Sanders v. Univ. of Idaho
| Decision Date | 03 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-00225-BLW |
| Parties | Shaakirrah R. SANDERS, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Erika Birch, Thomas Guy Hallam, Jr., Lourdes Annette Matsumoto, Strindberg Scholnick Birch Hallam Harstad Thorne, Boise, ID, for Plaintiff.
Bentley G. Stromberg, Sonyalee R. Nutsch, Clements Brown & McNichols, Lewiston, ID, for Defendants Mark Adams, Jerrold Long, University of Idaho.
Plaintiff, Shaakirrah R. Sanders, filed this action claiming discrimination, retaliation, and violation of her academic freedom in violation of federal and state law, against Defendants University of Idaho (UI), Mark Adams, and Jerrold Long. Before the Court is Sanders’ Motion to Amend in which she seeks to add defendant Jerrold Long in his individual capacity (Dkt. 30). Also before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 36, 40). The Court heard oral argument from the parties on May 26, 2021. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the motion to amend (Dkt. 30); denies Sanders’ motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 36); and grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 40). The Court also grants the parties’ unopposed motions to seal (Dkts. 35, 41, 53).
Sanders filed her initial complaint in this action in June 2019. (Dkt. 1.) The complaint alleged claims against two defendants: UI and Mark Adams in his official capacity as the former Dean of the UI College of Law. (Dkt. 1.)
In November 2019, Sanders filed a motion to amend her complaint. (Dkt. 16.) Defendants did not oppose the motion. (Dkt. 17.) The Court granted the motion based on the facts that Defendants did not oppose the proposed amendment, that the motion to amend was filed within the deadline set by the scheduling order, and that there was no indication of bad faith, undue delay, or prejudice to Defendants. (Dkt. 18.) Sanders filed her first amended complaint in December 2019 (Dkt. 19). Through this amendment, Jerrold Long, was added to the action as a defendant in his official capacity as the Acting Dean of the College of Law.
In June 2020, Sanders filed a second motion to amend, seeking to amend the complaint to add new factual allegations and claims based on events that occurred subsequent to the pleading amendment deadline (Dkt. 23). Again, Defendants did not oppose the motion. (Dkt. 24.) The Court found good cause for and accordingly granted the motion (Dkt. 25), and Sanders filed her second amended complaint (SAC) in early July 2020 (Dkt. 26). The SAC included factual allegations related to individual actions taken by Defendant Long but did not include claims against Long in his individual capacity.
In mid-November 2020, Sanders filed a third motion to amend, seeking to add individual capacity claims against Defendant Long. (Dkt. 30.) Defendants oppose the motion. (Dkt. 31.)
The deadline for amending the pleadings has passed. Thus, the motion to amend is governed not by the liberal provisions of Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but by the more restrictive provisions of Rule 16(b), which require a showing of "good cause." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc. , 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992). The focus of Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard is the diligence of the moving party. Id. at 608. A court should find good cause only if the moving party shows it "could not reasonably meet the established timeline in a scheduling order despite [its] diligence." DIRECTV, Inc. v. Busdon , No. CV-04-265-S-LMB, 2005 WL 1364571, *1 (D. Idaho June 8, 2005). "Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief." Johnson , 975 F.2d at 609 (citing Engleson v. Burlington N. R.R. , 972 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 1992) ).
When determining whether to grant a motion to amend outside the deadline imposed in the scheduling order, a court may also consider "the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification." Id. However, the court's inquiry should focus "upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification." Id. If the party moving to amend "was not diligent, the inquiry should end." Id.
Sanders contends that there is good cause to allow her to amend her complaint to bring claims against Defendant Long in his individual capacity. She explains that she did not seek to add these individual capacity claims through the previous amendment in June 2020 because she believed it to be prudent to depose Long about his individual actions and the purported reasons for those actions prior to determining whether he was an appropriate defendant in his individual capacity. This prudence was based on the fact that Long was, at the time, Sanders’ Dean and thus had the ability to take adverse actions against her and otherwise impact her employment.
Within days of filing the June 2020 motion seeking leave to file a second amended complaint, Sanders requested deposition dates for Long. However, for various reasons, Long's deposition did not occur until October 14, 2020, and November 3, 2020. Sanders explains that the deposition testimony of Long revealed information about his individual actions, and motivations behind those actions, that compelled Sanders to bring claims against him in his individual capacity. Sanders filed her motion to amend on November 13, 2020, less than two weeks after Long's deposition.
Defendants oppose the motion to amend, contending that Sanders has not shown that she was diligent in seeking this amendment and thus has not shown good cause exists for granting leave to amend. Defendants contend that the factual allegations of the proposed third amended complaint are not novel but are instead, for the most part, already included in the second amended complaint. They further contend that Sanders knew, or should have known, in July 2020 that these allegations formed the basis of her individual capacity claims against Long. Defendants contend that, as a result, Sanders has not shown good cause for the proposed amendment.
Defendants also contend that they "would clearly be prejudiced if good cause to modify the scheduling order were found here, and further amendment allowed." (Dkt 31 at 8.) They explain that discovery has closed and that, if the Court were to grant leave to amend while the motions for summary judgment are pending, additional briefing and perhaps additional discovery will be required. Finally, Defendants contend that amendment of the complaint would be futile.
The Court finds that, contrary to Defendants’ argument, Sanders has demonstrated that good cause exists for allowing the proposed amendment, that any prejudice resulting from the amendment will be minimal, and that amendment would not be futile.
First, Sanders did not unreasonably delay in seeking to add claims against Defendant Long in his individual capacity. As Sanders has explained, she was hesitant to add individual capacity claims against Long and wanted to conduct Long's deposition to make sure that such claims would be appropriate. After conducting Long's deposition, Sanders determined that the claims were appropriate and, less than two weeks later, filed her motion seeking to amend the complaint to add the individual capacity claims against Long.
Second, Defendants have not demonstrated they would suffer prejudice as a result of the proposed amendment. Long has been a defendant in this action since December 2019. Although he was a defendant only in his official capacity, Defendants have provided no specific reason why additional discovery would be needed if Long were to now become a defendant in his individual capacity as well. Thus, this is not a case in which a plaintiff is seeking to add a new defendant, a novel claim or theory of relief, or new factual allegations that will require additional discovery. To the contrary, as Defendants themselves point out, the factual allegations upon which Sanders relies in bringing the individual capacity claims against Long are virtually identical to the allegations already included in the second amended complaint.
Third, the Court is not convinced that granting leave to amend will require additional briefing. However, even if it does, the Court does not find that this would result in undue prejudice to Defendants. If Defendants seek leave to file a second motion for summary judgment aimed specifically at the individual capacity claims against Long, the Court will rule on that motion in due course.
Finally, leave to amend would not be futile because, as discussed below, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact preclude granting summary judgment in favor of Long on many of the claims brought against him. The Court will accordingly grant Sanders’ motion to amend the complaint.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Devereaux v. Abbey , 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial