Sandlin v. Pearsall

• Decision Date: 17 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. CIV-4-75-46.,CIV-4-75-46.
• Parties: Evelyne SANDLIN, Plaintiff, v. Everett PEARSALL et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

427 F. Supp. 494

Evelyne SANDLIN, Plaintiff, v. Everett PEARSALL et al., Defendants.

No. CIV-4-75-46.

United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, Winchester Division.

November 17, 1976.

Quinton F. Horton, McMinnville, Tenn. and Sidney W. Gilreath, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Clinton Swafford, Winchester, Tenn., J. Stanley Rogers, Manchester, Tenn., Bernard K. Smith and James W. Dempster, McMinnville, Tenn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NEESE, District Judge.

This is an action for monetary damages for deprivation of the plaintiff's civil rights. She claimed that she suffered serious damage to her eyesight from the use by the defendants Messrs. Rowland and Mathias upon her person, while she was in custody after an arrest, of unreasonable force, and that they failed to provide her with timely medical attention when she was in obvious need thereof. The jury found for the defendants, and the plaintiff moved timely for a new trial. Rules 59(a)(1), (2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The gravamen of such motion is that the verdict returned by the jury is contrary to the weight of the evidence and the applicable law.

Mrs. Sandlin, evidently an obnoxious drunkard of disgusting cultural standards, was arrested on the afternoon of January 3, 1974 while she was admittedly intoxicated. What transpired afterward is without substantial dispute. She was taken to jail and incarcerated, alone in a cell behind a solid iron door with only a comparatively small aperture in it. She began immediately after she was locked-up to kick upon the door, curse her custodians, and generally disturb the peace of the jail. To inspire her to behave herself, the defendant Mr. Rowland admittedly "* * * sprayed mace across the cell door in a sweeping motion. * * *" Mrs. Sandlin testified, without contradiction, that mace from such spray gun struck and penetrated into her eyes. It is inferable reasonably that she complained of the effect of the mace within the hearing of Mr. Rowland, because he admittedly called-out to her as he left the cells-portion of the jail: "If it bothers you, wash your face and you'll be all right!" Despite his admitted knowledge of Mrs. Sandlin's problem, although he "checked on her several times" during the ensuing evening, Mr. Rowland failed to ascertain that Mrs. Sandlin obviously was in need of medical attention during his entire shift.

The plaintiff was taken to City Court from the jail late the following afternoon. When the presiding judge observed her condition, even at that late time, he released Mrs. Sandlin for a period of two weeks.

The day after (Saturday), Mrs. Sandlin consulted a local physician who arranged for her to be examined by an ophthalmologist in another city. She was able to arrange the necessary transportation late that evening and was examined by Dr. John T. Cunningham about 10:00 o'clock, p. m. This physician found at that time an inflammatory reaction from the inside of Mrs. Sandlin's eyes with a definite reduction in vision in her right eye. He reexamined and treated Mrs. Sandlin several times thereafter and expressed the opinion that she had suffered, either from the toxic reaction of the mace or the force of the stream of mace sprayed into her eyes, a permanent loss of vision.

This Court submits issues to juries for their collective determination and customarily does not reweigh the evidence and set aside the verdict returned, because he feels a different result would have been more reasonable under the facts and the law. See ergo., United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. 544 Acres of Land, Etc., D.C.Tenn. (1969), 309 F.Supp. 46, 487. Contrary to the state rule, a federal judge presiding in Tennessee over a civil action does not sit as the seventh juror. Sitton v. Clements, D.C. Tenn. (1966), 257 F.Supp. 63, 672, affirmed C.A.6th (1967), 385 F.2d 869; Wertham Bag Corp. v. Agnew, C.A.6th (1953), 202 F.2d 119, 1223.

Notwithstanding: "* * * The trial judge in the federal system has * * * discretion to grant a new trial if the verdict appears to him to be against the weight of the evidence. * * *" Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. (1958), 356 U.S. 525, 540, 78 S.Ct. 893, 902, 2 L.Ed.2d 953, 964, rehearing denied (1958), 357 U.S. 933, 78 S.Ct. 1366, 2 L.Ed.2d 1375; accord: Trice v. Commercial Union Assurance Company (opinion per Frank W. Wilson, District Judge), C.A.6th (1964), 334 F.2d 673, 6776, certiorari denied (1965), 380 U.S. 915, 85 S.Ct. 895, 13 L.Ed.2d 801. In so doing, however, "* * * where no undesirable or pernicious element has occurred or been introduced into the trial and the trial judge nonetheless grants a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the trial judge * * * has, to some extent at least, substituted his judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury. Such an action effects a denigration of the jury system and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge takes over, if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury as the trier of the facts. * * *" Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc., C.A.3d (1960), 278 F.2d 79, 907.

In exercising its discretion on this basis, the Court must first separate jury trials in civil from criminal actions. In criminal cases, "* * * the jury has the power or technical right, if it can be called so to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts. * * *" Horning v. District of Columbia (1920), 254 U.S. 135, 138, 41 S.Ct. 53, 54, 65 L.Ed. 185, 186-187 (see headnote 3); see also United States v. Moylan, C.A.4th (1969), 417 F.2d 1002, 10063. In civil actions, however, if, after evaluating all the significant evidence, the trial judge is of the opinion, in the exercise of his own best judgment, that the jury has so disregarded the credible evidence that its verdict is against the clear weight thereof, the duty arises for the trial judge to check the jury's power to render a final and binding verdict by setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial, to the end that a miscarriage of justice does not result. See Duncan v. Duncan, C.A.6th (1967), 377 F.2d 49, 521, 2, certiorari denied sub nom. Fain v. Duncan (1967), 389 U.S. 913, 88 S.Ct. 239, 19 L.Ed.2d 260; cf. also Zegan v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, C.A.3d (1961), 266 F.2d 101, 1045.

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