Sandock v. F. D. Borkholder Co., Inc.

Decision Date28 November 1979
Docket NumberNo. 3-179,3-179
PartiesMelvin SANDOCK, Betty Sandock, Sam Sandock, Ruby Sandock and B. & S. Sandock, Inc., Appellees-Plaintiffs, v. F. D. BORKHOLDER COMPANY, INC., Appellant-Defendant. A 25.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Sam Mirkin, South Bend, for appellant-defendant.

Myron J. Hack, Hack & Asher, South Bend, for appellees-plaintiffs.

STATON, Judge.

B. & S. Sandock, Inc. (Sandock) and F. D. Borkholder Company, Inc. (Borkholder), entered into a contract for the construction by Borkholder of a concrete block addition to Sandock's pre-existing structure. The addition was to be used as a retail showroom and warehouse in furtherance of Sandock's furniture and carpet business. Sandock was unable to use the addition for its intended use, however, because of a recurring moisture problem on the inside of one of the walls. Sandock filed suit seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. After trial by the court, Sandock was awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $8,711.69 and punitive damages in the amount of $6,500.00.

In its appeal to this Court, Borkholder contends that: (1) the judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the trial court erred in not granting Borkholder's motion for an involuntary dismissal; and (3) the trial court erred in awarding punitive damages. 1

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Borkholder's argument with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence is two-fold. First, Borkholder argues that because Sandock has been able to use certain areas of the addition for storage, Sandock was not damaged at all. This argument is without merit. Because of the unsightliness of one of the walls, Sandock was not able to use the addition as a showroom. Because of the dampness, Sandock was only able to use part of the addition for storage. Additionally, the useful life of the addition was less than it would have been had the construction proceeded pursuant to the plans and specifications embodied in the contract. Sandock proved that it had been damaged.

Borkholder's second attack on the sufficiency of the evidence concerns testimonial conflicts as to the cause of the moisture problem. Several witnesses testified that the moisture problem was not attributable to Borkholder's work, while others testified that it was. Borkholder maintains that because of that conflict, the judgment was not supported by sufficient evidence. In propounding this argument, Borkholder has misconstrued the trial court's function as the finder of facts and our function as a court of appellate review. The case was heard below without the intervention of a jury. Accordingly, it was the function of the trial court to weigh the evidence and assess credibility in an effort to resolve the factual disputes. When, as here, the sufficiency of the evidence is raised as an issue on appeal, our function is to determine if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment based on an examination of the evidence most favorable to the party that prevailed below together with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Peters v. Davidson, Inc. (1977), Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 556. Such an examination in the instant case discloses that the judgment is supported by sufficient evidence.

II. Involuntary Dismissal

At the close of Sandock's case-in-chief, Borkholder moved for an involuntary dismissal. Involuntary dismissals are provided for in TR. 41(B), which reads in pertinent part as follows:

"After the plaintiff or party with the burden of proof upon an issue, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence thereon, the opposing party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that considering all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the party to whom the motion is directed, to be true, there is no substantial evidence of probative value to sustain the material allegations of the party against whom the motion is directed. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. . . ."

Borkholder contends that there was no substantial evidence of probative value concerning the amount of the damages that were incurred by Sandock and that the trial court therefore erred in not granting the motion. 2 Sandock offered testimony from which the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the addition was not suitable for the purposes contemplated by the contract. Sandock offered further testimony that the amount required to remedy the defects would be slightly in excess of $17,000. There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to overcome Borkholder's motion for an involuntary dismissal.

III. Punitive Damages

Borkholder failed in many respects to comply with the specifications embodied in the contract. This constituted a breach of the contract. As this Court recently noted in Monte Carlo, Inc. v. Wilcox (1979), Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 673, punitive damages are generally not recoverable in actions for breach of contract. Rather, the non-breaching party is limited to recovering compensatory damages. Punitive damages are recoverable only when tortious conduct accompanies or mingles with the breach and it appears that the public interest would be served by the deterrent effect of the punitive damages. Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor (1977), 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845.

Several of Borkholder's variances from the specifications were undisclosed, latent variances. 3 Such variances constitute a form of fraud or misrepresentation. The trial court could thus have properly concluded that tortious conduct accompanied the breach.

We fail to perceive, however, any public interest affected by the imposition of punitive damages. Borkholder and Sandock possessed equal bargaining power both before and after their agreement was reduced to writing. Borkholder's conduct was not "oppressive" as that term is used in the context of punitive damages. See Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp (1976), 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173. Nor can we say that the variances in this case endangered the safety of the public. Although we do not condone Borkholder's actions, we cannot say that those actions warranted, under the guidelines of Vernon Fire & Casualty and its progeny, the imposition of punitive damages. Sandock was entitled to compensation for all of its damages which proximately resulted from Borkholder's breach, but it was not entitled to punitive damages.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed to the extent that it awards punitive damages. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 4

HOFFMAN, J., concurs.

GARRARD, P. J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.

GARRARD, Presiding Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority disposition of issues I & II. However, I disagree with the court's treatment of the punitive damages issue.

In Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor (1977), 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 our Supreme Court reexamined the application of punitive damage awards to claims arising from a breach of contract....

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