Sangster v. Spangler

• Decision Date: 18 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 11896,11896
• Parties: Lila Rose SANGSTER, as Executrix of the Estate of Robert Sangster, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Earl SPANGLER, Sr., et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 610

541 P.2d 610

97 Idaho 186

Lila Rose SANGSTER, as Executrix of the Estate of Robert Sangster, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Earl SPANGLER, Sr., et al., Defendants-Respondents.

No. 11896.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Nov. 18, 1975.

Nick Chenoweth Orofino, C. J. Henderson, Clarkston, Wash., for plaintiff-appellant.

John W. Walker, Moscow, for defendants-respondents.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order granting judgment on the pleadings pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(c). The order entering judgment for respondent is based on the marrow ground that the pleadings indicate the release of defendant-respondent Earl Spangler, Sr., from all liability and therefore as to him, leave no material issue of fact in dispute. We reverse.

This action was instituted in October 1971 by appellant Lila Rose Sangster as executrix of the estate of her husband. The substance of the claim was for conversion of a tractor loaned to Spangler and his wife and retained by them despite repented demands for its return. Appellant sought the value of the tractor, punitive damages and costs. That complaint was arguably deficient but was amended by subsequent pleadings. An answer was filed by the Spanglers denying all allegations, affirmatively alleging the tractor was no longer in their control but on property of William and Constance Jenkins and counterclaiming for various torts.

No action was taken for a year, during which time a third party evidently repossessed the tractor and sold it. In October 1972, an amended complaint was filed reitcrating the claim for conversion, indicating that the tractor had been repossessed and sold and seeking damages for diminution of value and loss of rent during the time defendants had withheld possession. Plaintiff-appellant asserted therein that she had attempted to gain possession of the tractor through agents and 'placed in the hands of said agents a release directed to the defendants,'. Although not expressly stated, it is implied that such release was refered to and refused by the defendants.

In answer to that complaint, the Spanglers again denied all allegations and repeated that the Jenkins had possession and control of the tractor. As an affirmative defense, defendants indicated that since plaintiff could not remove the tractor across the Jenkins' property, permission was asked to move the tractor across adjacent property belonging to the Spanglers. It was further alleged that Earl Spangler gave permission to transport the tractor across his property on the condition that a signed, notarized release be given him by plaintiff 'severing him from liability for damage resulting in the transfer of the D-6 caterpillar across his property.' The answer alleged that 'said signed, notarized release was never given to the defendants Farl Spangler, Sr., and Ethel Spangler, his wife.' It was further alleged 'that said release was returned with the purported signature of plaintiff, but not notarized, whereupon defendants, not knowing plaintiff's signature, refused to grant such permission.'

In the following years both parties obtained new counsel. Some 30 days prior to trial, defendants' counsel received from appellant's counsel a stipulation permitting amendment to their answer, admitting the existence of the release alleged in the amended complaint. Following such amendment, defendants' counsel moved for and obtained judgment on the pleadings.

The only substantial question presented herein is whether the pleadings failed to present a material issue of fact for determination at trial. The district court concluded that a release having been alleged and admitted, no factual issue remained. The record indicates, however, that the only fact agreed upon in the amended pleadings of the parties was the existence of the release. A release is not effective until delivered and accepted. O'Toole v. Empire Motors, Inc., 181 Wash. 130, 42 P.2d 10 (1935); Halloran v. Fischer, 126 Conn. 44, 9 A.2d 290 (Conn.1939); Stiebel v....