Sandoval v. Hamersley
| Decision Date | 27 April 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-280A43,3-280A43 |
| Citation | 419 N.E.2d 813 |
| Parties | Louis SANDOVAL, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Cynthia Marie HAMERSLEY, Appellee (Defendant Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Lenore S. Perry, Legal Aid Society of Gary, Inc., Gary, for appellant.
Robert E. Stochel, Merrillville, for appellee.
Louis Sandoval filed a Petition to Establish Paternity of a Child Born Out of Wedlock in which he sought to be adjudicated the father of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley and asked that he be given custody of said child. The court 1 dismissed his petition and concluded that, according to IC 1971, 31-4-1-26 (now repealed), the petition was not timely filed. While his appeal on the dismissal of the paternity petition was pending, the court 2 granted the adoption petition of James and Cynthia Jane Hamersley. It found that it was "in the best interest of said child," that Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley be adopted by her aunt and uncle, the Hamersleys. 3
Sandoval's appeal from the dismissal of his Petition to Establish Paternity has been consolidated with his appeal from the granting of the Hamersleys' Petition for Adoption for the purposes of our review. While raising a number of issues for our consideration, Sandoval asks, in essence, whether the court erred in dismissing his paternity petition on the basis of the statute of limitations as set forth in IC 1971, 31-4-1-26 (now repealed). He also contends that because the court while hearing the adoption petition had allowed the introduction of evidence as to paternity, it had erred by failing to make a specific finding thereon.
We reverse and remand.
Initially, we note that the alleged errors, as set out in Sandoval's appeal from the dismissal of his Petition to Establish Paternity deal basically with a statute of limitations question. He claims that because the court improperly relied upon the statute of limitations, set forth in IC 1971, 31-4-1-26 (now repealed), he was wrongfully precluded from litigating the issue of paternity. We agree with his contention that the use of IC 1971, 31-4-1-26 (now repealed) as applied to the facts-at-bar was inappropriate. 4 Nonetheless, we are persuaded that there was no resulting prejudice to Sandoval because he was joined as a party in the adoption proceeding and was allowed to present evidence therein as to his alleged paternity. See Matter of Adoption of Infant Male (1978), Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 885.
In appealing the granting of the adoption petition, Sandoval claims, among other things that the court erred by not making a specific finding as to the issue of paternity. He claims that "the resolution of that issue was the pivotal point upon which all his rights vested, it was incumbent upon the Court to make a finding upon the issues in order to render a just decision in the adoption." We agree.
Pursuant to Sandoval's Trial Rule 52 motion, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in the granting of the Hamersleys' adoption petition. The following findings of fact are pertinent to our discussion:
The purpose of making findings of facts and conclusions of law is to provide the parties and the reviewing courts with the theory upon which the case was decided. Such findings effectively preserve the right of review for error. Miller v. Ortman (1956), 235 Ind. 641, 136 N.E.2d 17. Generally, the requirement of making such "special findings" has been interpreted to mean all those facts necessary for a judgment for the party in whose favor the conclusions of law are rendered. The trial court need not recite the evidence in detail as long as the ultimate facts found are stated in the findings. Salk v. Weinraub (1979), Ind., 390 N.E.2d 995. In order to determine whether the findings are adequate, we will look to see if they are sufficient to disclose a valid basis under the issues for the legal result reached in the judgment. In so doing, we will accept the findings made by the trial court if they are supported by evidence of probative value. In Re Marriage of Miles (1977), Ind.App., 362 N.E.2d 171. We may, however, add nothing to the findings of fact by way of presumption, inference or intendment. Malbin & Bullock, Inc. v. Hilton (1979), Ind.App., 387 N.E.2d 1332, 1334.
When one considers that the foregoing findings are the only findings which are even remotely related to the paternity issue, it becomes apparent that a finding necessary to the judgment is missing. Even when we construe the findings together in support of the judgment, Malbin & Bullock, Inc., supra, they are insufficient, in this respect, to disclose a valid basis for the legal result reached. The court found only that the "child's paternity was never established;" 5 it never stated that Sandoval was or was not the father of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley. From these findings, we are not allowed to imply anything other than a paternity relationship was never established. The findings are, in fact, neutral as to the identity of the father.
A finding as to whether Sandoval is or is not the father of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley is crucial to the proper disposition of the adoption petition. If Sandoval is found to be the father of Lisa, his posture in the matter of the Hamersleys' Petition for Adoption would be changed from one who has no standing, IC 1971, 31-3-1-6(g)(2), to one whose consent is required, IC 1971, 31-3-1-6(a)(2), or whose rights are to be considered in a termination of parental rights procedure, IC 1971, 31-3-1-7 (now repealed). Because under Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(D) a missing finding upon a material issue cannot be resolved by any presumption, we conclude that the paternity issue should be determined by a finding made by the trial court. See Malbin & Bullock, Inc., supra. We, therefore, reverse and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions to make specific findings of fact as to Sandoval's alleged paternity and the necessity for his consent to the adoption. Because of our determination, we need not resolve the other issues raised by Sandoval.
Reversed and remanded.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that this case should be remanded...
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