Sanderson v. Producers Commission Ass'n

Decision Date10 April 1950
Docket NumberNo. 41500,No. 1,41500,1
Citation360 Mo. 571,229 S.W.2d 563
PartiesSANDERSON v. PRODUCERS COMMISSION ASS'N et al
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Lyman Field, Clay C. Rogers, Reed O. Gentry, Kansas City, for appellants.

John J. Cosgrove, William D. Cosgrove, Kansas City, for respondent.

VAN OSDOL, Commissioner.

In this workmen's compensation case, claimant, widow of the employee, appealed to the Circuit Court from the final award of the Industrial Commission of Missouri upon review reversing an award to claimant by the referee of the Division of Workmen's Compensation. The Circuit Court reversed and set aside the finding and final award of the Industrial Commission, and entered a judgment for claimant awarding $12,645. Defendants, Employer and Insurer, have appealed.

Employee was fatally injured after he had finished his day's work at the place of his employment and when he was traveling in his employer's automobile on Employee's usual route from the place of his employment to his home.

The Industrial Commission (Commissioner Lahey dissenting) upon review found the claimant 'failed to prove that the death of employee, Charles Laird Sanderson, was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Producers Commission Association, as alleged.'

The Circuit Court found from the evidence 'as a matter of law, there being no dispute as to the evidence, that the employee, Charles Laird Sanderson, died from accidental injuries received by him on January 14, 1948, which injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment.' The sole issue raised in the presentation of claimant's claim was--did the accident, resulting in Employee's injury and death arise 'in the course of his employment.' Section 3691, R.S.1939, Mo.R.S.A. Sec. 3691.

It is generally held that accident, resulting in injury to an employee, arises 'in the course of his employment' when it occurs within the period of his employment, at a place where he may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co., 325 Mo. 677, 29 S.W.2d 128; Goetz v. J. D. Carson Co., 357 Mo. 125, 206 S.W.2d 530; Karch v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 358 Mo. 1062, 218 S.W.2d 765; Howes v. Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co., 223 Mo.App. 793, 22 S.W.2d 839; Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo.App. 543, 38 S.W.2d 497.

Employee, a hog buyer, was injured about 2:45 p.m., or possibly 3:00 p.m., January 14, 1948, at or near 4519 Harrison Street in Kansas City, when he was driving an automobile belonging to his employer, defendant-appellant Producers Commission Association. Employee died as a result of the injury, January 29, 1948. When he was injured, Employee was proceeding southwardly in Employer's automobile at or near the place where Gillham Road is 'joined by or empties into' Harrison Street. The automobile ran into a car parked in front of 4519 Harrison. Employee had worked that day for Employer at the Kansas City stockyards. Forty-fifth and Harrison is north and a little west of Employee's home, and south and a little east of the Kansas City stockyards. At the time he was injured, Employee was at a point on the way 'between the place where he worked and the place where he lived.' He was at a point on 'the route most of them all take directly to the yards.' When employees (including Employee), who worked outside, were through work in the afternoon, 'whether it is 12:00 o'clock or six in the afternoon,' they were through their regular duties for the day.

Employee was first employed in 1944, and at that time his work was exclusively at the stockyards. When he was originally employed, there was no 'talk about transportation at all.' In the spring of 1946, he was put in charge of Employer's stations at Malta Bend and Sedalia. Employee drove daily to these points from Kansas City in an automobile belonging to and furnished by Employer. The stations at Malta Bend and Sedalia were closed in October 1947. Employee continued to use the automobile in driving to and from his work at the stockyards, and in making probably eight or ten trips into the country to locate marketable hogs, and to solicit the shipment of hogs to the Kansas City Market. These trips into the country were made in October, November, December, 1947, and the last, a 'good will' trip to Malta Bend, was made on January 9 or 10, 1948, four or five days before Employee was injured.

Employer paid for the oil and gasoline used by Employee in his operation of the automobile owned and furnished by Employer. At night, Employee kept the automobile in the driveway or in the garage at his home. The automobile was one of four owned by Employer.

Employer's manager, called to the witness stand as a witness for claimant, testified, 'Mr. Sanderson primarily arrived at work about 6:30 or 7:00 o'clock (occasionally in busy seasons as early as 6:00 o'clock) in the morning and he came to the Kansas City stockyards to work from his home and we allowed him to take this car home to come on down at that hour which might be earlier than some of the sales staff and his department arrived on the job to get the preliminary duties of the day's work accomplished. * * *

'Q. When he took the car to and from work was that for any company purpose whatsoever? A. No, * * *.

'Q. When you permitted him to take this car home was part of that for his convenience in getting to work in the morning at that time? * * * A. Partly, yes, sir, because we allow that in other departments as well. * * *

'Q. When he was using the car solely to get himself from the yards to his home and back in the morning was that on any orders from you or any orders from anybody down at the company? * * * A. We maintained four company cars and we rent two stalls at the stockyards. We have a man today in the sheep department who is doing the same thing now that Mr. Sanderson was then of taking the car home at night and driving it back to work in the morning.'

Upon being asked whether Employee's use of the automobile 'outside of his hours,' in going to and from work, was in 'connection with personal business or company business,' the witness answered, 'I say for his personal use.' The witness further testified Employer's four automobiles were primarily bought and used for operations in the country, outside the city limits of Kansas City, 'calling on and maintaining good will and contact with our patrons.'

The difficult question--whether an accident occurring while an employee is riding to and from work in the employer's conveyance is one arising 'in the course of' the employment and compensable under workmen's compensation laws--has been considered in the many cases of other jurisdictions cited by the parties, appellants and respondent. The cited cases, and many others, are to be found in the Annotations, 10 A.L.R. 169; 21 A.L.R. 1223; 24 A.L.R. 1233; 62 A.L.R. 1438; 145 A.L.R. 1033.

Section 3695(c), R.S.1939, MoR.S.A. Sec. 3695(c), provides that, 'Without otherwise affecting either the meaning or interpretation of the abridged clause, 'personal injuries arising out of and in the course of such employment,' it is hereby declared not to cover workmen except while engaged in, or about the premises where their duties are being performed, or where their services require their presence as a part of such service.' The Section is not to be construed as unqualifiedly restricting compensable accident and injury to the time the employee is actually working in the performance of his duties on the premises of the employer. The Section has been held to extend the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Law to all employees while in or about any premises where they may be engaged in the performance of their duties, and while at any place where their services, or any task, or mission which forms a necessary part of their services, may reasonably require them to be. Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co., supra; Sylcox v. National Lead Co., supra.

In the Sylcox case the transportation by bus to and from his home was furnished plaintiff by his employer as a part of the consideration for plaintiff's work. Plaintiff had completed his actual labors for the day on the premises of his employer, and was injured when alighting from the bus some four miles distant from the place of his actual labors. In that case transportation was expressly contemplated by the contract of employment, but, in searching for a general statement of the determinative principles applicable to the very problem of the instant case, we have found no more able although summary treatment than that in the following paragraphs quoted from the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the Sylcox case, 225 Mo.App., at pages 547-548, 38 S.W.2d, at pages 499-500,

'Generally speaking, it is the scope of the contract of employment which furnishes the determinative test of whether such an accident is one for compensation. In other words, it is the contract of employment, and not the actual commencement of labor, which establishes the relationship of the parties under the act. If the right to transportation is given, either positively or inferentially, by the terms of the contract, the employment begins when the employee boards the bus to go to the scene of his labor; it continues throughout the entire period of transportation; and it terminates when he leaves the bus at his home. If the contract provides in express terms for transportation, there is but small room for controversy, but, where its provisions are to be implied from...

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