Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield

Decision Date21 July 2009
Docket NumberNo. 28,266.,28,266.
Citation215 P.3d 791,2009 NMCA 095
PartiesJose SANDOVAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico
OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Defendant Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. appeals following an unfavorable $2.2 million verdict in this negligence action. Defendant asserts error in denying its motion for a new trial or a remittitur, claiming that (1) insofar as the verdict was based on future damages, the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the evidence did not justify the amount of the award and was excessive because of Plaintiff's counsel's improper closing argument that tainted the verdict by "passion, prejudice, partiality, sympathy, undue influence, or a mistaken measure of damages." In this opinion, we reduce this string of descriptive nouns to "passion or prejudice." Defendant also claims that the court erred in awarding post-judgment interest at a rate of 15%.

{2} We affirm the verdict and judgment. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in any regard. The evidence justified the amount awarded and was not grossly out of proportion to the evidence and substantial evidence supported the verdict. Defendant's passion or prejudice argument is unavailing because Defendant failed to preserve the underlying improper-closing-argument ground and the circumstances do not require us to overlook the preservation failure.

BACKGROUND

{3} Plaintiff Jose Sandoval worked for Key Energy and was injured in mid-December 2005 while assisting an employee of Defendant in setting a packer tool in an oil well owned by Latigo Petroleum. The tool was owned and operated by Defendant. Defendant and its employee, Johnny Taylor, were on site supervising operations related to setting the packer tool. Precision Wireline (Precision) was the operator that ran a wire, which was connected to the tool, from its truck. Precision experienced engine trouble that caused the process of powering and running the tool into and out of the well to be delayed several hours.

{4} After the packer tool was finally set and brought to the surface, Mr. Taylor attempted to release the pressure from the tool, but he experienced a problem with the tool's primary bleed-off port and unsuccessfully tried various customary ways to accomplish the release. Mr. Taylor and others then attempted to unscrew the tool, at which time the tool blew apart, and the handle of the chain tongs that were attached to the tool struck Plaintiff and fractured his right femur.

{5} Plaintiff sued only Defendant and only in negligence, claiming that Defendant failed to provide a safe place to work and safe equipment, failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to adequately supervise the work being performed in a safe manner, and directed work to be performed in an unsafe manner. The jury found Defendant to be 100% at fault and awarded Plaintiff damages in the sum of $2.2 million.

{6} Defendant filed a motion for a new trial or, alternatively, for remittitur, asserting that the verdict was grossly out of proportion to the injury and shocked the conscience. One ground was that the award of damages "for future loss of earnings and/or pain and suffering" was not supported by the evidence. Another was that Plaintiff's counsel's closing argument inflamed the jury's passion or prejudice which led to an exorbitant and improper verdict. The district court denied Defendant's motion.

{7} Defendant appealed from the court's final judgment that awarded Plaintiff $2.2 million plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Defendant also appealed from the court's order and amended order that denied Defendant's motion for a new trial or, alternatively, for remittitur.

{8} In its brief in chief, Defendant contends in its first point that the evidence is not sufficient to support the amount awarded. Defendant points to undisputed evidence that Plaintiff's special damages relate to his medical bills and lost wages totaling approximately $100,000; that Plaintiff's leg is fully healed; that Plaintiff is capable of returning to his old job; that Plaintiff did not sustain permanent muscle damage or bone deformation to his leg; and that Plaintiff's future pain and suffering would be limited to a dull ache during wet or cold weather, treatable with little or no medication. Thus, Defendant contends, neither the high-end estimate of $600,000 for loss of future earnings nor the approximate $1.5 million remaining for pain and suffering is supported by substantial evidence, and the district court therefore erred in not granting Defendant's motion for a new trial or remittitur. Defendant actually asserts that there is no evidence presented to support permanent pain except for a residual dull ache in the leg during cold or wet weather, and there is no evidence presented to support loss of future earnings. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to prove loss of future earnings with reasonable certainty, arguing that whether Plaintiff would have been promoted to a higher position is speculative.

{9} Defendant contends in its second point that the verdict amount is excessive and shocks the conscience. Defendant essentially argues that the jury's factually unsupported, excessive award was reached based on Plaintiff's counsel's improper closing argument and on passion or prejudice, and thus the jury's deliberations and verdict were tainted by passion or prejudice.

{10} In oral argument, Defendant restructured the foregoing two points. Defendant maintained that, under its first point, the amount of the verdict shocked the conscience and that in measuring what shocks the conscience, this Court examines other instructive cases in which courts have determined whether an award was excessive. Defendant argued that its substantial evidence contention in the first point was to be decided primarily, if not solely, on the basis of whether the verdict shocked this Court's conscience. Defendant maintained that its second point, which was that Plaintiff's counsel's closing argument remarks were improper and caused the jury's verdict to be tainted, was completely independent of its first point, and thus not affected were we to determine that the amount of the verdict was supported by substantial evidence. We address Defendant's arguments as they are presented in its briefs. However, we assimilate Defendant's various arguments into what we believe constitutes its essential contentions. We believe we cover all of Defendant's arguments. No tack Defendant has taken persuades us that the district court erred or that the verdict should be overturned.

{11} Defendant contends in its third and final point that the district court erred in awarding a 15% instead of an 8.75% post-judgment interest rate. We are unpersuaded.

DISCUSSION
I. The Excessive-Verdict Issues
A. Standards of Review
Substantial Evidence

{12} The generally applicable substantial evidence standard is that we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict by examining whether the verdict is supported by "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate to support a conclusion." Weststar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, 2003-NMSC-002, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 114, 61 P.3d 823 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We "review all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and resolve all conflicts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." Id. Defendant assigns this standard of review to its first point on appeal.

Abuse of Discretion

{13} The applicable standard in reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial or remittitur is abuse of discretion. See State v. Mann, 2002-NMSC-001, ¶ 17, 131 N.M. 459, 39 P.3d 124 ("This Court will not overturn a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial unless the trial court abused its discretion."); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 29, 766 P.2d 280, 289 (1988) ("Refusal to grant a new trial will only be reversed where it is found to be an abuse of discretion."). Defendant assigns this standard of review to its second point on appeal.

{14} "An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case." Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. "When there exist reasons both supporting and detracting from a trial court decision, there is no abuse of discretion." State v Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We "do not find an abuse of discretion unless the court's ruling exceeds the bounds of all reason or is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable." Mayeux v. Winder, 2006-NMCA-028, ¶ 34, 139 N.M. 235, 131 P.3d 85 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, this Court will determine that a district court has abused its discretion "when it applies an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision is premised on a misapprehension of the law." Klinksiek v. Klinksiek, 2005-NMCA-008, ¶ 4, 136 N.M. 693, 104 P.3d 559 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, we have ruled that "[w]here the court's discretion is fact-based, we must look at the facts relied on by the trial court as a basis for the exercise of its discretion, to determine if these facts are supported by substantial evidence." Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 60, 134 N.M. 77, 73 P.3d 215 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{15} It is reasonable to conclude that a damages award that is clearly out of proportion to an injury or...

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