Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 94-132

Citation884 P.2d 968
Decision Date10 November 1994
Docket NumberNo. 94-132,94-132
PartiesRay SANDSTROM, Appellant (Defendant), v. Jodi SANDSTROM, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Ray Sandstrom, Pro Se.

Michael D. Zwickl, Casper, Representing appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

Appellant Ray Sandstrom (the husband) appeals from an order in which the district court denied his motion to dismiss and his motion to vacate orders, granted the renewed motion made by Appellee Jodi Sandstrom (the wife) for entry of a summary judgment, denied the wife's motion to strike, and quieted title to a ranch in the wife.

We affirm.

ISSUE

The husband states the issue on appeal:

Point Involved

Where the [husband] filed a motion to dismiss predicated upon a settlement agreement signed by the parties, duly notarized, and which called for the immediate dismissal of all proceedings between the parties, was the court authorized to simply ignore its terms, declare the motion not to be "timely filed," and proceed as though the agreement never existed?

FACTS

This is the second time that this quiet title action has been before the Supreme Court. Originally, the case was appealed with a related case which involved the domestication of a Florida divorce decree. In that divorce decree, title to a Fremont County ranch was awarded to the wife.

The district court granted a summary judgment in favor of the wife in the domestication action. On appeal, we affirmed the district court's summary judgment order in the domestication action, and we dismissed the husband's appeal in the quiet title action because the district court had not entered a final order in that case. Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103 (Wyo.1994). The district court subsequently granted a summary judgment in favor of the wife which quieted title to the property in her. The husband appeals from that summary judgment.

The facts of this controversy were articulated at length in Sandstrom; consequently, we will recite only those facts which are pertinent to the issue presented in this case. 880 P.2d at 104-05. The wife filed a motion on June 14, 1993, for a summary judgment in the quiet title action. On July 26, 1993, after the husband had failed to respond to her motion within the time required by W.R.C.P. 6(c), the wife filed a motion for entry of a summary judgment. On August 6, 1993, the On September 22, 1993, the husband filed a motion to dismiss the wife's complaint. His motion to dismiss was predicated upon a settlement agreement. The husband asserted that he and the wife had settled all their outstanding differences, including the controversy which involved the Fremont County property, by signing the settlement agreement. On that same day, the wife filed a traverse to the motion to dismiss. The wife argued that the settlement agreement resulted from improper ex parte contacts between the husband, who was a licensed attorney, and the wife, who was represented by counsel. An affidavit executed by the wife was attached to the traverse. The wife averred that she was hospitalized at the time she signed the agreement and that the husband used undue influence in convincing her to sign it.

                husband filed a "Memorandum Re:  Summary Judgment Motion."   A hearing on the wife's motions was scheduled for September 23, 1993
                

At the hearing, the district court indicated that it would not rule on the wife's motion for a summary judgment in the quiet title action because it was going to consider the husband's motion to dismiss at a later date. See Sandstrom, 880 P.2d at 108. The district court ordered the husband to have no further ex parte contacts with the wife.

A hearing on the husband's motion to dismiss was scheduled for March 17, 1994. Prior to the hearing, the husband filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment orders, 1 and the wife filed two motions: (1) a motion to strike the husband's motion to dismiss; and (2) a renewed motion for entry of a summary judgment in the quiet title action. After the district court held a hearing on the parties' motions, it denied the husband's motion to dismiss because the motion had not been filed in a timely manner, and it also denied his motion to vacate the summary judgment orders. The district court denied the wife's motion to strike but granted her renewed motion for entry of a summary judgment and quieted title to the Fremont County property in her.

DISCUSSION

The husband contends that, even though he did not respond in a timely manner to the wife's motion for a summary judgment, the district court erred by granting the wife's motion without considering his motion to dismiss. We disagree.

W.R.C.P. 56(c), which pertains to summary judgments, provides in part:

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.--Unless the court otherwise orders, the motion and any response and other papers relating thereto shall be served pursuant to Rule 6(c).

W.R.C.P. 6(c) states in pertinent part:

(c) Motions and motion practice.

(1) Unless these rules or an order of the court establish[es] time limitations other than those contained herein, all motions ... shall be served at least 10 days before the hearing on the motion[s]. Except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), or unless the court by order permits service at some other time, a party affected by the motion may serve a response, together with affidavits, if any, at least three days prior to the hearing on the motion or within 20 days after service of the motion, whichever is earlier.

In this case, the district court did not issue any orders which changed the time in which the husband was required to respond to the wife's motion for a summary judgment. The deadlines in W.R.C.P. 6(c), therefore, applied in this case. The wife filed her motion for a summary judgment on June 14, 1993. The husband did not respond to the motion within twenty days as was required by the rule. Since the husband failed to comply with the rules of civil procedure, the district court refused to consider his motion to dismiss in determining whether the wife was entitled to have a summary judgment.

"The Rules of Civil Procedure provide...

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