Sanford v. Alabama Power Co.
| Decision Date | 18 October 1951 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 993 |
| Citation | 256 Ala. 280,54 So.2d 562 |
| Parties | SANFORD v. ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
McEniry, McEniry & McEniry, Bessemer, for appellant.
Fite & Fite, Jasper, and Martin, Turner & McWhorter and J. C. Blakey, all of Birmingham, for appellee.
The bill in this cause was filed by the Alabama Power Company against I. N. Sanford under § 1109, Title 7, Code 1940, to quiet the title to the iron, coal and other minerals in, under and upon the W 1/2 of the NE 1/4 and NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 34, Township 15 South, Range 17 West, in Walker County, Alabama. The bill was amended so as to delete therefrom the NW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of said Section 34. In other words, as finally amended the bill sought to quiet the title to the iron, coal and other minerals in, under and upon the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 and the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 34, a total of eighty acres. From a decree for complainant, the respondent has appealed to this court. Since the appeal was taken, I. N. Sanford, the appellant, has died and the cause has been revived in the name of his heirs or personal representatives.
A bill in equity may be properly filed and maintained under § 1109, Title 7, to quiet title to the mineral interest in land by the owner of such interest. Gulf Coal & Coke Co. v. Alabama Coal & Coke Co., 145 Ala. 228, 40 So. 397.
It is well settled by the decisions of this court that under the statute authorizing a bill in equity to quiet title, the complainant must have the quiet and peaceable possession, actual or constructive, as distinguished from a scrambling or disputed possession. Ladd v. Powell, 144 Ala. 408 39 So. 46; Randle v. Daughdrill, 142 Ala. 490, 39 So. 162; Vandegrift v. Southern Mineral Land Co., 166 Ala. 312, 51 So. 983; Dawsey v. Walden, 243 Ala. 93, 8 So.2d 417; Price v. Robinson, 242 Ala. 626, 7 So.2d 568.
The complainant did not aver or seek to prove an actual possession of the minerals in question, but relies upon constructive possession, which the law attaches to legal title in the absence of an actual possession by anyone else. Vandegrift v. Southern Mineral Land Co., supra.
The answer of the respondent denied that complainant was the owner of the legal title to the minerals and denied that complainant was in peaceable possession thereof. The answer further avers that respondent is in possession of the minerals, claiming title to an undivided interest therein.
Complainant could not recover merely upon proof of title if the evidence showed that respondent was in possession of the minerals. Ordinarily, we would first consider the evidence as it relates to the possession of the minerals involved, because if the evidence showed that respondent was in possession or that there was a scrambling or disputed possession, it would be unnecessary to pass on the question of complainant's title. However, in view of the nature of this case, we think it advisable to first treat the question of title.
Complainant and respondent both trace their claim of title to the minerals back to a common source, one H. A. Key, it being conceded that the said Key was, as of January 16, 1874, the owner of both the surface and the minerals in the land here involved.
On January 16, 1874, H. A. Key and wife executed a deed to J. M. Garner covering 360 acres of land, including that here involved. This deed was recorded on February 20, 1882. It is the contention of complainant that this deed only conveyed to J. M. Garner the surface rights in the 360 acres of land, the mineral rights being retained by the grantor, H. A. Key.
On November 14, 1884, after the deed to J. M. Garner had been placed on record, H. A. Key and wife by warranty deed, for a recited consideration of $700, conveyed to Misgrove Brothers all the minerals in, under and upon 280 acres of land which had been included in the deed of January 16, 1874, including the minerals in, under and upon the land involved in this proceeding. Upon the trial of this cause, complainant introduced in evidence numerous deeds executed from 1885 to 1941 showing a full, direct, and complete chain of title to the minerals involved in this suit from H. A. Key through Musgrove Brothers and others into complainant. Complainant's deed to the minerals involved in this suit, which deed included other property, was under date of September 22, 1941. All the conveyances under which complainant claims were duly recorded.
While the respondent, appellant here, does not expressly concede that the deed of January 16, 1874, from H. A. Key and wife to J. M. Garner conveyed only the surface rights to the land covered by the deed, it is not argued here, nor was it argued below, that the construction contended for by complainant, appellee here, is not correct.
The respondent relies, in the main, on a written instrument termed an 'agreement,' under date of September 27, 1874, which the respondent contends conveyed to J. M. Garner the mineral rights which had been excepted or reserved in the conveyance of January 16, 1874. This so-called agreement was not placed on record until April 5, 1948, long after complainant secured its deed purporting to convey to it the minerals here involved.
In regard to this 'agreement,' the complainant takes the position that it is not sufficient to operate as a conveyance, but that if it should be so construed, complainant was an innocent purchaser for value, without notice as to any interest which the agreement purports to convey, since it was not placed on record until April 5, 1948. The respondent contends that irrespective of the fact that the 'agreement' was not placed on record, J. M. Garner and his successors in interest have been in possession of the surface of the land covered by the conveyance of January 16 1874, from that date until the date of trial, and have performed acts showing possession of the minerals; hence complainant had constructive notice of the 'agreement' under date of September 27, 1874. The respondent also seems to claim ownership of the minerals in, under and upon the lands involved in this suit by adverse possession.
The respondent's mother was the daughter of J. M. Garner, the grantee in the deed of January 16, 1874. Respondent claims to own a substantial undivided interest in both the surface and mineral rights of the land covered by the deed under date of January 16, 1874, through inheritance and by purchase from other heirs of the said J. M. Garner.
The first question for our determination is whether or not the deed of January 16, 1874, conveyed only the surface interest to the grantee therein, J. M. Garner. If that deed also conveyed the mineral interest, then it is admitted by the complainant, appellee here, that it is not entitled to recover and that the decree of the trial court is erroneous. The deed of January 16, 1874, reads as follows:
'I John Brake Justice of the Peace for said county certify that H A Key and C C Key whose manes are signed to the foregoing conveyance and who is known to me acknowledged before me on this day that being informed of the contents of the conveyance executed the same voluntarily on the day the same bears date
'Given under my hand the 16 day of January A D 1874
John Brake J P' (Emphasis supplied.)
Unless that part of the deed of January 16, 1874, which we have italicized above operates to except the mineral interests and to reserve such interests to the grantor, then, of course, it follows that the grantee, J. M. Garner, received the entire interest in the land described in the deed. It is evident that the deed was drafted by an unskilled person. The excepting clause is poorly punctuated and is not altogether clear. The 'F Montgomery mineral agreement' referred to in the deed was not produced in the trial of this cause. No one seems to know anything about its contents. Because of the admission of the parties that on January 16, 1874, H. A. Key was the owner of both the surface and mineral interests in the land covered by the deed of that date, for the purposes of this case it is to be assumed that F. Montgomery, if there was such a person, had no interest whatsoever in the minerals at the time the deed was executed. The phrase, 'with the exception of the F Montgomery mineral agreement,' if considered alone, might be said to be so vague and uncertain as to render such phrase inoperative in the absence of proof of its contents. However, such phrase must be considered with the words immediately following, viz., 'to wit, all the mineral.' When thus...
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Gerhard v. Stephens
...give title by constructive adverse possession to the mineral rights appurtenant to the entire tract (e.g., Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., supra, 256 Ala. 280, 289--290, 54 So.2d 562; Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra, 256 Ky. 51, 65, 79 S.W.2d 394). Other courts have held that the developm......
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...is not necessary that the possession on the part of the respondent be of such character as would ripen into title. Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., 256 Ala. 280, 54 So.2d 562; Price v. Robinson, 242 Ala. 626, 7 So.2d 568; Buchmann Abstract & Investment Co. v. Roberts, 213 Ala. 520, 105 So. 675......
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Murphy v. Traylor
...the testator must be as fully carried out as legally possible, his will must meet the requirements of the law. Sanford v. Alabama Power Company, 256 Ala. 280, 54 So.2d 562 (1951). The majority does not answer the question as to ejectment by an unincorporated association. See Arnold v. Metho......
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Gerhard v. Stephens
...'As to the severed mining estate, a distinct title must be asserted and established." (78 N.E. at p. 436.) Sanford v. Alabama Power Co. (1951) 256 Ala. 280, 54 So.2d 562 presented the unusual situation where the adverse possessor had a deed to the minerals, however it was held that mining o......