Sanfilippo v. County of Santa Cruz

• Decision Date: 28 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. C-75-675 SW.,C-75-675 SW.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Joseph SANFILIPPO et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ et al., Defendants.

415 F. Supp. 1340

Joseph SANFILIPPO et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ et al., Defendants.

No. C-75-675 SW.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

June 28, 1976.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bernd W. Schmidt, San Jose, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Clair A. Carlson, County Counsel, James M. Ritchey, Asst. County Counsel, County of Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, Cal., for defendant County of Santa Cruz.

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge.

This is an action for inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs are owners of 206 acres of unimproved mountain land in Santa Cruz County. They allege that the County's General Plan and zoning scheme, as applied to their land, deprive them of their property without just compensation in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. The case is presently before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons given below, the Court denies this motion.

The parties are in agreement as to the history of plaintiffs' efforts to secure County approval of their development applications. In 1972 the zoning on the land in dispute was changed from a residential classification which permitted one residence per 2.5 acres, to UBS-100, which permitted one residence per 100 acres and a number of other uses by special permit. Some time after the UBS-100 designation, plaintiffs applied for rezoning, approval of a plan to divide their land into smaller parcels, and for "conceptual approval" of a planned unit development (PUD) project.

On July 3, 1974 all three requests by the plaintiffs were denied by the County Planning Commission. Upon the recommendation of the planning staff, the Commission also advised the plaintiffs not to proceed with further planning or PUD application processing for residential development of the property. On October 7, 1974, in a final administrative step, plaintiffs filed a claim for inverse condemnation against the County. This claim was denied on October 15, 1974.

Statute of Limitations

Defendants contend that actions for review of zoning decisions must be brought within 30 days from the effective date of such decisions, according to Santa Cruz County Code § 13.04.135, or at most within 90 days of enactment or amendment of the challenged zoning ordinance, under California Government Code § 65860. Neither of these code sections is applicable here. The County ordinance specifically exempts from the 30-day limit review of the types of governmental action listed in California Government Code § 65907, which includes the decisions of zoning boards and of boards of appeal respecting variances, conditional use permits and other permits. The present action challenges, on constitutional grounds, the County Planning Commission's refusal to rezone plaintiffs' property, to approve a land division or to give conceptual approval to a PUD project for the site. This action is therefore exempt from the 30-day limitation ordinance.

Defendants also err in asserting that Cal.Gov't Code § 65860 applies to this situation. That section refers only to suits contesting the conformance of local zoning to local general plans; and whether or not the zoning of plaintiffs' land conforms to Santa Cruz County's General Plan is not at issue here.

This case is governed by Cal.Gov't Code § 905, which establishes the framework for the presentation of claims for money or damages against public entities. Section 905 incorporates by reference Cal. Gov't Code §§ 911.2 and 945.6, the limitations statutes applicable to the present action. Section 911.2 requires presentation of a claim for damages to the public entity within one year after accrual of the cause of action; section 945.6 requires commencement of suit within six months of the rejection of the claim by that entity. See Dorow v. Santa Clara County Flood Control District, 4 Cal.App.3d 389, 84 Cal.Rptr. 518 (1970).

Plaintiffs' cause of action did not accrue until July 3, 1974, when the Planning Commission denied their applications for rezoning and land division and indicated it would deny any formal request for PUD approval. Plaintiffs' subsequent claim for damages for inverse condemnation was filed against the County on October 7, 1974, well within the one year limit prescribed in § 911.2. It was officially rejected on October 15, 1974, and suit was filed in this court on April 7, 1975, less than six months later. The Court therefore finds that the present action is not barred by the applicable California statutes of limitations and that the motions to dismiss on this ground must be denied.

Immunity from Suits for Monetary Damages

Defendants assert that under California law public entities are immune from suits for monetary damages growing out of public enactments or permit approval procedures. While this may be true in many areas of tort law, such an immunity doctrine does not apply here. It is an elementary proposition that governmental entities are not immune from actions brought under constitutional provisions guaranteeing just compensation for public takings of private property. To hold, as defendants assert, that all land use regulations are by definition valid discretionary legislative acts would be to ignore the constitutional requirement that takings be accompanied by just compensation and to eliminate actions for inverse condemnation. Irrespective whether protection against inverse condemnation is afforded under the California Constitution, California immunity legislation could not limit the substantive rights of landowners under the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.¹

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants contend, on a variety of theories, that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant suit. Without discussing each of these theories in detail the Court finds subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have competently alleged a cause of action for violation of their constitutional rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments. The ultimate success of their suit turns on the Court's construction of these Amendments in the factual context of this case. Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964). The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 and the County is a proper defendant; therefore jurisdiction is properly laid under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F.Supp. 647 (N.D.Cal. 1974).

It is true, as defendants point out, that plaintiffs have not produced a complete administrative record of the proceedings that took place in connection with the adoption of the challenged zoning ordinance and General Plan, or with the denial of the plaintiffs' lot split, rezoning, and conceptual PUD applications. This fact does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction in an inverse condemnation proceeding. The plaintiffs have submitted those administrative records that have been made available to them. In any event, this court is not bound by the facts reflected in the records compiled below.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies available at the County level, and are thus precluded from bringing the instant suit. This court is of the opinion, however, that plaintiffs' efforts in this connection have been sufficient. Requiring plaintiffs to pursue additional applications to the Planning Commission would be futile and wasteful.

Defendants contend that their conceptual denial of plaintiffs' PUD proposal was not a final administrative denial and therefore cannot be the basis of a challenge in this Court. As a matter of...