Sands v. CDCR

• Decision Date: 08 October 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:15-cv-01140-RRB
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: PHILIP SANDS, Plaintiff, v. CDCR, et al., Defendants.

PHILIP SANDS, Plaintiff, v. CDCR, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01140-RRB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

October 8, 2015

DISMISSAL ORDER

Plaintiff Philip Sands, a California state prisoner appearing pro se, brought this civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 in the California Superior Court, County of Kings, against CDCR, Warden Swift, and Lieutenant Marsh. Lieutenant Marsh removed the action to this Court.¹ The incident underlying the Complaint occurred while Sands was incarcerated at the Corcoran State Prison. Sands is currently incarcerated at the Wasco State Prison, Wasco, California.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.² This Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally"frivolous or malicious," that "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."³ Likewise, a prisoner must exhaust all administrative remedies as may be available,⁴ irrespective of whether those administrative remedies provide for monetary relief.⁵

In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."⁶ "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."⁷ Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), including the rule that complaints filed by pro se prisoners are to be liberally construed, affording the prisoner the benefit of anydoubt, and dismissal should be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can plead no facts in support of his claim that would entitle him or her to relief.⁸

This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.⁹ "[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability . . . 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'"¹⁰ Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true.¹¹ "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."¹²

II. GRAVAMEN OF COMPLAINT

Sands simply alleges that on January 6, 2014, his hands were flex-cuffed behind his back for a period of six to seven hours, during which he was forced to urinate with his hands behind his back. Staff refused to free Sands' hands or loosen the flex-cuffs. Sands does not identify the correctional officers involved.

III. DISCUSSION

Sands was denied relief at the Director's level, exhausting his administrative remedies.¹³

I. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT: It is the appellant's position that on January 6, 2014, staff violated his rights when they inappropriately secured him with flexible handcuffs "Flex-Cuffs" for six to seven hours. The appellant asserts that his housing unit was being searched and he was denied food and water and was forced to urinate with his hands behind his back. The appellant contends he was not a threat and this was unnecessary. The appellant requests that Corcoran State Prison (COR) follow the regulations when handcuffing him.

II. SECOND LEVEL'S DECISION: The First Level of Review (FLR) noted that the institution was operating under a Program Status Report (PSR) which authorized the use of restraints when inmates were under escort and out of their assigned cell. The FLR noted the appellant was secured in flex-cuffs while his housing unit was searched. The FLR noted the appellant and other inmates were afforded the use of the restroom, water, and adjustment of the restraints if needed. The Second Level of Review (SLR) did not find any evidence of staff misconduct or that the appellant suffered from the use of the restraints. The SLR denied the appeal.

III. THIRD LEVEL DECISION: Appeal is denied.

A. FINDINGS: The Third Level of Review (TLR) acknowledges that the appellant was secured with waist restraints while his housing unit was searched; however, this security precaution was due to the security precautions the institution enacted pursuant to the PSR. The institution determined inmates posed a threat and it was necessary to secure their hands with restraints while they were outside of their cell. The appellant alleges that this constitutes a violation of his rights. The institution attested that the appellant was offered the use of the restroom, water, and an adjustment of the restraints. The TLR notes that the appellant has not presented any evidence that the staffexceeded their authority relative to the use of the restraints, and there is no evidence that the appellant suffered any long term adverse affect.

Therefore no relief is provided at the TLR.

B. BASIS FOR THE DECISION:

California Penal Code Section: 832.5, 832.7, 5058

California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section: 3000, 300 I, 3005, 3006, 3084.1, 3268, 3268.2, 3270, 3335, 3380

C. ORDER: No changes or modifications are required by the Institution.¹⁴

Sands' Complaint is deficient on its face. Turning first to the California Department of Corrections ("CDCR"). The Supreme Court has held that "states or governmental entities that are considered 'arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment" are not "persons" under § 1983.¹⁵ CDCR falls within the category of those state entities entitled to sovereign immunity.¹⁶ Accordingly, the Complaint as against CDCR must be dismissed without leave to amend.

To the extent that Sands Includes a claim against the Warden, Sands does not allege any facts that tie Warden Swift to the acts giving rise to Sands' injury. To impose liability on a supervisor, the supervisor's wrongful conduct must be sufficiently causally connected to the constitutional violation.¹⁷ That is, the official must "implement a policy sodeficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation."¹⁸

A person deprives another "of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains]." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978) (Johnson) (emphasis added). The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. [Citations omitted.]¹⁹

To obtain relief from Warden Swift Sands must allege specific facts that tie the Warden to the acts giving rise to Sands' injury. That is, Sands must allege and ultimately prove that Warden Swift "set in a motion a series of acts by others, which he knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury."²⁰ The applicable policy was Departmental policy,²¹ not policy adopted by Warden Swift at the institutional level. Furthermore, the Complaint does not challenge the policy itself, only the manner in which it was executed. Thus, the allegations of the Complaint as presently constituted fail to allege any facts sufficient to warrant the granting Sands relief as against Warden Swift. Nor does it appear that Sands can truthfully plead any facts that wouldcreate liability on the part of Warden Swift. Accordingly, the Complaint as against Warden Swift must also be dismissed without leave to amend.

With respect to Lt. Marsh, the Exhibits show that he was the First Level Reviewer of Sands' internal appeal.²² There is no allegation that Lt. Marsh in any way participated in the acts giving rise to Sands' claim. The Complaint as presently constituted fails to allege any facts sufficient to warrant granting relief to Sands. It is also readily apparent from the Complaint and its attachments that Lt. Marsh was not directly involved in the events underlying Sands' claims. Therefore, the Complaint as against Lt. Marsh will also be dismissed without leave to amend.

That does not, however, necessarily end the Court's inquiry. Normally, the Court would grant Sands leave to amend to name the responsible correctional officers. However, as discussed further below, Sands Complaint fails to allege any facts that would entitle him to relief in this Court.²³

It has long been well-established that the wanton and unnecessary use of physical force resulting in the infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.²⁴ Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of cruel and unusual punishments clause, core of judicial inquiry iswhether force was applied in good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.²⁵ While the extent of the injury suffered by an inmate is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; absence of a serious injury does not necessarily end the inquiry.²⁶ "The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimus uses of physical force, provided the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'"²⁷ As stated by the Ninth Circuit.

We have previously identified five factors set forth in Hudson to

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