Sanders v. State, 87231
| Decision Date | 22 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 87231,87231 |
| Citation | 707 So.2d 664 |
| Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly S47 Kristopher SANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
We have on appeal Kristopher Sanders' conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we affirm the conviction but find that we must remand this cause for a new penalty phase proceeding because the trial court (1) excused a juror for cause without allowing defense counsel to question the juror, and (2) allowed a mental health expert to testify on behalf of the State even though that expert initially was retained as a confidential expert for Sanders.
The facts of this case are as follows. On April 26, 1994, the body of Henry "Hank" Clark (the victim) was discovered slumped over in the driver's seat of a truck parked off a highway. The victim had been shot three times: once in the right side of the head, once near the top of the head, and once in the upper arm. The wounds were consistent with the victim having been shot by someone sitting in the passenger's seat. Testing revealed that, although cocaine metabolites were found in the victim's blood, it was unlikely that he had been using cocaine just prior to his death.
Among other things, officers found the following items in the vehicle: a total of $2,379 in cash, $1,330 of which was in plain view on the visor; a total of 215 grams of marijuana, some of which was contained in two bags located on the seat next to the victim; a postman's scale; a cattle prod or "stun gun" under the driver's seat; and a .9 millimeter shell casing on the floor. Two palm prints lifted from the truck matched Sanders'. Footprints found outside the vehicle appeared to originate from the passenger's side and led out to the highway.
Several days before the murder, a witness overheard a conversation that occurred in Joey Duckett's living room. In that conversation, Duckett stated that Hank "needed to die," to which Sanders replied that he would "do it."
After Sanders was picked up and given the appropriate Miranda 1 warnings, he provided a statement to law enforcement officers, in which he admitted killing the victim. He claimed that he and the victim drove to Tampa and purchased crack cocaine, that they stopped at a store and Sanders called Duckett to tell him where he was, that they stopped and smoked some cocaine, that the victim decided to smoke the cocaine rather than sell it, that an argument ensued, that Sanders had a gun hidden inside his pants, and that Sanders "flipped out" and shot the victim when the victim reached for the cattle prod under the seat. At the time he gave the statement, Sanders appeared to be calm and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs. He also stated that he had no remorse for the killing. ("It just means it's one less face in the world I have to deal with.") He acknowledged that Duckett paid him $900 to kill the victim four days before the murder but stated that the planned murder was not to occur for another two weeks.
Sanders also stated that, when he got out of the truck after killing the victim, George Nashef drove by and stopped and picked him up. Sanders' versions of how Nashef knew to pick him up were inconsistent. Sanders further stated that Nashef took him to Duckett's house after the murder where he showered and disposed of his bloody clothing.
Nashef testified and admitted that his version of the events had changed over time. In the beginning, he denied any involvement. Later, he gave several statements, the details of which were somewhat inconsistent. At trial, he testified that Sanders arranged for him to pick Sanders up at the site where the murder occurred and that he took Sanders back to Duckett's house. He indicated that he originally denied involvement because he was afraid of being killed and of being incriminated.
Sanders was convicted as charged.
At the penalty phase proceeding, the State presented testimony to reflect that after the murder Sanders showed the victim's gold necklace to an individual and told the individual that the dent in the necklace had been caused by the gunshot to the victim's neck.
Sanders presented testimony regarding his age of twenty years, his gentle and helpful nature and kind disposition, his ability to fix things, his traumatic childhood, his drug addiction, and the fact that he had obtained his GED since being arrested in this case. His mental health expert, Dr. Michael Maher, a psychiatrist, testified that Sanders had a low IQ (80); had a history of mental problems including depression, personality disorder, and self-mutilation; had been admitted to the Arthur Dozier School for Boys; had been involuntarily committed under the Baker Act; and had stayed almost six months at a residential treatment facility as a result of cocaine use and gasoline inhalation. He concluded that Sanders was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired at the time of the murder.
In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Sidney Merin, a clinical psychologist. Sanders objected to Dr. Merin's testimony because Dr. Merin had originally been retained as a confidential expert for Sanders and had been provided with confidential and privileged information regarding Sanders. Although the information was in Dr. Merin's possession for six months, he stated that he did not review this information before it was returned to Sanders. Dr. Merin was allowed to testify. He did not interview Sanders before giving his testimony but concluded, based on Sanders' taped confession and other records, that no mental mitigators were present and that much of Sanders' behavior was done to get attention.
The jury recommended, by an eight-to-four vote, 2 that Sanders be sentenced to death. The trial judge followed that recommendation, finding one aggravating circumstance: that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). He found no statutory mitigating circumstances but did find a number of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 3
In this appeal, Sanders raises a total of eight issues, 4 only one of which involves the conviction phase. In the conviction phase issue, which involves the penalty phase as well, Sanders asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to cross-examine witness George Nashef about his drug-running activities. Sanders argues that the judge's ruling kept evidence critical to Nashef's credibility from the jury. Because Nashef was a key witness, Sanders contends that the inclusion of this testimony would have prevented the State from establishing that the murder was premeditated for conviction purposes and that it was cold, calculated, and premeditated for sentencing purposes.
Section 90.612(2), Florida Statutes (1995), provides:
Cross-examination of a witness is limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in its discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters.
Under this provision, a trial judge has broad discretion in determining limitations to be placed on cross-examination. Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96 (Fla.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 230, 136 L.Ed.2d 161 (1996); Jones v. State, 580 So.2d 143 (Fla.1991). A judge's determination to allow or disallow questioning in that regard is not subject to review unless the determination is clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 404 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, limiting cross-examination in a manner that precludes relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of testimony constitutes error, especially when the cross-examination is directed at a witness for the prosecution. Stradtman v. State, 334 So.2d 100, 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), approved, 346 So.2d 67 (Fla.1977).
In this case, the State elicited testimony from Nashef regarding his fear for his safety as an explanation for the differing versions of the events surrounding the murder that he gave to law enforcement officers during the course of the investigation in this case. To counter this testimony, defense counsel asked Nashef on cross-examination if he was running drugs for the group of people with whom Sanders associated. The State objected. The trial judge allowed a proffer of Nashef's testimony before he ruled. In the proffer, Nashef testified that he got drugs for the group one time and that he ran drugs three or four other times for another group. The judge sustained the State's objection and instructed the jury to disregard defense counsel's question about Nashef's drug-running activities.
Under these circumstances, we do not conclude that the judge abused his discretion in disallowing defense counsel's question as to Nashef's drug-running activities. See Jones (judge properly disallowed questions regarding whether witness was a drug dealer). Moreover, even were we to conclude that the testimony was erroneously excluded, we would find that the error had no effect on the outcome of the conviction. 5 The jury was well aware of Nashef's inconsistent statements to law enforcement officers regarding this crime, and in his proffered testimony he admitted running drugs for Duckett on only one occasion. The proffered testimony would have added little, if any, substance to Sanders' attempt to discredit Nashef.
We now turn to the penalty phase issues raised by Sanders. In his first penalty phase issue, Sanders contends that the trial judge violated Florida Rule of...
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