Sandford v. Metcalfe

• Decision Date: 18 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 29467.,29467.
• Citation: 110 Conn.App. 162,954 A.2d 188
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Irene SANDFORD v. Watson B. METCALFE et al. Gretchen Pulvermann, Executrix (Estate of Mary Jane Watson) v. Watson B. Metcalfe et al.

954 A.2d 188

110 Conn.App. 162

Irene SANDFORD v. Watson B. METCALFE et al.

Gretchen Pulvermann, Executrix (Estate of Mary Jane Watson) v. Watson B. Metcalfe et al.

No. 29467.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 18, 2008.

Decided July 18, 2008.^*

Daniel W. Moger, Jr., with whom was Joyce H. Young, Greenwich, for the appellants (defendants).

James A. Fulton, Greenwich, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

FLYNN, C.J., and LAVINE and PELLEGRINO, Js.

PELLEGRINO, J.

This is an appeal from the judgments of the trial court sustaining two appeals from the Probate Court for the district of Greenwich, which refused to authorize a distribution to the plaintiffs, Irene Sandford and Gretchen Pulvermann, in accordance with the will of Mary Jane Watson (decedent). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The dispute giving rise to this appeal concerns the distribution of the assets of the estate of the decedent, who died on February 10, 2000. Five days before the decedent's death, on February 5, 2000, she asked Sandford, a friend who lived in Armonk, New York, to come to her house in Greenwich.¹ Sandford, an attorney licensed to practice law in New York but not in Connecticut, arrived at the decedent's home after work that evening. Sandford found the decedent in her bed and suggested that the decedent should be seen by a physician.

The decedent asked Sandford to draft her a new will, continually insisting that she would discuss no other subject until Sandford did as she requested. The decedent's prior will had been executed in December, 1962, and left her estate to her now deceased mother and husband with a contingent beneficiary of her cousin, Watson B. Metcalfe. Sandford explained to the decedent that she was not licensed to practice law in Connecticut and, upon learning that the decedent wanted to name her as a beneficiary, told the decedent that she could not prepare the will. The decedent, however, insisted that she prepare the will. Sandford relented and complied with the decedent's wishes by handwriting a will that, in accordance with the decedent's instructions, left the estate in equal shares to Sandford and to the decedent's handyman, Robert Peterson, who was also present in the decedent's home that evening. No provision was made in the will for residuary beneficiaries. After the will was signed and witnessed, the decedent was taken to a hospital where she died five days later.²

After the decedent's death, both the 1962 will and the handwritten will dated February 5, 2000, were offered to the Probate Court for the district of Greenwich for probate. The heirs at law³ attempted to prevent the handwritten will from being admitted to probate, making the same public policy and undue influence arguments that they are asserting in this appeal. The Probate Court, Hon. David R. Tobin, found that the February 5, 2000 will was the decedent's last will and testament and admitted it to probate. The plaintiffs attempted to appeal from Judge Tobin's decision, but that appeal subsequently was dismissed as untimely. No appeal was taken from the trial court's judgment dismissing the probate appeal.⁴

Pulvermann was appointed as executrix of the estate, as set forth in the decedent's February, 2000 will. In fulfilling her duties, Pulvermann submitted an accounting to the Probate Court, calling for an equal distribution of the proceeds of the estate to Sandford and Peterson in accordance with the provisions of the will. At that time, Metcalfe, an heir at law, applied to the Probate Court for an order of distribution, claiming that the bequest to Sandford failed by operation of law, and, because the will did not have a residuary clause, the bequest to Sandford should pass under the laws of intestacy to the decedent's heirs, including himself.

The order for distribution filed by Pulvermann and the order for distribution filed by Metcalfe were presented to the Probate Court. Hon. Daniel F. Caruso, serving as the acting judge of the Probate Court for the district of Greenwich, held that the bequest to Sandford failed by operation of law and ordered that her bequest pass in accordance with the laws of intestacy to the decedent's heirs at law. Pulvermann and Sandford thereafter filed separate appeals from Judge Caruso's decision to the Superior Court. The appeals subsequently were consolidated, and the court, R. Robinson, J., sustained the appeals. The heirs at law have filed this appeal.

At the outset, we take a moment to clarify what is at issue in this appeal. It is the claim of the heirs at law that because the will drafted by Sandford constituted the unauthorized practice of law and was violative of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit an attorney from preparing any instrument giving herself a substantial gift; Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(c); Sandford's conduct violated public policy, and this court must remedy that violation. We conclude, however, that the question of whether Sandford engaged in the unauthorized practice of law or violated rule 1.8(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct was not decided in the action from which this appeal arises.⁵ Accordingly that aspect of the claim by the heirs at law is not an issue before us and we need not address it. See Celentano v. Oaks Condominium Assn., 265 Conn. 579, 589 n. 9, 830 A.2d 164 (2003) ("[b]ecause our review is limited to matters in the record, we will not address issues not decided by the trial court" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Moreover, because the heirs at law did not file a timely appeal from Judge Tobin's decision admitting the February 5, 2000 will to probate, we are presented with a duly admitted will that provides for a distribution to Sandford. The issue before this court, therefore, is not whether there should be a distribution in accordance with the will, because that issue was decided by the decision of the Probate Court and unsuccessfully appealed, but whether there should be a forfeiture of the bequest to Sandford, the attorney who drafted the will, on the basis of public policy. We conclude that there should not be a forfeiture.

We begin by identifying the relevant legal principles and standard of review that govern the resolution of the defendants' appeal. "An appeal from a Probate Court to the Superior Court is not an ordinary civil action.... When entertaining an appeal from an order or decree of a Probate Court, the Superior Court takes the place of and sits as the court of probate.... In ruling on a probate appeal, the Superior Court exercises the powers, not of a constitutional court of general or common law jurisdiction, but of a Probate Court....

"The function of the Superior Court in appeals from a Probate Court is to take jurisdiction of the order or decree appealed from and to try that issue de novo.... Thereafter, upon consideration of all evidence presented on the appeal which would have been admissible in the probate court, the superior court should exercise the same power of judgment which the probate court possessed and decide the appeal as an original proposition unfettered by, and ignoring, the result reached in the probate court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gordon, 45 Conn.App. 490, 494-95, 696 A.2d 1034, cert. granted on other grounds, 243 Conn. 911, 701 A.2d 336 (1997) (appeal dismissed October 27, 1998).

Because the facts underlying this appeal are undisputed, the conclusion of the trial court that the testamentary gift from the decedent to Sandford did not violate public policy involves a question of law, which we review under the plenary standard of review. See Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 773, 792 A.2d 66 (2002).

"The law governing descent and distribution emanates from the legislature and is purely statutory.... The legislature has, by statute, carved out exceptions to the statutes governing descent and distribution to deprive an ostensibly rightful heir, falling within the ambit of those exceptions, of an otherwise lawful inheritance. Under [General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)] § 45-273a (a) [now § 45a-436 (g)]⁶ a person who, without sufficient cause, abandons his or her spouse is foreclosed from receiving a statutory share of the estate of the deceased spouse. Under [General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)] § 45-279(a) [now § 45a-447]⁷ a person finally convicted of murder is precluded from inheriting any part of the estate of the deceased victim...." (Citations omitted.) Hotarek v. Benson, 211 Conn. 121, 125-28, 557 A.2d 1259 (1989). There is, however no statute barring an attorney who drafted a testamentary instrument from inheriting by the instrument she drafted.

Because there is no statute barring a distribution to Sandford, the heirs at law ask us to use our equitable powers to prevent such a distribution. We cannot do so. "Even if the omission of such a statute were the result of legislative oversight or neglect, we have no power to supply the...