Sandler v. Executive Mgmt. Plus

• Decision Date: 01 March 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 0732,Sept. Term,0752,2010.,s. 0732
• Citation: 203 Md.App. 399,38 A.3d 478
• Parties: Theodore I. SANDLER, et al. v. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT PLUS.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

203 Md.App. 399

38 A.3d 478

Theodore I. SANDLER, et al.

v.EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT PLUS.

Nos. 0732

0752

Sept. Term

2010.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 1, 2012.

Theodore I. Sandler, Rockville, MD, for appellant.

Richard S. Basile (Robert E. Ammons, PA, on the brief), Greenbelt, MD, for appellee.

Panel: ZARNOCH, HOTTEN, J. FREDERICK SHARER (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

HOTTEN, J.

Appellants, Theodore I. Sandler and Abbie L. Fields, appeal from the judgments of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered in favor of appellee, Executive Management Plus, in these consolidated landlord-tenant actions.¹ Appellants raise two issues, which we have combined and recast as a single issue:

Whether the circuit court erred by striking appellants' jury trial demand.

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.²

BACKGROUND

On August 26, 2008, the parties entered into a one year residential lease for a single family home located at 12008 Titian Way in Potomac, Maryland. The lease contained a renewal clause. According to appellants, a “dispute arose” between the parties regarding whether appellants properly exercised the renewal clause to extend the lease for another year. Appellee, however, asserted that appellants modified the original lease, creating a counter-offer for the renewal term, which appellee did not accept.

On September 29, 2009, appellee served appellants with a “Notice to Vacate.” On November 4, 2009, in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County, appellee filed a “Complaint and Summons against Tenant Holding Over” (“THO”), seeking possession of the property.³ See Md.Code (1974, 2003 Repl.Vol., 2009 Supp.), § 8–402 of the Real Property Article (“R.P.”). On November 6, 2009, in the District Court, appellants filed a “Petition in Action of Rent Escrow [and] for Injunction.” Appellants' claim under the 1975 Rent Escrow Act alleged the presence of certain “conditions and defects in the leased premises,” including “mold, flaking paint, Building Code violations, [and] Environmental Dept. violations.” Appellants sought an “[i]njunction against harrassment [sic]” and damages “for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment or warranty of habitability in the amount of $3[,]744 x 4 Mos. Rent.” See R.P. § 8–211. See generally Neal v. Fisher, 312 Md. 685, 541 A.2d 1314 (1988) (discussing Rent Escrow Act).

The rent escrow case came before the District Court on December 9, 2009. Because the THO case had not been called, the District Court continued both cases to December 16, 2009. In the meantime, as we shall note below, one of the appellants asked about moving for a jury trial. On that same date, apparently after the hearing, appellant Sandler filed a written jury trial request. On December 16, 2009, the District Court sent both cases to the circuit court for jury trials.

On February 22, 2010, appellants moved to consolidate both cases, and the circuit court granted the motion on March 10, 2010, with the clerk entering the order the next day. On March 24, 2010, the consolidated cases went before another circuit court judge for a hearing on several motions and for trial. The court reversed the consolidation order and granted appellee's motion to strike the jury trial demand.

The cases each went to trial before yet another circuit court judge on May 12 and 13, 2010. In each case, the court granted appellee's motions for directed verdicts, which were essentially motions for judgment.⁴ See Md. Rule 2–519. Appellants timely appealed both decisions, and we consolidated the appeals for our consideration.

We shall recite additional facts as they relate to the issues before us.

DISCUSSION

I. Introduction

The right to a jury trial in Maryland is afforded by Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.⁵ See Pickett v. Sears Roebuck & Company, 365 Md. 67, 89, 775 A.2d 1218 (2001). This Constitutional mandate is implemented by Md.Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2009 Supp.), § 4–402(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) ⁶ and Maryland Rule 3–325, which sets forth procedural requirements for a jury trial demand.

On appeal, appellants claim that the circuit court erred by denying their right to a jury trial. They assert that the court's failure to recognize their proper jury plea from December 9, 2009 was made more difficult by notational errors in the record. They further contend that “[c]umbersome, overlapping files and an effective campaign of disinformation created significant confusion during the proceedings[, and that the] flawed assumptions of fact, adopted by the Court fatally affected the proceedings in this case.” They take issue with the view that these cases involved purely equitable claims that would not warrant a trial by jury, and also complain that they were denied due process of law because the record below “was conflicted and in error.” They further maintain that “[n]otational, procedural and factual errors” combined to limit their right to be heard and to defend their right to their home. Specifically, they rely on the circuit court's acceptance of an incorrect jury plea date as an error which, above all others, had a fatal effect on this case and was “an incorrect and prejudicial assumption.” Appellants believe that they continue to have an interest in the “implied value of their lease” and a legal claim flowing from appellee's actions.

Appellee responds that the actions sub judice are solely equitable in nature and, as a result, appellants are not entitled to a jury trial. Appellee further contends that the circuit court properly denied a jury trial for two reasons: (1) appellants' failure to make a timely written demand for a jury trial and (2) the instant cases only seek equitable relief. Appellee also maintains that, assuming that appellants have a right to a jury trial in this case, the denial of a jury trial is harmless error because appellee moved for directed verdicts in both cases, which the circuit court granted. As such, the court's rulings in appellee's favor on questions of law would have taken these cases from the jury in any event.

We agree with appellee that any error in striking appellants' jury trial demands was harmless. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court. To place this holding in context, we address the contention that the cases before us are solely equitable and do not warrant a trial by jury, then addressing the timeliness of appellants' jury trial demands. As discussed infra, we conclude that the actions before us are not limited to claims for equitable relief and that appellants would have been entitled to a jury trial in each case provided they alleged a sufficient amount in controversy and fulfilled other prerequisites for demanding a jury trial. We will not address appellee's contention that appellants failed to comply with the order that they make payments to appellee pursuant to R.P. § 8–118 because it appears that appellants tendered rent payments to the circuit court.

II. Suit for Possession as Action at Law–Amount in Controversy

Appellee contends that both actions are equitable in nature and, thus, do not warrant a trial by jury. With respect to the THO action, appellee insists that it merely seeks possession of the property it owns. We disagree with appellee that a litigant in a tenant holding over action would never be entitled to a trial by jury. In an appropriate case, where a tenant asserts a right to continue possession in defense of a landlord's action seeking possession, and where the tenant also makes a claim for damages that he or she might suffer as a result of an ejectment or ouster, the tenant would be entitled to a jury trial provided that the alleged damages exceeded the required amount in controversy.

The Court of Appeals' decision in Martin v. Howard County, 349 Md. 469, 709 A.2d 125 (1998), is instructive. In that case, Howard County filed an action to “abate” a nuisance pursuant to R.P. § 14–120, which, at the time, created a cause of action to “abate” a nuisance when one's use of real property involved controlled dangerous substances or paraphernalia. Id. at 471–72, 709 A.2d 125. The tenant requested a jury trial, and the case was transferred to the circuit court. Id. at 475–76, 709 A.2d 125. The circuit court struck an earlier order allowing a jury trial and remanded to the District Court because the court agreed with the county that the action sounded in equity as the county sought only injunctive relief. Id. at 476, 709 A.2d 125.

The Court of Appeals disagreed that the county's possession action was solely equitable in nature, and instead concluded that

[a]n action by or on behalf of a landlord to evict a tenant, on the ground that the tenant no longer is entitled to possession, and to restore possession to the landlord, “is historically an action at law to which the right to a jury trial has always attached in this State.” ... It is a form of the traditional legal action of ejectment.... Since ejectment, as well as trespass out of which the action of ejectment grew, are actions at law, the constitutional right to a jury trial attaches.

Id. at 481–83, 709 A.2d 125 (citations omitted). Although the trial court action had been styled a “Complaint for Injunctive Relief,” the actual relief sought by the county was, in fact, legal in nature. Id. at 476, 709 A.2d 125. The Court of Appeals distinguished actions seeking to halt certain activities on the property, instead pointing out that the nature of the remedy dictates whether the action is one at law or in equity:

With respect to actions against defendants who are allegedly engaging in activity constituting a nuisance, the relief sought will determine the nature of the action. If the relief requested is an order requiring the defendant to stop engaging in the activity, the action is equitable. If the plaintiff requests money damages, or if a plaintiff not in possession requests an order ousting a tenant from...