Sansbury v. State
| Decision Date | 11 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05–1704–CR–793 |
| Citation | 96 N.E.3d 587 |
| Parties | Richard Bernard SANSBURY, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant : Rory Gallagher, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Richard Bernard Sansbury appeals his convictions of carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor,1 and driving with a suspended license with a similar infraction within the past ten years, a Class A misdemeanor.2 We reverse and remand.
[2] Sansbury raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as:
[3] On the evening of January 17, 2016, Detective Andrew McKalips and Officer Mollie Johanningsmeier of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) were on patrol in Indianapolis. Detective McKalips was training Officer Johanningsmeier, who was a rookie. McKalips saw a vehicle, specifically a Pontiac Aztek, make a turn without activating a turn signal. He also noted that one of the Aztek's headlights was not working.
[4] McKalips turned his car around and stopped the Aztek in an apartment complex. The Aztek stopped near an apartment building, one and a half to two feet from the curb. The vehicle did not stop in a marked parking spot, but was instead sitting by the side of a road where traffic drove through the complex. McKalips approached the Aztek and learned that Sansbury was the driver. Sansbury had a passenger, Elisha Goins. Sansbury lived in the nearby building.
[5] McKalips determined Sansbury did not have a valid driver's license. Further, Sansbury was not the Aztek's registered owner. The registered owner was Sansbury's mother, Jorja Payton. McKalips decided to impound the Aztek. He contacted a tow truck and requested backup.
[6] Next, McKalips searched the vehicle, claiming it was necessary to inventory its contents. During the search he found three handguns. Two were in the center console, which was closed but not locked. McKalips found the third handgun under a back seat, concealed under a shirt. He also saw a clip of ammunition wedged between the driver's seat and the center console. McKalips determined that neither Sansbury nor Goins had a valid permit to possess guns. At that point, the search ended, and neither McKalips nor Johanningsmeier prepared a written inventory of the Aztek's contents.
[7] The State charged Sansbury with possession of a handgun without a license and driving with a suspended license with a similar infraction within the past ten years. Sansbury filed a motion to suppress all evidence discovered through the search and seizure of the automobile. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion at the end of the hearing.
[8] The case was tried to the bench, and Sansbury renewed his objection to the admission of evidence discovered during McKalips' search. The trial court overruled his objection. After the State ended its presentation of evidence, Sansbury moved for involuntary dismissal. The court adjourned the hearing to consider cases cited by Sansbury. At a subsequent hearing, the court denied Sansbury's motion and offered Sansbury the opportunity to present evidence. Sansbury chose not to present any evidence. The trial court determined Sansbury was guilty as charged and imposed a sentence. This appeal followed.
[9] As a preliminary matter, we note that the parties' briefs contain references to evidence presented during the suppression hearing. The consideration of evidence presented at a previous proceeding in the same action is sometimes permitted. L.H. v. State , 878 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). For example, incorporation of testimony from one proceeding into another may be appropriate when agreed to by the parties or when authorized by statute. Id.
[10] In the current case, prior to trial, neither party asked the court to incorporate the evidence that was presented during the suppression hearing into the evidence presented at trial. Sansbury merely stated during trial that he was incorporating his arguments from the suppression hearing in support of his objections and motion for involuntary dismissal. Further, there is no indication that the court relied on evidence presented at the suppression hearing during trial. We thus limit our evidentiary review to the testimony and exhibits presented during trial.
[11] Sansbury claims the handguns and ammunition should not have been admitted into evidence because the officers' impoundment of his mother's Aztek and subsequent search violated his federal and constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure. The State responds that the impoundment and inventory search were proper and did not violate Sansbury's constitutional rights. We resolve this issue under the Fourth Amendment and need not address Sansbury's claim under the Indiana Constitution.
[12] We review de novo a trial court's ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial court's determination of the facts. Belvedere v. State , 889 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ind. 2008). We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. at 288.
[13] The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a warrant for a search to be considered reasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Berry v. State , 704 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 1998). When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that the search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Meister v. State , 933 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ind. 2010).
[14] One exception to the warrant requirement is a police inventory search of a vehicle following impoundment. Fair v. State , 627 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ind. 1993). Impoundment is proper when it is part of law enforcement's community caretaking function or is otherwise authorized by statute. Id. at 432. In this case, the State does not allege that the impoundment of the Aztek was justified by statute, and we must determine whether the seizure was permissible under law enforcement's community caretaking function.
[15] When impoundment is not specifically directed by statute, the risk increases that a decision to tow will be motivated solely by the desire to conduct an investigatory search. Id. at 433. To prevail on the question of whether an impoundment was warranted under the community caretaking function, the State must demonstrate that: (1) the belief that the vehicle posed some threat or harm to the community or was itself imperiled was consistent with objective standards of sound policing; and (2) the decision to combat that threat by impoundment was in keeping with established departmental routine or regulation. Id.
[16] In the current case, the IMPD's policy on impounding vehicles and conducting inventory searches was admitted into evidence at trial. Detective McKalips explained that he impounded the vehicle pursuant to the department's policy, specifically a provision that a vehicle may be impounded and towed if it is "operated by a non-licensed or suspended driver." Tr. Vol. III, State's Trial Ex. 2, p. 2. He also noted the car was "not in a parking spot." Tr. Vol. II, p. 70. The record reflects that Sansbury parked the car near an apartment building, one and a half to two feet from the curb, in an area where traffic drove through the complex. Tr. Vol. III, State's Trial Ex. 1. The IMPD's policy authorizes the towing of a vehicle that is causing "a traffic or other hazard." Tr. Vol. III, State's Trial Ex. 2, p. 2. Based upon these two reasons, we conclude the State established, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, that the vehicle posed a threat of harm or was itself imperiled, and the decision to impound the car complied with established department regulations. See Ratliff v. State , 770 N.E.2d 807, 810 (Ind. 2002) ().
[17] Sansbury cites to Taylor v. State , 842 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 2006), in support of his claim that the decision to impound was improper, but that case is factually distinguishable. In that case, the Court concluded the car posed no hazard to public safety because it was parked "on the correct side of the parking lot," in "a permissible parking area." Id. at 332. In Sansbury's case, the car was not parked in a parking area, but rather was stopped in a road where traffic drove through the complex.
[18] Sansbury also cites to Fair , 627 N.E.2d 427, but that case is distinguishable as to the issue of impoundment. In that case, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the police erred in impounding the defendant's car because it was "neatly parked" in an apartment complex and "did not impede traffic." Id. at 433–34. By contrast, Sansbury's car was parked one and a half to two feet from the curb, in the flow of traffic.
[19] As further support for his challenge to the impoundment of his car, Sansbury points to testimony that: (1) the owner of the apartment complex permitted residents to park along the curb when the...
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