Sanders v. State

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FOGLEMAN
• Citation: Sanders v. State, 259 Ark. 329, 532 S.W.2d 752 (Ark. 1976)
• Decision Date: 23 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Parties: Galen Ray SANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 75--197.

Page 752

532 S.W.2d 752

259 Ark. 329

Galen Ray SANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 75--197.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Feb. 23, 1976.

Don Langston, Fort Smith, for appellant.

Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by James Guy Petty, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

FOGLEMAN, Justice.

Galen Ray Sanders was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon after a jury trial on a charge of assault with intent to kill. He moved to quash his arrest and to suppress incriminating statements made by him to the police which he alleged to be the fruit of the arrest. The ground for the motion to quash the arrest was lack of probable cause for his arrest without a warrant. The ground for his motion to suppress his statements to police was basically the illegal arrest. We find that the arresting officers had probable cause and affirm the judgment.

Appellant was charged with having assaulted Ricky Banning, son of William L. Banning. Both were employed by Shipley Baking Company, the son having gone to work after some employees had gone on strike. They left work shortly before 8:30 p.m. The Bannings came out the back door of the bakery and got into the father's pickup truck on the parking lot at the bakery. The son was shot as they were leaving the parking lot. The father, who was driving, looked through the rear view mirror of his pickup truck, because he had heard a noise which seemed to come from that direction, followed by three similar sounds in rapid succession. He saw three or four people standing around a vehicle which he recognized as one belonging to Sanders. The Bannings proceeded to the police station. Just before the father, who was driving, pulled into the driveway to the police station, they met the Sanders vehicle, a 1971 Chevrolet pickup truck with a white camper shell, which was travelling in the opposite direction at an abnormal speed for the area and came very close to the Bannings. The Bannings could not see who was driving. They proceeded into the station and the father told Detective Hill that his son had been shot, that he had seen the Sanders vehicle at the scene, that he had seen 'people' standing around the vehicle, that he had met the Sanders vehicle en route to the police station and that whoever was driving came very close, either trying to get in front of the Banning vehicle or to see into it as it turned into the police station.

The Bannings then went to the hospital. The father returned to the police station after the son had seen a doctor. The son arrived at the police station 15 or 20 minutes later and they signed statements typed by Hill. Sanders was brought into the station while the Bannings were there. Sanders had been arrested by Detectives Sharp and Hill. As Hill was leaving the police station to go to Sanders' residence at about 9:40 p.m. he met Sharp. Hill had obtained Sanders' address from a computer. They proceeded to the trailer park where Sanders lived. After obtaining directions to the address they had, they found the Sanders vehicle about 25 feet from the gate at the entry to Sanders' house trailer. Hill saw it as soon as they arrived. Hill had questioned employees at the Shipley Baking Company at about 8:45 p.m. and verified the ownership of the truck Banning had described. When the officers knocked on the door, Sanders' wife answered and called Sanders, who came to the door after a slight delay. Hill asked him to come outside, saying that he and Sharp wanted to talk to him. Although there are some conflicts in the testimony about the exact sequence of events thereafter, Sanders was told that he was under arrest for investigation of assault with intent to kill. He asked the officers if they had a warrant and told them that he was not going with them unless they had a warrant. Sanders' wife was at the door hysterically hollering that he didn't have to go if they didn't have a warrant, and that 'the lawyer' had said so. Sanders was told by Hill that no warrant was necessary because they had probable cause for the arrest for a felony, but Sanders kept repeating that he was not going unless they had a warrant and that his attorney had told him that he was not required to do so. Detective Sharp undertook to explain to Sanders that he would be right if a misdemeanor was involved, but that a 'felony case' was involved. After Sanders' continued refusal, the officers subdued him, handcuffed him and took him to the police station.

When they were all in the police automobile after the arrest, Sanders was advised of his constitutionl rights by Hill. Some of the incriminating statements which Sanders claims should have been suppressed were spontaneous but one was in response to a question by Hill. Hill stated that when he left the police station, he intended to arrest Sanders, even though an inference could be drawn from Hill's testimony at the preliminary hearing that he formed that intention after Sanders came out of the trailer. Neither Sanders nor his wife testified at the suppression hearing and the testimony of Sharp and Hill stood uncontradicted.

On appeal, all presumptions are favorable to the trial court's ruling on the legality of the arrest, and the burden of demonstrating error rests upon appellant. Williams v. State, 258 Ark. 207, 523 S.W.2d 377. When we indulge these presumptions, we cannot say that the trial judge erred. The police officers had authority to make a warrantless arrest if they had reasonable grounds to believe that Sanders had committed the felony of assault with intent to kill. Williams v. State, supra. When we consider the totality of the circumstances beginning with the sighting of Sanders' vehicle at the scene of the shooting to its being found at his residence within a reasonably short time span during which it had been 'driven at' the Banning vehicle as it started to enter the driveway to the police station, we think there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause for the arrest.

It is to be remembered that probable cause is only a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the accused committed a felony, but not tantamount to the quantum of proof required to support a conviction. Graves v. State, 256 Ark. 117, 505 S.W.2d 748. Johnson v. State, 249 Ark. 208, 458 S.W.2d 409. The existence of probable cause depends upon the facts and circumstances of which the arresting officer has knowledge at the moment of the arrest. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).

Determination of probable cause is based upon the factual and practical considerations of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). This practical, nontechnical concept has been said to afford the best compromise that has been found for accommodating competing interests, so that law enforcement will not be unduly hampered and law abiding citizens not left at the mercy of the whim and caprice of a police officer. Beck v. Ohio, supra; Brinegar v. United States, supra. In making this determination the reviewing court should follow a liberal rather than a strict course. In re Watson's Petition, 146 Mont. 125, 404 P.2d 315 (1965).

To have probable cause for an arrest, it is not necessary that the arresting officer have the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). A probability is not a certainty or a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Lathers v. United States, 396 F.2d 524 (5 Cir., 1968). The question of probable cause is a pragmatic one to be decided in the light of the circumstances of a particular case, which are reviewed, not as a legal scholar determines the existence of consideration in support of a promise, but as a man of reasonable prudence and caution would determine whether the person arrested has committed a felony. People v. Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W.2d 808 (1962). The answers cannot be found by the application of a mathematical formula. Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 228 (Alaska, 1972). See also, 5 Am.Jur.2d 740, Arrest § 48. Constitutional standards permit common sense, honest judgment by police officers in their probable cause determinations. Lathers...