Sandusky v. Herrera
| Decision Date | 05 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-01436-DDD |
| Parties | AARON SANDUSKY, Applicant, v. JUAN HERRERA, Residential Reentry Manager, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter is before the Court on the Amended Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed by Aaron Sandusky pro se on August 9, 2018. (Doc. 7). Having considered the Response to the Amended Application (Doc. 29), Mr. Sandusky's Reply (Doc. 36), and the Respondent's Surreply (Doc. 40), the Court dismisses the Amended Application as moot.
In 2012, Mr. Sandusky was convicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of California of two counts of violating the Controlled Substances Act: (1) conspiracy to manufacture and to possess with the intent to distribute more than 1,000 marijuana plants; and, (2) possession with the intent to distribute at least 50 kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana. (Doc. 7, at pp. 3-4). The convictions were based on Mr. Sandusky's activities as the president of a California-based Medical Marijuana Cooperative. (Id.). The court sentenced Mr. Sandusky to a 10-year prison term, to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. (Id., at p, 4; Doc. 36, at p. 5). Mr. Sandusky was then remanded to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP).1 The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in United States v. Sandusky, No. 13-50025, 564 F. App'x 282 (9th Cir. March 17, 2014).
When Mr. Sandusky initiated this action in June 2018, he was incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in Florence, Colorado. In the Amended Application, Mr. Sandusky claims that the BOP's expenditure of funds to incarcerate him "violates § 538 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235 and its successor, § 542 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-31." (Doc. 7, at p. 3). For relief, Mr. Sandusky requests an evidentiary hearing to establish that his actions were wholly compliant with California state medical marijuana laws at the time he was charged and convicted of the federal drug offense. (Id., at pp. 7, 12). Mr. Sandusky asserts that once his compliance is established, he is entitled to immediate release from prison. (Id.).
On December 22, 2018, during the initial review proceeding, Judge Babcock issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing this action for lack of statutory jurisdiction. (Doc. 18). Judge Babcock determined that "[t]he essence of Applicant's claim is that he should not have been convicted and sentenced for his conduct in the first place" and, therefore, the claim "implicates the legality of his sentence of imprisonment and must be asserted in the sentencing court" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.2 (Id., at p. 9). On appeal, the Court of Appeals forthe Tenth Circuit issued a published opinion reversing Judge Babcock's decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. See Sandusky v. Goetz, 944 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2019). The Tenth Circuit determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the proper statutory vehicle for Mr. Sandusky's claims because he is challenging the execution of his sentence, not the validity of his convictions or sentence. Id. at 1247.3
After the Tenth Circuit issued the mandate on February 7, 2020 (Doc. 27), the action was reinstated in this Court (Doc. No. 28) and was reassigned to the undersigned (Doc. 34).
While Mr. Sandusky's appeal was pending in the Tenth Circuit, he was transferred to the Long Beach RRM, a residential re-entry facility in California, so that he could complete treatment under the ResidentialDrug Abuse Program prior to his projected release date of March 12, 2020. (Doc. 26, at p. 2).
Mr. Sandusky completed his federal term of imprisonment and was released from BOP custody on March 12, 2020. (Declaration of Juan Herrera,4 Doc. 31-1, at ¶ 8). Mr. Sandusky is currently serving a five-year term of supervised release under the supervision of the United States Probation Office. (Doc. 31-1, Herrera Decl., at ¶ 9; see also Doc. 36, Affidavit of Aaron Sandusky, ¶¶ 2-4, and attached Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order).
Respondent argues that the Amended Application should be dismissed as moot because Mr. Sandusky completed his federal sentence and has been released from BOP custody. (Doc. 31).
The medical and recreational use of marijuana has been legalized in numerous states, but marijuana is still classified as a federal "'controlled substance' under schedule I of the" Controlled Substances Act. See Green Sol. Retail, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1111, 1113 (10th Cir. 2017). See also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (). "Although still illegal federally, the Justice Department has declined to enforce § 841 when a person or company buys or sells marijuana in accordance with state law." See Green Sol. Retail, Inc. 855 F.3d at 1114. In December 2014, Congress "reinforced this arrangement," see id., by enacting the following rider in an Omnibus bill that funded the government through September 30, 2015:
None of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used, with respect to theStates of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, to prevent such States from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014). "Various short-term measures extended the appropriations and the rider through December 22, 2015." United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016). The appropriations rider has been included in substantially similar form in subsequent congressional appropriations, see Sandusky, 944 F.3d at 1243, including the appropriations bill funding the government through September 30, 2020, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-93, § 531, 133 Stat. 2317 (2019).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may only be granted if the applicant "is in custody in violation of the Constitution, or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(1) ().
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,477 (1990). At all stages of the case, the parties must have a "personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). "This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted). "A habeas corpus petition is moot when it no longer presents a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution." Aragon v. Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 691 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7). See also Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 2012) (). If an event occurs during the pendency of an action that "makes it impossible for the court to grant 'any effectual relief whatever,' the case must be dismissed. Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 11 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).
The mootness doctrine does not apply if: 1) secondary or collateral injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury; 2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; 3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or 4) it is a properly certified class action suit). Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the Amended Application, Mr. Sandusky claims that the appropriations rider prohibits the BOP, a component of the Department of Justice, from expending funds on his "continued incarceration." (Doc. 7, at p.3). Mr. Sandusky maintains that he is entitled to "immediate release" if he establishes at an evidentiary hearing that the conduct forwhich he was convicted was "wholly compliant" with California medical marijuana laws.5 (Doc. 7, at pp. 7, 12).
Mr. Sandusky's release from prison and from BOP custody moots his claim that the Department of Justice is expending funds to incarcerate him in violation of the appropriations rider. See Riley, at 310 F.3d at 1257 (); Rhodes, 676 F.3d at 935 (...
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