Sandoval v. Woods

• Decision Date: 29 May 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 2:10-CV-11444
• Parties: MAXIMO SANDOVAL, Jr., Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

MAXIMO SANDOVAL, Jr., Petitioner,

v.JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent

Civil No. 2:10-CV-11444

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: May 29, 2013

HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING

LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Maximo Sandoval, Jr., ("Petitioner"), presently confined at the Kinross Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his application, filed pro se, petitioner challenges his convictions for second-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L.A. 750.520c(1)(f); and being a fourth felony habitual offender, M.C.L.A. 769.12. For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted of the above offenses following a jury trial in the Tuscola County Circuit Court.¹ This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):

In the summer of 2005, defendant, then a 25 year-old male, knocked on the victim's window at 2 a.m. The victim, then a 13 year-old girl who is developmentally delayed, knew the defendant because his parents lived in her neighborhood and because she worked with defendant at a local farm. When the victim heard the knocking, she went to the door and opened it. When she saw defendant, she went outside. Defendant and the victim went to his parents' house and the two entered the back of defendant's mother's van, where they kissed. Defendant then touched the victim's breasts and her vagina and the victim told him to stop. Defendant refused and called the victim derogatory names. The victim tried to leave the van, but defendant pulled her back into the van. Defendant, having pulled his pants down, then grabbed the victim's head and forced her to perform fellatio on him twice. The victim told defendant to stop, but he refused and continued to push her head down. Sometime during these events, the victim tried to push defendant off her and defendant tried to choke her. The victim got out of the van and ran home. Once the victim returned home, the victim's mother called the police and the victim submitted to a sexual assault examination and rape kit. The examiner found saliva on the victim's chest, which was collected and sent for DNA testing. Defendant's DNA matched the DNA collected from the victim's chest.

Defendant was arrested on August 22, 2006 (sic). Defendant was then incarcerated on parole detainer and remained incarcerated during the pendency of this matter. Trial was set for February 14, 2006. However, on February 13, 2006 the charges were dismissed without prejudice because the DNA analysis had not yet been completed. The prosecutor refiled the charges on May 12, 2006 and defendant was arraigned and "rearrested" on June 5, 2006. After a pretrial in October 2006, the matter was brought to trial on January 9, 2007. At trial, defendant presented an alibi defense, alleging that he was sleeping at his sister's house at the time of the event. The victim testified according to the facts above. The victim also indicated that she has been angry, embarrassed, and afraid as a result of the incident and that she sought counseling after the incident.

People v. Sandoval, No. 277509, * 1-2 (Mich.Ct.App. December 4, 2008).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed but the case was remanded for re-sentencing. Id., lv. den. 483 Mich. 980, 764 N.W.2d 237 (2009). On remand, petitioner's sentences of twenty to sixty years in prison was reduced to eighteen to sixty years in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's new sentence.People v. Sandoval, No. 291626 (Mich.Ct.App. June 15, 2010); lv. den. 488 Mich. 873, 788 N.W.2d 454 (2010).

In his original and amended habeas petitions, petitioner seeks habeas relief on the following grounds:

I. The State of Michigan denied the petitioner's right to a speedy trial 180-day rule (M.C.L. 780.131 and M.C.R. 6.004(D)), on claims that the Michigan Department of Corrections (M.D.O.C.) never sent the required notice by certified mail as required. Id. The State of Michigan is in direct violation of federal and constitutional law for denying petitioner's U.S. Constitutional rights, 6th and 14th Amendments.

II. Petitioner's convictions should be overturned because there was insufficient credible evidence at trial to prove petitioner is guilty of the crimes.

III. The petitioner's sentences are invalid because they are based on "inaccurate" information, i.e., improper scoring of the legislatively imposed burden of proof and insufficient facts; therefore, his due process rights were violated.

IV. The State of Michigan erred by enhancing petitioner's guideline with subsequent enhancements by using a prior misdemeanor conviction for which petitioner was not advised of his rights to an attorney nor represented by one. Therefore, violating petitioner's 6th and 14th Amendment constitutional rights.

V. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

VI. Petitioner's sentences are invalid because they are based on inaccurate information, improper scoring of the legislatively imposed burden of proof and insufficient facts, which requires petitioner to re-raise this issue (O.V. 11) at state level after remand in the interest of justice and violation of his due process rights. 14th Amend.

VII. Petitioner should be entitled to 496 days toward his minimum sentence which he accumulated while being detained by the M.D.O.C. due to being on parole when arrested for this case. Failure to grant credit toward his minimum sentence violates Michigan law regarding consecutive sentencing and jail credit, constitutional double jeopardy, due process, and equalprotection guarantees that were violated when he received no credit against the new sentence for a crime committed on parole.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

III. Discussion

A. The State of Michigan denied the petitioner's right to a speedy trial 180-day rule (M.C.L. 780.131 and M.C.R. 6.004(D)), on claims that the Michigan Department of Corrections (M.D.O.C.) never sent the required notice by certified mail as required. Id. The State of Michigan is in direct violation of federal and constitutional law for denying petitioner's U.S. Constitutional rights, 6th and 14th Amendments.

Petitioner first claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that he was brought to trial in violation of the 180 day rule as set forth in M.C.L.A. 780.131 and M.C.R. 6.004(d).

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim that his right to a speedy trial was deprived because he was brought to trial in violation of Michigan's 180 day rule set forth in M.C.L.A. 780.131 and M.C.R. 6.004(d) because it is essentially a statelaw claim. See Burns v. Lafler, 328 F. Supp. 2d 711, 722 (E.D. Mich. 2004). A violation of a state speedy trial law by state officials, by itself, does not present a cognizable federal claim that is reviewable in a habeas petition. Burns, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 722 (citing Poe v. Caspari, 39 F. 3d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1994); Wells v. Petsock, 941 F. 2d 253, 256 (3rd Cir. 1991)). Petitioner's allegation that the State of Michigan violated its own 180 day rule would therefore not entitle him to habeas relief. Id.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. To determine whether a speedy trial...