Sanford v. King

• Decision Date: 05 April 1905
• Citation: 103 N.W. 28,19 S.D. 334
• Parties: JAMES W. SANFORD, Mayor of the City of Chamberlain, Trustee for M. McAndrews, et al., Plaintiffs and appellants, v. HENRY J. KING, Eliza Reynolds, and Frank S. Browne, Defendants and respondents.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

19 S.D. 334

103 N.W. 28

JAMES W. SANFORD, Mayor of the City of Chamberlain, Trustee for M. McAndrews, et al., Plaintiffs and appellants,

v.

HENRY J. KING, Eliza Reynolds, and Frank S. Browne, Defendants and respondents. South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Brule County, SD Hon. Frank B. Smith, Judge Affirmed John D. Rivers Attorneys for appellants. S. H. Wright, J. E. House, and A. B. Chubback Attorneys for respondents. Opinion filed April 5, 1905

HANEY, J.

This is an action in equity, wherein the mayor of Chamberlain seeks to have it adjudged that the defendants Henry J. King, Eliza Reynolds, and their successors in interest hold the naked legal title to certain real property in trust for certain alleged town site occupants. The appeal is from an order sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. The pleading thus assailed is voluminous. It contains many matters of which courts take judicial notice, numerous conclusions of law, and an argument in support of the plaintiffs’ position. Without attempting to eliminate its redundant and irrelevant allegations, it will be assumed that these questions of law were involved in the ruling of the learned circuit court:

(1) Whether certain patents were issued to the wrong parties;

(2) whether defendants are estopped from asserting title to the premises by reason of former judgments of the circuit court within and for Brule county; and

(3) whether several causes of action have been improperly united.

In 1880 the lands in controversy were embraced by the Great Sioux reservation, “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed occupation of the Indians.” In that year the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway company made an agreement with the Indians to purchase certain lands, including those described in the complaint, which contract was confirmed by the Secretary of the Interior on January 3, 1881. When the Indians’ rights were extinguished, the rights of the railway company were recognized, and continued to exist until April 15, 1895, when the land first became open to entry, and when the defendants Henry J. King and Eliza Reynolds, as homestead claimants, and the then mayor of Chamberlain, on behalf of certain alleged town-site claimants, initiated a contest before the United States Land Department, which was carried to the commissioner, thence to the secretary, by whom a rehearing was had, and which resulted in a decision awarding the lands to the homestead claimants. The contention before the department was, as it is here, that the lands were not open to homestead entry, because they were within the corporate limits of the city of Chamberlain. The department appears to have decided that the lands were not within the corporate limits, for the reason that a special act of the territorial legislature, passed in 1885, purporting to extend the boundaries of the then existing municipality, was ineffectual for that purpose. But the reasons assigned for its decision are not material. Were the lands open to homestead entry? If they were, the department did not err in so holding, however fallacious may have been the reasoning by which the right result was reached. So now the material inquiry is whether these lands were open to homestead entry, which may or may not depend on the effect of the territorial act purporting to extend the city limits. Where, as in this instance, the parties have been afforded ample opportunity to be heard, and have exhausted every recognized means to establish their respective claims before the tribunal charged with the duty of hearing and determining such claims, its judgment should be sustained by the courts, in the absence of clear and cogent reasons for a different conclusion. The law applicable to department decisions is thus stated by Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the United States Supreme Court:

“It has undoubtedly been affirmed over and over again that in the administration of the public land system of the United States questions of fact are for the consideration and judgment of the Land Department, and that its judgment thereon is final. Whether, for instance, a certain tract is swamp land or not, saline land or not, mineral land or not, presents a question of fact, not resting on record, dependent on oral testimony; and it cannot be doubted that the decision of the Land Department one way or the other, in reference to these questions, is conclusive, and not open to relitigation in the courts, except in those cases of fraud, etc., which permit any determination to be re examined. Johnson v. Towsley, 80 US (13 Wall.) 72 (1871); Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 US 636; Steel v. Refining Co., 1 SCt 389; Wright v. Roseberry, 7 SCt 985; Heath v. Wallace, 11 SCt 380; McCormick v. Hayes, 16 SCt 37. But it is also equally true that when, by act of Congress, a tract of land has been reserved from homestead and pre-emption, or dedicated to any special purpose, proceedings in the Land Department in defiance of such reservation or dedication, although culminating in a patent, transfer no title and may be challenged in an action at law. In other words, the action of the Land Department cannot override the expressed will of Congress, or convey away public lands in disregard or defiance thereof. Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 646; Wright v. Roseberry, 519, 7 SCt 985, – LEd –; Doolan v. Carr, 8 SCt 1228, – LEd –; Davis’ Adm’r v. Weibbold, 529, 11 SCt 628, – LEd –; Knight v. Land Ass’n, 12 SCt 258.”

Burfenning v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 16 SCt 1018, – LEd –.

What, then, was the will of Congress respecting these particular tracts of land? It possessed the power to dispose of them in any manner it deemed proper, provided the disposal did not interfere with vested rights, and none such existed when these homestead proceedings were initiated.

“An act of the Legislature which includes public lands in the limits of a town does not segregate it from the public domain, and withdraw it from homestead entry by its own force. It does so, as Mr. Justice Miller has well said in the leading case of Root v. Shields, 1...