Sansing v. Ryan, CV-11-1035-PHX-SRB
Decision Date | 07 February 2013 |
Docket Number | No. CV-11-1035-PHX-SRB,CV-11-1035-PHX-SRB |
Parties | John Edward Sansing, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
DEATH PENALTY CASE
Petitioner John Edward Sansing, a state prisoner under sentence of death, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that he is imprisoned and sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 35.)1 The petition raises 29 claims. Pursuant to the Court's general procedures governing resolution of capital habeas proceedings, the parties have briefed both the procedural status and merits of Petitioner's claims. (Docs. 37, 51.) Petitioner has also filed a Motion for Evidentiary Development regarding four of his claims. (Doc. 53.) As set forth below, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to either evidentiary development or federal habeas relief.
In September 1998, Petitioner pled guilty to the first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and sexual assault of Trudy Calabrese. The Arizona Supreme Court summarized the facts as follows:
State v. Sansing, 200 Ariz. 347, 351-52, 26 P.3d 1118, 1122-23 (2001) (Sansing I).
In September 1999, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Ronald S. Reinstein held a sentencing hearing to determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed the crime in the expectation of pecuniary gain, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5),2 and that Petitioner committed the murder in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). The court further found that Petitioner had failed to prove any statutory mitigating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13-703(G), but that he had established five non-statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) impairment from the use of crack cocaine; (2) a difficult childhood; (3) acceptance of responsibility and remorse; (4) lack of education; and (5) family support. Weighing the sentencing factors, the court determined that the proven mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravation and sentenced Petitioner to death.
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court struck the pecuniary gain aggravating factor but nonetheless affirmed. Sansing I, 200 Ariz. at 355-56, 26 P.3d at 1126-27. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), holding thatArizona's aggravating factors are an element of the offense of capital murder and therefore must be found by a jury. The Court granted Petitioner's petition for certiorari, vacated the Arizona Supreme Court's judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Ring. Sansing v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 954 (2002) (mem.). On remand, the state court determined that the lack of jury findings as to aggravation constituted harmless error in Petitioner's case. State v. Sansing, 206 Ariz. 232, 77 P.3d 30 (2003) (Sansing II). The Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari. Sansing v. Arizona, 542 U.S. 939 (2004).
Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief in state court, raising six claims for relief. In July 2008, the trial court dismissed five of the claims as meritless or procedurally precluded. It held a four-day evidentiary hearing on the remaining claim, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and ultimately denied relief in July 2010. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied a petition for review in May 2011, and Petitioner thereafter initiated these habeas corpus proceedings.3
Because it was filed after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). The following provisions of the AEDPA will guide the Court's consideration of Petitioner's claims.
Under the AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present" his claims to the state's highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999).
A claim is "fairly presented" if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971). Unless the petitioner clearly alerts the state court that he is alleging a specific federal constitutional violation, he has not fairly presented the claim. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing specific provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), or by citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings. Rule 32 of the Arizona...
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