Sanders v. Village of Riverside

• Decision Date: 07 October 1902
• Docket Number: 856,857.
• Citation: 118 F. 720
• Parties: SANDERS v. VILLAGE OF RIVERSIDE. [1] VILLAGE OF RIVERSIDE v. SANDERS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

118 F. 720

SANDERS v. VILLAGE OF RIVERSIDE. ^[1]

VILLAGE OF RIVERSIDE v. SANDERS.

Nos. 856, 857.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

October 7, 1902

Samuel W. Packard, for Joshua C. Sanders.

Amos C Miller, for village of Riverside.

Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.

This suit grew out of the disputed ownership of two strips of land, each 30 feet wide and 4,700 feet long, in Riverside, a suburb of Chicago. They are adjacent to, parallel with, and separated by, the right of way of a railroad. Mr. Sanders, a citizen of New York, claims title through mesne conveyances from the Riverside Improvement Company, a corporation that founded Riverside. The village claims the land as part of its public parks, through an alleged common-law dedication by the improvement company. Private rights of abutting lot owners are not involved, as none of them is a party to this litigation.

In March, 1891, Mr. Sanders filed his bill against the village alleging that he was the owner and in possession of the land that the village was asserting an unfounded claim of ownership, and had committed and was threatening to continue acts of trespass and waste, and praying that his title be quieted and the village enjoined, etc. In April, 1891, the village answered, denying complainant's title and possession, asserting title and possession in itself, and averring that complainant had no right to maintain his bill, because when he filed it he was out of possession, and the land was not vacant and unoccupied. Complainant immediately replied. In December, 1891, by leave of court, the village filed a cross-bill setting up its title and possession, the adverse and unfounded claims of Mr. Sanders, and praying that its title be quieted. Mr. Sanders answered the cross-bill in February, 1892, denying the village's title, but admitting that he was not in possession when he commenced his suit. In March, 1892, the village filed its reply. Between May, 1892, and May, 1894, a large amount of evidence was taken before a notary by agreement of the parties. This evidence was printed and filed on December 12, 1894, and the cause and cross-cause were set for final hearing on the pleadings and proofs on the 17th, but were not heard at that time. In January, 1896, a motion by the village for the dismissal of complainant's bill on the ground that he was not in possession, as shown by his own pleadings, was overruled. February 11, 1896, by agreement, an order was entered that 'said cause and cross-cause are by agreement of counsel hereby referred to E. B. Sherman, one of the masters in chancery of this court, to consider the evidence taken herein, and to report to this court his conclusions of fact and of law. ' The master's report was filed in October, 1900.

In substance, the master found that the improvement company had offered to dedicate the strips in question,-- the inner part, adjoining the railroad, as a portion of a park system, and the outer portion as alleys; that the alleys were abandoned, and that Mr. Sanders, under his deed of the entire strips, executed in 1874, was entitled to a decree quieting this title to the alley portions only; 'that the improvement company failed to indicate by its acts, or the statements of its officers and agents, the precise and definite location and boundaries of the strips on either side of the right of way of the railroad which it intended to dedicate to public use as a part of the public parks and grounds, except as such locations and boundaries were shown upon its maps (made in 1869 and 1870), -- on one map by a part of said strips being colored in green, and on another map by the said part being dotted with dark spots'; 'that the master is of the opinion that, although tested by accurate mathematical measurement, the colored part of said strips, as shown upon the maps (drawn on a scale of 400 feet to the inch), is not in all places exactly one-half of the entire strips, and, although said colored part is not exactly of uniform width throughout their entire length, yet an ordinary observer, examining the map to ascertain what part of said strips was colored and what part uncolored, would receive the impression that practically the inner one-half of said strips, lying next to and on both sides of the railroad right of way, was colored, and the outer half thereof uncolored, and that it is made sufficiently certain by said maps that the improvement company intended to dedicate the one-half of said strips lying adjacent to said railroad right of way as a part of the public parks and grounds, and the outer half thereof as public alleys'; that the public and the village accepted the offer of dedication; that from 1885 to 1890 the village cut the grass and weeds on the 30-foot strips; that in 1890 the village planted a row of trees along the center of each strip, and made ditches to mark the boundaries; that the maps fail to state, in words or figures, the respective widths of the park and alley portions of the strips; that no marks have ever been made upon the ground, nor separate possession taken, to indicate what was park and what was alley; that the village was entitled to a decree quieting its title to the inner half of the strips.

With his report the master returned the objections Mr. Sanders had made before him; and by order of court, entered by agreement, these objections were to stand and be treated as exceptions filed before the court. The village filed no objections before the master, nor exceptions before the court. On the hearing of the exceptions the court dismissed both the cause and the cross-cause for want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter.

Mr. Sanders, among other assignments, has presented these: '(1) The court erred in dismissing the said bill for want of jurisdiction. (2) The court erred in refusing to enter a decree in said cause and cross-cause quieting the title of the complainant as against the village of Riverside to the whole of the two strips of land claimed by complainant in his bill. ' The village insists that the action of the court below was right; but that, if the dismissal be found erroneous, its title be quieted to the park portions of the strips, and also to the alley portions.

Before JENKINS and BAKER, Circuit Judges.

BAKER Circuit Judge, having made this statement, .

There can be no question but that the village could have driven Mr Sanders to an action of ejectment if it had stood upon the proposition that one out of possession cannot maintain an equity suit to quiet title against one in possession. Jackson v. Simmons, 39 C.C.A. 514, 98 F. 768. And the objections now urged, that Mr. Sanders came into court with unclean hands, and that a municipality cannot be held as defendant in a suit to quiet title, would have to be considered, if they had been made in time, and had not subsequently been waived. The village, however, however, filed a cross-bill, in which it set up its own title and possession, and the adverse claims of Mr. Sanders, and asked affirmative relief. 'The jurisdiction to relieve the holders of real property from vexatious claims to it, casting a cloud upon their title, and thus disturbing them in its peaceable use and enjoyment, is inherent in a court of equity. ' Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 3 Sup.Ct. 495, 28 L.Ed. 52. The cross-bill presented a cause that...