Sanders v. Williams, 96

Decision Date15 February 1956
Docket NumberNo. 96,96
Citation209 Md. 149,120 A.2d 397
PartiesArthur W. SANDERS et al., trading as Sandy's Esso Service v. John L. WILLIAMS.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Ralph W. Powers (Powers & Gifford, Hyattsville, on the brief), for appellants.

Alvin L. Newmyer, Sr., Washington, D. C. (Jackson Brodsky and Newmyer & Bress, on the brief), Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ.

HAMMOND, Justice.

The operators of a gasoline service station were held liable by a jury because one of them, while adjusting the carburetor of a Buick automobile, suddenly applied the gas and caused the car to lurch forward and strike the appellee. The sole reliance in this appeal is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the appellee was free from contributory negligence as a matter of law.

The appellee, a regular patron of the service station, had previously spoken to one of the operators about part time work there. On the night of the accident, he drove in to get gas and stopped his car facing the Buick, which was standing at the other end of the pump islands. After his car had been serviced and he had paid for the gas, he walked in front of his car and stood between it and the Buick waiting for an opportunity to talk to Sanders, who was working on the Buick. Its hood was up, the motor was idling, and no one was in the car. Sanders was adjusting the carburetor so that the motor would not idle too fast as it had been doing. Appellee stood there for a minute or two waiting to tell Sanders that he could not take the part time job at the filling station that he had been considering. Sanders and the owner of the Buick say that appellee put his foot on its bumper and watched the adjustment of the idling screw of the carburetor. Sanders says: 'When adjusting a carburetor on a car that is idling fast, you have to touch the gas a little' and that, as he did so, the car lurched forward and caught the appellee between its bumper and that of his own car. He was asked whether, before he applied the gas, he told appellee to get out of the way and said that he did not, and also, that he did not know when he applied the gas whether the driving mechanism was set so that the car would move. He said that the hand brake was partially applied. It may be gleaned from the testimony of Sanders, although it is not entirely specific, that in a fluid drive car, such as the Buick, if the lever on the dash is at 'drive', forward motion will be restrained by the hand brake as long as the car is idling, but that if sufficient gas is forced into the carburetor, it will move forward in spite of the restraint of the brake, and that this apparently is what happened.

The appellants concede that there was ample evidence of the negligence of Sanders, and that the appellee, although he had completed his purchase of gasoline, continued to be owned the duty of ordinary care. In the charge the trial court said 'the Court tells you as a matter of law that the plaintiff had a right to be there * * * that he himself, that is, the plaintiff himself, was not guilty of negligence contributing to the happening of this accident or injury.' The appellants fully and specifically excepted to this phase of the charge, urging below, as they do here, that the plaintiff, by lack of care for his own safety, put himself in a position of danger and so contributed to his injury and that the jury should have been allowed to consider whether his conduct was negligent.

As is true of primary negligence, one measure of contributory negligence is the need, in a given situation, to anticipate danger....

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42 cases
  • Faith v. Keefer
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 3 Septiembre 1999
    ...of judgment, this alone does not make the act negligent if an ordinarily prudent person may have made the same error. Sanders v. Williams, 209 Md. 149, 120 A.2d 397 (1955). The elements of the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk are equally well settled. The defendant must show: (......
  • Hill v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 4 Octubre 2000
    ...error." Faith v. Keefer, 127 Md.App. 706, 747, 736 A.2d 422, cert. denied, 357 Md. 191, 742 A.2d 521 (1999) (citing Sanders v. Williams, 209 Md. 149, 120 A.2d 397 (1956)). In support of their contention that appellee's failure to go back to the hospital or seek medical attention during the ......
  • Moodie v. Santoni
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 28 Enero 1982
    ...of an ordinarily prudent person under the same or similar circumstances, not that of a very cautious person. Sanders v. Williams, 209 Md. 149, 153, 120 A.2d 397, 399 (1956); and what an ordinarily prudent and careful person would do under a given set of circumstances is usually controlled b......
  • Menish v. Polinger Co., 117
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 27 Abril 1976
    ...of an ordinarily prudent person under the same or similar circumstances, not that of a very cautious person. Sanders v. Williams, 209 Md. 149, 153, 120 A.2d 397, 399 (1956); and what an ordinarily prudent and careful person would do under a given set of circumstances is usually controlled b......
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