Sanford v. Poe

• Citation: 69 F. 546
• Decision Date: 15 July 1895
• Docket Number: 325.,324,322,321
• Parties: SANFORD v. POE et al. (two cases). FARGO v. SAME. PLATT v. SAME.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

69 F. 546

SANFORD v. POE et al. (two cases). FARGO v. SAME. PLATT v. SAME.

Nos. 321, 322, 324, 325.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

July 15, 1895

These suits were brought to enjoin the assessment of taxes against the Adams Express Company for the years 1893 and 1894, and the American Express Company and the United States Express Company for the year 1894. The defendants are Ebenezer W Poe, auditor of the state of Ohio, John K. Richards, Attorney General of the state of Ohio, and William T. Cope, Treasurer of the state of Ohio, and compose a board of tax appraisers for the assessment of telegraph, telephone, and express companies, under an act of the Ohio legislature passed April 27, 1893, and known as the 'Nichols Law.' To the several bills demurrers were filed, which, on full argument were finally sustained, and the bills dismissed. The complainants have severally perfected appeals and assigned errors. The ground upon which the suits all proceed is, in substance, that the assessments complained of, and the scheme of taxation embodied in the Nichols law, under which the assessments were made, are void as in contravention-- First of the constitution of Ohio, which provides that all property shall be taxed according to its true value in money by a uniform rule, and that the property of corporations shall be taxed 'the same as the property of individuals' (Const. Ohio, art. 12, Sec. 2, and art. 13, Sec. 4); second, 'of the constitution of the United States, because the effect of the rule of valuation prescribed by the statute and adopted in these particular assessments is, not to confine the tax to the property of the companies within the state of Ohio, but to tax something else which is not within the state of Ohio, and therefore to take the property of the companies without due process of law, and that the scheme, as a special one applied to these special agencies of interstate commerce, imposes an illegal burden upon that commerce'; third, complainants also contend that, if the Ohio statute be valid under both the constitution of Ohio and of the United States, the assessments are nevertheless void, because the assessments made were arbitrary and illegal, in that the assessors did not follow the statute or pursue any definite mode of valuation. Upon a first hearing before Circuit Judge Taft, the demurrers of the defendants were overruled, and defendants required to answer. The ground upon which Judge Taft proceeded was-- First, jurisdiction in equity was predicated upon the ground that a multiplicity of suits would result unless the defendants should be restrained from certifying their assessments to the auditors of 87 counties, within each of which the defendants had property; second, that the Nichols law, under which the assessments had been made, was void as in conflict with the constitution of the state of Ohio. The opinion of the court upon these questions is reported in 61 F. 449. Before answers were filed, a suit involving the constitutionality of this legislation was decided by the supreme court of Ohio, and the validity of the law under the Ohio constitution sustained. State v. Jones, 37 N.E. 945. Upon the filing of this opinion by the Ohio court, Judge Taft granted a rehearing, and sustained the demurrers of defendants, upon the ground that the decision of the supreme court of Ohio as to the construction of the Nichols law and its validity under the constitution of Ohio was conclusive upon the courts of the United States. A very convincing opinion upon this aspect of the question was filed, and is reported in 64 F. 9. A further argument was heard before Judge Taft upon the question as to whether the state board of assessors had enforced the Nichols law according to the construction placed thereon by the supreme court of Ohio. Upon the latter hearing it was agreed that the bills of the several complainants should be treated as amended by the incorporation therein of the facts which had been made to appear by the two affidavits of the defendant Poe as to the manner in which the amount of the several assessments had been reached. The learned circuit judge, upon the bills as thus amended, was of opinion that the board of assessors had kept 'well within the law' as construed by the Ohio court. He therefore sustained the demurrers and dismissed the several bills.

Ramsey, Maxwell & Ramsey, for plaintiffs.

J. K. Richards, Atty. Gen., and Thos. McDougall, for defendants.

Before LURTON, Circuit Judge, and SEVERENS and HAMMOND, District Judges.

After the foregoing statement of the case, the opinion of the court was delivered by LURTON, Circuit Judge.

If the assessments complained of be illegal, for any reason, the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin the defendants from certifying them to the several county auditors of the state seems to be clear, upon the ground that a multiplicity of suits would result unless the assessment be enjoined before the assessors shall certify to each county auditor the proportion of the gross assessments collectible by each county auditor under the scheme of apportionment among the counties provided by the act. To require the complainants to pay each of the numerous county auditors, and then sue to recover, or to enjoin each, would be most oppressive. We think, therefore, that the jurisdiction asserted in the bill, of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, was a sufficient ground to support the original bill, as well as the bills subsequently filed to enjoin the tax of 1894, assessed after the jurisdiction in the original case had attached. Cummings v. Bank, 101 U.S. 153-157; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575-618; Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U.S. 339-348, 12 Sup.Ct. 250; Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591-599, 11 Sup.Ct. 646; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 12 Sup.Ct. 62; Express Co. v. Poe, 61 F. 470.

The question as to the constitutionality of the Nichols law under the Ohio constitution must be regarded as conclusively settled for this court by the opinion of the highest court of the state of Ohio, as announced in the case of State v. Jones, heretofore cited. The objection that this court ought not to feel precluded by the opinion of the Ohio court, by reason of the made-up character of the suit in which that opinion was announced, is not satisfactory. It is true that the circuit court of the United States first obtained jurisdiction of the question as to the validity of the Nichols law under the constitution of Ohio, and that that court, in a very vigorous and persuasive opinion, concluded that the Nichols law contravened the constitution of Ohio, and was therefore invalid. The courts of Ohio had not theretofore passed upon the question, and the circuit court could not escape the duty of determining for itself the true meaning and construction of the constitution of Ohio, so far as involved by the mode of assessment provided by the Nichols law. Before a final decree had been rendered, the supreme court of Ohio, in a case involving the validity of the same law, announced a contrary opinion, and held the Nichols law, as construed by the same court, an entirely valid law, so far as it was supposed to be affected by the state constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, we think the duty of the circuit court was to accept the opinion of the Ohio court as conclusive, and to render judgment accordingly. The case before it involved no rights or contracts between individuals which had been entered into upon the faith of earlier and conflicting decisions of either the courts of the United States or of the state, and therefore presented no question such as arose in Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 32, 2 Sup.Ct. 10, or Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U.S. 556, 4 Sup.Ct. 539, or Douglass v. Pike Co., 101 U.S. 677, or Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134. Where the construction or validity of a state statute does not involve rights acquired upon the faith of earlier and conflicting decisions, it is the clear duty of federal courts to accept and adopt the decisions of the highest court of a state in respect to the construction and conformity of state laws to the constitution of the state. The decision of such questions properly belongs to the highest court of the state. We entirely concur with the opinion of the circuit judge upon this question, who said:

'Here is not involved the validity or construction of a law on the faith of which individuals have made contracts, advanced money, or incurred liability. We have here simply a tax law fixing the obligation of artificial persons of a certain class to contribute to the support of the state. In respect of such a law, it would be anomalous and absurd to have a diversity of rulings between the state and federal courts. The intolerable result of such a diversity would be that companies who could invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court would not pay the tax, while all those who could not invoke the jurisdiction would be compelled to pay it. There is nothing in the decisions of the supreme court of the United States which gives the slightest warrant for supposing that, in the case of a state tax law, it would not follow the decision of the supreme court, whenever rendered, and however divergent from its own views the conclusion, provided no federal question was involved. In the State Railroad Tax Case, 92 U.S. 575, 617, 618, the circuit court of the United States held that a tax law of Illinois was invalid because in violation of the state constitution. Before the cases reached the supreme court of the United States on appeal, the supreme court of the state decided that the law was valid. The circuit court decree was accordingly reversed. It is true that in that case the supreme court of the United States concurred with the state court on

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