Santa Barbara Patients' Collective Health Coop., Coop. v. City of Santa Barbara

Citation911 F.Supp.2d 884
Decision Date29 November 2012
Docket NumberCase No. CV 10–06534 DDP (RCx).
CourtUnited States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
PartiesSANTA BARBARA PATIENTS' COLLECTIVE HEALTH COOPERATIVE, a California cooperative corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA, a California municipal corporation, Defendant.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Dana J. Rosenberg, Law Office of Dana J. Rosenberg, Santa Barbara, CA, for Plaintiff.

Tom R. Shapiro, Santa Barbara City Attorney, Santa Barbara, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge.

Presently before the court is Defendant City of Santa Barbara's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Mootness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendant contends that because Plaintiff Santa Barbara Patients' Collective Health Cooperative (SBPCHC) has closed its marijuana dispensary in the face of an enforcement action by the United States Attorney's Office, Plaintiff's action is moot.

After reviewing the parties' papers and hearing oral argument, the court grants the Motion in part and denies the Motion in part and adopts the following order.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Santa Barbara Patients' Collective Health Cooperative (SBPCHC) is a cooperative corporation that was operating a medical marijuana collective and dispensary in the city of Santa Barbara. Plaintiff obtained a Medical Marijuana Dispensary Permit (“Permit”) in 2008, shortly after the City of Santa Barbara (City) enacted Ordinance 5449, its first medical marijuana ordinance (“Original Ordinance”), codified in Chapter 28.80 of the Santa Barbara Municipal Code. ( See Compl. Exh. A.) On June 29, 2010, the Original Ordinance was revised by the enactment of Ordinance 5226 (“Revised Ordinance”). ( See Compl. Exh. B.) The Revised Ordinance changed the permissible locations for the operation of marijuana dispensaries within the City and required existing dispensaries to comply within 180 days.

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in response to the Revised Ordinance of June 29, 2010. In November 2010, this court issued a Preliminary Injunction in favor of Plaintiff, prohibiting enforcement against Plaintiff. On May 17, 2011, in response to the Preliminary Injunction, 1 the City adopted “An Ordinance of the Council for the City of Santa Barbara Amending the Municipal Code to Establish Revised Regulations for Those Storefront Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Permitted Under City Ordinance No. 5449 as Adopted on March 25, 2008 (“the Amendment). (Compl. Exh. C.) The Amendment allowed existing dispensaries in non-conforming locations to operate in those locations for four years, so long as “the day to day operation of the non-conforming dispensary is consistent with dispensary operational requirements” of the Revised Ordinance and so long as operations did not cease for more than 30 days. ( Id.)

On August 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandate (“FAC”), alleging eight causes of actions and seeking compensatory and punitive damages and a writ of mandate. Plaintiff alleged violations of its rights (fundamental vested rights, right to due process, right to equal protection, and right to freedom of association) and of the prohibitions against taking without just compensation and ex post facto laws.

In the meantime, the City had appealed this court's Preliminary Injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Preliminary Injunction on June 13, 2012, and remanded it to this court for reconsideration based on the fact that during the pendency of the appeal, the City had passed the Amended Ordinance, which extended the amortization period from 180 days to four years.2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000). Although a complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 1949 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 1950. Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is a “context-specific” task, “requiring the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

III. DISCUSSIONA. Timeliness of 12(b)(1) Motion

Plaintiff's argument that Defendant's Motion is untimely is without merit. [M]ootness is a jurisdictional defect .... [which] means that it can be raised at any time either by the parties or by the court acting sua sponte. Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds. It was appropriate for Defendant to move to dismiss on mootness grounds at this stage in the proceedings.

B. Mootness

[A] federal court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of California v. U.S., 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 449, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, [a]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir.2002). An action becomes moot if “the requisite personal interest captured by the standing doctrine ceases to exist at any point during the litigation.” Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 425 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, if it is “impossiblefor the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S., 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 449, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant argues that this action is moot because Plaintiff's business was closed down by federal law, not by the City, and is prohibited from operating by federal law, not by the Ordinance, and thus the court cannot “grant any effectual relief” to Plaintiff. (Mot. at 7.) Defendant acknowledges that “a live claim for damages may prevent dismissal for mootness,” but asserts that none of Plaintiff's actual damages are due to the Ordinance. (Mot. at 7.) Finally, Defendant argues that the possibility of Plaintiff reopening its business is too “remote and speculative” to create a “tangible prejudice to the existing interests” of Plaintiff. (Mot. at 4.)

1. Actual Damages

Under its first six causes of action, Plaintiff requests relief in the form of general, special, compensatory, and punitive damages, along with costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The First Amended Complaint does not specify the amount of damages requested. In its Opposition to the Motion, Plaintiff asserts that it was injured by Defendant, but the only actual damages Plaintiff points to are $160,000 in attorney's fees to obtain the preliminary injunction and “tens of thousands more” to defend against Defendant's appeal. (Opp. at 5.)

Although the prevailing party in a § 1983 action can recover reasonable attorney's fees, such fees are not separately cognizable as damages. [A]ttorney's fees [cannot] fairly be characterized as an element of ‘relief’ indistinguishable from other elements. Unlike other judicial relief, the attorney's fees allowed under § 1988 are not compensation for the injury giving rise to an action. Their award is uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at trial.” White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 452, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982). See also Metcalf v. Borba, 681 F.2d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir.1982).

Thus the court finds that Plaintiff has not pled actual damages sufficient to defeat mootness.

2. Nominal Damages

Because Plaintiff is bringing a § 1983 suit, Plaintiff may be entitled to nominal damages for the violation of its constitutional rights even if it cannot show actual damages. See Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir.2002). See also United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir.1999) (“Nominal damages are available where the violation of a legal or constitutional right produces no ‘actual damages.’), and Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 922 (9th Cir.1986) (“Even assuming that [Plaintiff] did not suffer actual damages as a result of the unlawful extradition, his complaint stated valid section 1983 claims for nominal damages.”) “By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only...

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