Sanford v. Wheelan
Decision Date | 01 June 1885 |
Citation | 7 P. 324,12 Or. 301 |
Parties | SANFORD v. WHEELAN. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal from Umatilla county.
John J Balleray, for respondent.
Richard Williams, for appellant.
This appeal is from a decree of the circuit court for the county of Umatilla. The respondent commenced a suit in that court against the appellant to enforce the specific performance of a written contract under seal, of which the following is a copy:
It was alleged in his complaint in the suit that on the said twenty-second day of April, 1882, the time the said conveyance was to be made as provided in said contract, that he prepared a deed of warranty, in terms conveying the said half of the said lot to the appellant, and that he was ready and willing to deliver the same to him, and to put him in possession of the said premises, but that the appellant refused to receive it, or go into the possession of the premises, or perform the contract, and the respondent claimed as relief a decree that the appellant be required to accept the said deed, and to pay him the said sums of money in accordance with said contract, and general relief. The appellant averred in his answer that the said premises were, at the time of the execution of the said contract, and on the said twenty-second day of April, incumbered by mortgages of large amount, one of which was in favor of H.J. Vanschuyver & Co., executed by the respondent to said H.J. Vanschuyver & Co., November 18, 1880, given to secure payment of a promissory note from the respondent to said company for the sum of $1,540.66, with interest thereon from date, at the rate of 1 per cent. per month until paid, and for $50 additional as attorney's fees, in case suit were instituted to collect it; that said note bore date November 17, 1880, and was payable in eight months thereafter. Another of said mortgages was executed by the respondent to S. Rothchild, R. Alexander, and Richard Lambert, to secure the payment of three promissory notes from the former to the latter parties for the respective sums following: $315.04, $622.42, and $203.99, each bearing date the twenty-fifth day of February, 1882, and payable 90 days therefrom, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum; and contained a provision for the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee in case suit was instituted to collect it; and that both of said mortgages were, at the date of the execution of said contract, and had ever since been, wholly unsatisfied. Other issues were tendered by the answer, but it is unnecessary to notice them.
The respondent, in his reply to said matter, in the answer averred that said appellant had, at the time the contract was executed, actual and personal notice of said incumbrances that he conferred with the mortgagees, and that they assured him that they would interpose no objection to the said sale, and that each of the incumbrances could, by the decree of the court in the suit, be discharged and paid out of the agreed purchase price, which the appellant should be decreed to pay for the premises. The reply contained denials of other portions of the answer, but there was no other issue upon said matter of incumbrance than above mentioned. Testimony was taken in the case tending to prove and disprove the various issues between the parties. The circuit court heard the proofs and allegations, and decreed that the appellant pay into court immediately the sum of $3,000, and that execution issue therefor, and that said sum of money be applied by the clerk of the court to the satisfaction of the said mortgages in the order in which they were mentioned in the answer, and that the deed executed by the respondent and wife, a deed prepared and signed after the commencement of the suit, upon the payment into court of said $3,000, be delivered to the appellant; which is the decree appealed from. The only question of importance to be decided by this court is whether the appellant could equitably be compelled to accept the deed...
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...that the purchaser, knowing the existence of the easement, intended the insertion of a vain provision in the contract.' Sanford v. Wheelan, 12 Or. 301, 306, 7 P. 324, 327, was a suit for specific performance of a contract with a provision similar to the one obligating the vendor in the case......
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...the courts hold that it is a personal covenant and therefore does not run with the land. 7 R.C.L. 1105, 1112, 1135, 1163; Sanford v. Wheelan, 12 Or. 301, 307, 7 P. 324.' While it is that the written undertaking of the Stansberys in the agreement with the city, a stranger to the title, canno......
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...and sue for the specific performance of the contract, or he may sue for strict foreclosure of the contract. * * *' In Sanford v. Wheelan, 12 Or. 301, 7 P. 324 (1885), this court stated that the vendor of real property could enforce the payment of the purchase price in equity. Johnston v. Wa......
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...§ 91, p. 612; Maupin, Marketable Title to Real Estate (3d ed.), 207 § 85-a; 55 Am.Jur. 945, Vendor and Purchaser § 553; Sandord v. Wheelan, 12 Or. 301, 306, 7 P. 324; Caveny v. Asheim, 202 Or. 195, 223, 274 P.2d 281; Weiss v. Binnian, 178 Ill. 241, 52 N.E. 969. Also see Lavey v. Graessle, 1......