection of Sanders's interpretation triggers another issue: Was the Board required to explain why it did not make a finding? Our consideration of this issue turns on a question of statutory interpretation and accordingly is also subject to our independent review. See id. Specifically, Wis.Stat. § 775.05(5) authorizes judicial review only of the Board's "findings and the award," so we must determine the meaning of that phrase. We assume, without deciding, that the first issue- -whether the Board was required to make a finding--falls within the purview of § 775.05(5). We conclude the Board is not so required; it has discretion. Our assumption, however, does not extend to the Board's exercise, or non-exercise, of this discretion.

III. DISCUSSION

¶13 In this court's seminal 2004 decision, State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, we confirmed textualism is the correct methodology for statutory interpretation. 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Kalal is binding on "all Wisconsin courts"--indeed, it is "the most cited [Wisconsin] case of modern time[.]" See Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq.L Rev 969, 969-70 (2017); see also State v Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶104 n1, 273 Wis.2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (Sykes, J, concurring) ("[T]he principles of statutory interpretation articulated by this court in . . . Kalal . . . [cannot] be dismissed as mere 'spirited discussions' or 'vigorous discussions' by 'part of the court.' . . . Needless to say, Kalal is binding precedent."). (emphasis added). Under this well-established textualist methodology, we begin and end with a plain-meaning analysis of Wis.Stat. § 775.05 because its text is unambiguous. See Enbridge Energy Co. v. Dane County, 2019 WI 78, ¶19, 387 Wis.2d 687, 929 N.W.2d 572 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶45).

¶14 We interpret the relevant words of the statute in accordance with their "common and approved usage"; however, "technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law" are "construed according to such meaning." See Wis.Stat. § 990.01(1). To determine common and approved usage, we consult dictionaries. See State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶32, 369 Wis.2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258 (citing State v. Sample, 215 Wis.2d 487, 499-500, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998)). To determine the meaning of legal terms of art, we consult legal dictionaries. State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶¶29-31, 308 Wis.2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 547 (consulting Black's Law Dictionary to determine the meaning of "discovery").

¶15 We read the relevant words of the statute "in the context in which . . . [they] are used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes." James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶20, 397 Wis.2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶46). We also consider traditional canons of construction, which serve as "helpful, neutral guides" for our analysis. Id., ¶23 n.12 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 61 (2012)).

¶16 Lastly, we consider statutory history, which can be relevant to plain meaning. Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 2022 WI 7, ¶20, 400 Wis.2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 (quoting James, 397 Wis.2d 517, ¶26); Wis.Stat. § 990.001(7) ("A revised statute is to be understood in the same sense as the original unless the change in language indicates a different meaning so clearly as to preclude judicial construction. If the revision bill contains a note which says that the meaning of the statute to which the note relates is not...