Sang Lung v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 21 February 1898
• Docket Number: 12,548.
• Citation: 85 F. 502
• Parties: SANG LUNG et al. v. JACKSON, Collector.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

85 F. 502

SANG LUNG et al. v. JACKSON, Collector.

No. 12,548.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. California.

February 21, 1898

Thos D. Riordan and Edward Lande, for complainants.

Samuel Knight, Asst. U.S. Atty., for defendant.

DE HAVEN, District Judge.

This is an action in equity brought by a great number of resident aliens, subjects of the Empire of China, against John P Jackson, as collector of customs at the port of San Francisco, in which the court is asked to enjoin the defendant from proceeding to destroy a large quantity of tea imported by the complainants. The bill of complaint alleges that during the months of May, June, and July, in the year 1897, the complainants imported into the United States from China, and entered at the custom house at the port of San Francisco, 2,910 packages of tea, commercially known as 'Canton Tea'; that Canton tea has been largely imported into this country from China since 1868, and is known by that name in the tea trade of the world, and is in general use throughout the United States; that, upon the entry at the custom house of San Francisco of the said teas so imported by complainants, the same were duly examined by the examiner appointed at law, with reference to purity quality, and fitness for consumption, and that 'the said tea was found by the examiner to be not equal in purity quality, and fitness for consumption to the standards provided by law, and inferior in purity, quality, and fitness for consumption to said standards, for the sole consideration that the only standards provided by law are those embraced in the regulations of the treasury department' adopted May 1, 1897, for the examination of imported teas, under the act of March 2, 1897, and in which regulations Canton tea is not named as one of the standards. The bill further alleges 'that the said matter was thereafter referred for decision to a board of three United States general appraisers, who were designated by the secretary of the treasury department of the United States, and that said board did, after due examination, affirm the said finding and decision of said examiner,' and upon the same ground that the defendant, as collector of the port, refuses to issue to complainants any permit for the release or delivery of said tea, or any part thereof, on the sole ground that there is no standard established by law for the said tea, and that the only standards fixed by law 'are those limited in and by the regulations of the treasury department in regard to the importation and inspection of tea,' adopted May 1, 1897, and which do not include Canton tea. It is further alleged that the defendant, as such collector of the port, and under color of his said office, threatens to destroy the said tea, imported as aforesaid by the complainants, and will so destroy it, unless restrained by injunction; that such threatened injury would be irreparable, and not susceptible of pecuniary compensation, and would also destroy and prohibit the importing business in which complainants are engaged; and that the relief for which complainants ask 'is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.' The bill also contains this allegation: 'That it is not intended by the said act of congress approved March 2, 1897, and is in violation thereof, to restrict and limit the standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of tea into the United States to those standards only which are defined by said regulation, and that, so restricted, the same is a preferential standard which is not founded upon grounds, consistent with law or the policy of the law, and constitute a special and unwarranted discrimination, by giving undue preference of one class of tea over another, where both are equal in purity, quality, and fitness for consumption, and are unjust, oppressive, unreasonable, discriminating, unequal, prejudicial, and not authorized by, but contrary to, the letter, spirit, and purpose of the said law of congress approved March 2, 1897.' The defendant demurs to the bill upon the ground that complainants have not thereby shown themselves to be entitled to the relief prayed for therein.

1. One of the grounds urged in support of the demurrer is that the bill fails to show that the complainants will sustain irreparable injury, in this: that it is apparent that, for any damage which they or either of them might sustain by reason of the destruction of the tea referred to in the bill an action at law would afford an adequate remedy, notwithstanding the general allegation that such injury would be irreparable, and not capable of being compensated in damages. It is undoubtedly true that such general allegation in a bill of complaint is not of itself sufficient to show that a plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury, if some threatened action of a defendant is not enjoined. 'The facts stated must satisfy the court that such apprehension is well founded. ' Branch Turnpike Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of Yuba Co., 13 Cal. 190. In my opinion, the facts do not show that complainants would sustain irreparable injury if the defendant should destroy the tea referred to in the bill, as damages would be an adequate compensation for any loss which either of the complainants might sustain by reason of its destruction. But if it is shown by the allegations of the bill that such action of the defendant would be in violation of law, then the resort by the complainants to a court of equity, for the purpose of preventing the commission of such threatened violation of their property rights, may be justified under the well-settled rule that a court of equity may take cognizance of any controversy when necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits. It is true each of the complainants has a separate and distinct interest in the tea which the defendant threatens to destroy, but they all have a community of interest in the subject-matter of the controversy; that is, a common interest in the question whether the defendant is authorized by law to destroy such tea. The alleged rights of each and all of the complainants depend upon the same facts, and must therefore, necessarily, be determined by the same principle of law. In such a case a court of equity will take jurisdiction in order to prevent a multiplicity of actions. 1 Pom.Eq.Jur. § 269; Osborne v. Railroad Co., 43 F. 824; De Forest v. Thompson, 40 F. 375. It therefore becomes necessary to consider the further question, whether the complainants have shown by the bill that any legal rights of theirs will be violated by...