Sanford v. Hamner

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HEAD, J.
• Citation: Sanford v. Hamner, 115 Ala. 406, 22 So. 117 (Ala. 1897)
• Decision Date: 26 May 1897
• Parties: SANFORD v. HAMNER.

22 So. 117

115 Ala. 406

SANFORD v. HAMNER.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 26, 1897

Appeal from chancery court, Fayette county; Thomas Cobbs Chancellor.

Bill by John B. Sanford against Clem. A. Hamner to quiet title, for an injunction, an account, and general relief. From an order in vacation sustaining both a demurrer to the bill and a motion to dismiss for want of equity, without granting leave to amend, complainant appeals. Reversed.

A. B McEachin and Daniel Collier, for appellant.

M. B McCollum and Jones, Mayfield & Brown, for appellee.

HEAD J.

The case is before us on demurrer to the bill and motion to dismiss for the want of equity, both sustained by the chancellor, in vacation, without granting leave to amend. The case-made is, substantially, that the county of Fayette owning a described lot of land, with a courthouse thereon, the county commissioners sold the same at public auction, and it was bid off by the respondent, Hamner, at the price of $215, and an absolute conveyance of the property was executed to him by the commissioners. Whether the mandatory provisions of section 888 of the Code, which are essential to a disposition of county property by the commissioners, were complied with or not, does not appear, either by the recitals of the deed or averments of the bill; but the bill is capable of amendment on this point, and the demurrers do not raise the objection we have indicated. We will, therefore, treat the sale and conveyance as having been legally made by the county commissioners. The bill alleges that this purchase by respondent was made at the instance and request, and for the use and benefit, of the municipal corporation of Fayetteville, within whose limits the property was situated, for use as a council chamber; that he acted as such agent throughout the transaction, and used the funds of the corporation, furnished to him for that purpose, in making a cash payment of one-half of the purchase money; that for the residue of the purchase money (there being some doubt expressed of the power of the municipality to give a binding obligation therefor), the complainant, Sanford, the respondent, and one J. H. Moore gave their individual notes for the same, for the accommodation of the town; that the town went into immediate possession, and, after using the property for some time as a council chamber, determined to sell the same, and did expose the same to sale at public auction. To this point the bill avers the respondent had made no claim whatever to the property, but treated and recognized it, always, since the sale by the county commissioners, as the property of the town. The town, before its sale, was ready and endeavored to pay the county the balance of the purchase money, and did not do so because one of the notes could not be found. The complainant, Sanford, desiring to purchase the property at the sale to be made by the town, procured the respondent to act for him in making the purchase, and he accordingly attended the sale, and bid off the property for complainant at the price of $1,600, which sum complainant paid to the town, and for the same received the deed of the municipal authorities, and went into immediate, actual, adverse possession of the property, and has continued therein ever since. To the time of this purchase, payment of the purchase money, and taking possession, which occurred in February, 1895, and up to about the middle of April following, respondent still made no claim to the property, but about the latter date set up a claim that he had a half interest in complainant's purchase, and sought to enforce it in chancery, but was defeated. About the time of making this claim (April 13, 1895), and just before filing his bill to enforce it, he, against the protest of complainant as mayor of the town (which office complainant held), paid to the county the balance of said purchase money due it, represented by the notes of himself, complainant, and said Moore, as aforesaid. On August 5, 1895, the respondent instituted against complainant an action of trespass quare clausum fregit and trover, joined in separate counts, claiming damages in the count of trespass for pulling down and destroying the buildings on the lot, and in the count of trover for the conversion of 75,000 bricks taken therefrom; the alleged wrongs occurring subsequent to complainant's purchase and entry into possession. This action is still pending. The bill avers that respondent, claiming said property, has moved a large quantity of said property from the premises against the protest of complainant, and that complainant is informed and verily believes that he is likely to remove and convert to his own use more of said property if not restrained, etc. The insolvency of respondent and his inability to respond in damages are averred. The bill insists that respondent is estopped in equity to assert his legal title against complainant, and prays that he be devested of, and complainant invested with, that title, and that the deed from the county commissioners to respondent be canceled. The bill also prays prevention of further trespasses by injunction, for account of damages already committed, injunction of the action at law, and for general relief.

The demurrers and motion to dismiss appear to proceed upon the theory that the scope and purpose of the bill are only to establish and enforce, in behalf of complainant as the purchaser from the town, an express parol trust in the land or a resulting trust therein arising from the payment of the purchase money by the town; and respondent insists upon the inhibition of the statute upon the creation of such an express trust in lands, and contends that the averments do not make a case of resulting trust, enforceable by complainant. We find, however, that the bill takes a step beyond this, and, in addition, stands for relief upon the equity of estoppel by conduct, or "equitable estoppel," as it is called. We will proceed to notice, first, this feature of the case, remarking, however, that there is no equity in the bill for the enforcement of an express trust in the land, by reason of the statute against it. We will dispose of the question of resulting trust further on. We are of opinion that, upon the facts averred in the bill, the respondent is estopped, in a court of equity, to set up against the complainant his legal title to the property, upon the complainant paying, or offering in his bill to pay, to him the amount of the purchase money, with interest, which he (respondent) paid to the county with his own funds. The estoppel rests upon a course of conduct on his part, averred in the bill, which renders it inequitable for him now to say that the town was not the real owner of the property, and that its sale to complainant did not pass that ownership to him. Treating the deed of the county commissioners as we have said we would, it passed the legal title to respondent, and no express trust can be ingrafted upon it. But it is nevertheless true that, known to the town authorities, including the complainant, who was then mayor of the town, and who joined in the notes for the deferred payments of the purchase money, he accepted an agency to purchase for the town; accepted from the town the money to make the cash payment; permitted the town to take possession and use the property as its council chamber for more than two years under claim of absolute ownership; made no claim whatever to the property, but at all times recognized and treated it as the property of the town; and, most material of all, and upon which the estoppel mainly depends, when the town determined to sell, he not only stood by and made no claim whatever, but, knowing that the town was claiming and selling as absolute owner in its own right, he consented with the complainant that he would attend the sale, and act as the complainant's agent as an intending purchaser, and did actually attend as such agent, and for the complainant became the highest bidder at $1,600, and suffered the complainant to pay the purchase money, receive the deed of the town authorities, and go into actual possession as absolute owner, without asserting any claim in his own behalf, and thereafter set up the claim that the purchase made at the sale by the town was for the use of both himself and co...