Sanders v. State

Citation704 N.E.2d 119
Decision Date07 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 27S00-9711-CR-619,27S00-9711-CR-619
PartiesCharles L. SANDERS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Matthew P. Ryan and Patrick N. Ryan, Marion, for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General, and Rosemary L. Borek, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Charles L. Sanders seeks reversal of his convictions for murdering Ruben Rodriguez and for committing battery on Jose Perez.

Sanders claims that the trial court improperly refused to give instructions on lesser included offenses, that the State's evidence was insufficient to rebut his claim of self-defense, and that the trial court wrongly admitted evidence of another crime that Sanders committed. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

On July 7, 1996, Sanders and his friend Rick Booker attended a quinceanera, a coming-out party, for Evita Rodriguez at the Marion Armory. Shortly after his arrival, Sanders fought with another guest, Steve Cunningham, near a door leading to an outside stairway. After Cunningham got away, Sanders walked quickly down the stairs. When he looked back toward the top of the stairs Sanders saw Jose Rodriguez, Sr., the decedent's brother, put a knife to the neck of his friend Booker. Sanders pulled a gun from his waistband. Jose Rodriguez, Sr., released Booker. Ruben Rodriguez started down the stairs, and Sanders shot him twice. Ruben Rodriguez bled to death from a gunshot wound to the chest. Although Ruben Rodriguez had a knife that night, it is unclear whether he was brandishing it at the time he was shot. (Compare R. at 2108-09, 2154, 2176-77, 2237 with 1521, 2203.)

Another guest, Jose Perez, testified that he heard the gunshots shortly after he arrived at the quinceanera with his brother. He began to look for his wife, who had driven separately. When he did not find his wife at her table or at her car, he went to his brother's vehicle and got his gun. He testified that someone shot at him from the passenger side of a small white car, hitting a toe on his right foot. He returned fire. Sanders left the party in the passenger seat of a white Hyundai driven by Rick Booker.

The State charged Sanders with the murder of Ruben Rodriguez, 2 the battery of Jose Perez, 3 and possession of a handgun without a license. 4 It sought enhancement of the handgun charge 5 based on Sanders' prior conviction for carrying a handgun without a license.

At trial, the judge refused to give Sanders' tendered instructions on reckless homicide 6 and criminal recklessness 7 because there was no evidence of recklessness, and because a theory of recklessness was inconsistent with Sanders' claim of self-defense.

The jury convicted Sanders of battery and possession of a handgun without a license, but it was unable to reach a decision about the murder charge. The court set the murder charge for retrial and directed that trial on the enhancement take place immediately after the murder retrial.

At the second trial, the judge denied Sanders' motion in limine to exclude evidence on the battery of Jose Perez. Sanders again tendered an instruction on reckless homicide, which the court again refused. (R. at 164.) This time, the trial judge did not state a reason for refusing the instruction (R. at 2285), and defense counsel did not object to the court's refusal of that particular instruction (R. at 2289).

The second jury convicted Sanders of murder and the enhancement on the handgun charge. The court imposed concurrent sentences as follows: sixty-five years for the murder, eight years for the battery, and eight years for the possession of a handgun without a license (including the enhancement).

I. Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses

Sanders claims that the trial court erred in refusing his tendered instructions on criminal recklessness as a lesser included offense of battery and on reckless homicide as a lesser included offense of murder.

Indiana courts use the Wright v. State test for determining when a trial court should instruct on a lesser included offense. 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.1995). First, we determine whether the lesser offense is either "inherently" or "factually" included in the offense charged. Id. at 566-67; Champlain v. State, 681 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind.1997). Second, if we conclude that the lesser offense is included in the charged offense, then we ascertain whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists as to which offense the defendant committed. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567; Champlain, 681 N.E.2d at 700.

A. Sanders' Criminal Recklessness Instruction

Criminal recklessness is not an inherently included lesser offense of battery because each requires proof of an element that the other does not. Compare Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-2-1 (West 1998) (battery requires proof of touching) with Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (West 1998) (criminal recklessness requires proof of substantial risk of bodily injury); Shoup v. State, 570 N.E.2d 1298, 1304 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). Criminal recklessness may, however, be factually included in the crime of battery if the charging instrument alleges facts that "reflect a substantial risk of bodily injury," and "show that the touching was done with a disregard of the harm that might occur." Shoup, 570 N.E.2d at 1305.

Count Two of the information states "Charles Lagaurdia Sanders did knowingly touch Jose Perez in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, to wit: by shooting him in the right foot, said touching being committed with a deadly weapon...." (R. at 6.) While Count Two alleges that Sanders created a substantial risk of bodily injury by claiming that Sanders shot Perez, it does not charge Sanders with the state of mind requisite for a determination that criminal recklessness is a factually lesser included offense of battery in this case. Because the information does not assert that Sanders disregarded the consequences of his actions, criminal recklessness was not a lesser included offense of this battery charge. The trial court properly refused Sanders' criminal recklessness instruction.

B. Sanders' Reckless Homicide Instruction

At both trials, Sanders tendered a reckless homicide instruction as an alternative choice for the jury on the murder charge. A comparison of the murder and reckless homicide statutes indicates that the only element that distinguishes the crimes from each other is the level of mens rea required. Compare Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-1-1 (West Supp.1998) with Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-1-5 (West 1998); McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79 (Ind.1998). Reckless homicide is, therefore, an inherently included lesser offense of murder. McEwen, 695 N.E.2d at 85; Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. We next examine whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists as to whether Sanders committed the lesser or the greater offense.

In Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010 (Ind.1998), this Court set out a shifting standard of review for appellate examination of whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists. The standard for review of a trial court's failure to give a requested lesser included offense instruction is "affected by the specificity with which a defendant presents the case for the instruction to the trial court." Id. at 1019.

[W]hen the [trial] court rejects tendered instructions on lesser included offenses on their merits, but the record provides neither a finding that there is no serious evidentiary dispute nor a specific claim from the defendant as to the nature of that dispute, the standard of review is an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 1020. At the trial that resulted in his murder conviction, Sanders did not provide any specific objection to the refusal of his reckless homicide instruction. (See R. 164, 2285, 2289.) We therefore review the trial court's refusal of that instruction for an abuse of discretion. The issue, then, is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that there was not a serious evidentiary dispute about whether Sanders committed murder instead of reckless homicide.

The crime of murder requires that the defendant killed knowingly, 8 Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-1-1 (West Supp.1998), or in other words that he was aware of a high probability that he was doing the act of killing, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(b) (West 1998). Reckless homicide, on the other hand, requires that the defendant killed recklessly, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-1-5 (West 1998), in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of the harm that might result, and in substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(c) (West 1998).

Sanders himself presented evidence that, as he stood at the bottom of the stairs, he aimed at and shot the person descending toward him. (R. at 2108-09, 2176-77, 2237-38.) There is no evidence that he was shooting at the crowd on the stairs at random; rather, he shot only at Ruben Rodriguez. There was no serious evidentiary dispute that Sanders knowingly shot Rodriguez, because Sanders must have known that firing directly at a person at such close range is highly probable to result in death. Therefore, the trial court appropriately refused Sanders' homicide instruction on reckless homicide.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Sanders claims that the State did not adequately rebut his claim of self-defense and that there was thus insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction.

The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence challenge. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Instead, we consider the evidence most favorable to the verdict and draw all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42 (Ind.1997). If the evidence and inferences provide substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict, we affirm. Id.

"A claim of self-defense in a...

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